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Abstract
For thousands of years, the Paso del Norte region which today includes Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua, El Paso, Texas, and Sunland Park, New Mexico, has been a strategic location by
virtue of its geographic positioning at the lowest and easiest passage across the continental
divide. During the 19th and 20th centuries as railroad networks connected the region to the far
reaches of the U.S. and the interior of Mexico, it became a nexus for natural resource and labor
extraction. Mining and smelting industries were later joined by agriculture and manufacturing to
benefit from the transportation network and the abundance of labor. The region was transformed
between 1940 and 2000 in terms of industrialization, physical footprint, and population
expansion as a result of several bilateral treaties and agreements. The Paso del Norte region
became a global manufacturing hub overwhelmed by mass migration, depressed wages, and a
woefully insufficient public infrastructure that created unsafe and unhealthy living conditions for
all of its residents. One of the outcomes of this unfettered growth was the deterioration of the air
quality within the shared air basin. By the mid 1990s, the sister cities of El Paso and Ciudad
Juárez had the worst air pollution along the border and each city ranked among the most polluted
in its respective country.
This dissertation explores a six decade period of bilateral economic and labor agreements
that facilitated the devastating degradation of air quality in the Paso del Norte air basin. It
examines the factors that drove the dramatic growth in the region and the pressures that growth
placed on limited public infrastructure. Finally, this dissertation explores how a group of
fronterizos created a binational, multi-sectoral stakeholder organization named the Paso del
Norte Air Quality Task Force, which became a catalyst for innovative air pollution abatement
strategies and cross-border environmental protection in their community.
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Introduction

The US/Mexico border region is a geographically diverse area that spans two countries,
four U.S. states, six Mexican states, twenty-six federally recognized US tribal reservations,
thirty-five Mexican municipalities, and twenty-five U.S. counties. The border region also
encompasses natural systems including three deserts, numerous rivers, the drainage basins of the
Colorado River and the Rio Grande, and the binational air basins of a series of densely populated
sister cities – all in a 2000-mile stretch between the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.
Situated in the middle of the 2000-mile border, the Paso del Norte region includes the
jurisdictions of two federal governments, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Reservation, three states
(Chihuahua, Texas and New Mexico), three primary municipalities (Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua,
El Paso, Texas, and Sunland Park, New Mexico), and a number of incorporated and
unincorporated communities. It is characterized by a river valley formed by the Rio Grande
(named the Rio Bravo in Mexico) which flows through the pass between mountain ranges. The
Franklin Mountains are a north-south oriented mountain chain that nearly bisects El Paso. The
Sierra de Juárez lines Ciudad Juárez along the southwest, while Mount Cristo Rey and the Rio
Grande Rift surround Sunland Park. The Hueco Mountains flank the region to the east. In some
places, the mountains that surround the Paso del Norte metropolitan area rise up over 3000 feet
from the surrounding desert and the river valley, forming what looks like a bowl and is
commonly referred to as an air basin.
For thousands of years, the Paso del Norte region has been a strategic location by virtue
of its geographic positioning at the lowest and easiest passage across the continental divide – the
mountainous, hydrological divide that bisects the Americas. During the 19th and 20th centuries as
railroad networks connected the region to the far reaches of the U.S. and the interior of Mexico,
1

it became a nexus for natural resource and labor extraction. Industries of mining and smelting
were later joined by agriculture and manufacturing industries that would similarly benefit from
the transportation network and the abundance of labor. The region was transformed between
1940 and 2000 in terms of industrialization, physical footprint, and population expansion as a
result of several bilateral treaties and agreements. The Paso del Norte region became a global
manufacturing hub overwhelmed by mass migration, depressed wages, and a woefully
insufficient public infrastructure that created unsafe and unhealthy living conditions for all of its
residents. One of the outcomes of this unfettered growth was the deterioration of the air quality
within the shared air basin. By the mid 1990s, the sister cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez had
the worst air pollution along the border and each city ranked among the most polluted in its
respective country.1
This dissertation explores a six decade period of bilateral economic and labor agreements
that facilitated the devastating degradation of air quality in the Paso del Norte air basin. While
there are without question other significant areas of environmental pollution related to the
unsustainable industrialization and urbanization in the region, including water and soil
contamination, this study focuses on air pollution. It examines the factors that drove the dramatic
growth in the region and the pressures that growth placed on limited public infrastructure.
Finally, this dissertation explores how a group of fronterizos created a binational, multi-sectoral
stakeholder organization named the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force (PDNAQTF), which
became a catalyst for innovative air pollution abatement strategies and cross-border
environmental protection in their community.

1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Summary: Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area, First
Stage (1992-1994),” 1992. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografía, “Censo General de la Población,” 19402000, http://www.inegi.org.mx/default.aspx (Accessed 11/5/17).
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HISTORIOGRAPHY
My dissertation explores the transboundary environmental resource management of the
U.S.-Mexico border region, with a specific focus on the air quality management of the Paso del
Norte region. While the field of border environmental history is relatively young and the
historiography is limited, I was able to draw on the historiography of boundary controls and
transboundary resource management. The historiography that informs my research in the area of
borderlands and fronterizo identity is extensive. The works I include in this historiography are
not exhaustive but they are representative of the scholarship in these fields.
The works of Norris Hundley, Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Rachel St. John, and C.J Alvarez
address the challenges of institutionalizing boundaries, managing the shared resources that exist
at those boundaries, and negotiating the competing economic/political interests that clashed with
the constructs of boundaries. Hundley’s work examines the disputes, negotiations, and treaties
between the United States and Mexico with respect to the waters of the Rio Grande/Bravo, the
Colorado, and the Tijuana rivers. Spanning almost a century of disputes between the two
countries, Hundley presents a detailed account of the national and international politics involved
in the eventual signing of the 1906 and 1944 treaties that govern surface water apportionment.
Hundley argues that water apportionment was widely ignored by both countries until populations
grew, at which point weak international law conventions gave way to bitter conflicts that these
treaties sought to ameliorate.2
St. John’s work places the border at the center of the geographic struggle for
demarcation, the development of regional economies, and as the subject of binational
cooperation and conflict between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1930s. St. John documents

2 Norris Hundley, Dividing the Waters: Century of Controversy Between the United States and Mexico (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966).
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the actual surveying and establishment of the border that divided the U.S. and Mexico after 1848,
then again following the Gadsden Purchase in 1853. She also illustrates the enormous gap in
understanding of the border region between the Washington D.C./Mexico City negotiators and
the border residents who knew the region best.3 C. J. Alvarez examines the physical
infrastructure built along the border to enable control of people and natural resources. The built
environment of enforcement-oriented apparatuses, Alvarez argues, is antithetical to the centuries
of migration in the region and the dynamic flows of its natural resources.4 Lytle Hernandez,
meanwhile, explores the ways in which U.S. and Mexico border policy has shifted in light of the
economic imperatives of both countries – at times in contravention of standing legal frameworks
governing border controls and the infrastructure designed to enable those controls. Her work
speaks to the fact that the built environment of border controls was utilized based on political and
economic expediency.5
The works of Oscar J. Martinez, Mario T. Garcia, Omar Valerio-Jimenez, Laura Gomez,
and John McKiernan González explore political, economic, geographic, and environmental
factors that have contributed to the formation of the fronterizo identity. Martinez’ work
documents the historical development of the frontier region through an examination of Ciudad
Juárez. Martinez intended for his work to challenge notions that Ciudad Juárez (and border
communities generally) were not representative of Mexico or the Mexican experience. He
questions notions of the border as a place bereft of culture and the tendency to characterize the

3 Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border (Princeton,
NJ and London, England: Princeton University Press, 2011).
4 C. J. Alvarez, Border Land, Border Water: A History of Construction On The US-Mexico Divide (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2019).
5 Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2010).
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border region as a mere economic appendage of the U.S.6 Garcia in turn examines the role of
Mexican immigrants in the development of El Paso and the U.S. economy generally. Despite the
importance of their contributions, Garcia exposes the ways in which this community was
segregated, manipulated and oppressed by the elite power structure in El Paso throughout the late
19th and early 20th century.7
Valerio-Jimenez looks at the political and social transformations that took place among
the residents and institutions in the lower Rio Grande region under Spanish, Mexican, and
American governance between 1749 and 1900. He contends that the influx of nation-building
influences, conflicts, and adaptations resulted in the development of a unique and dynamic ethnic
and national identity.8 McKiernan González examines the way in which the U.S. government
used medicine to construct notions of race and nationality along the US/Mexico border between
1848 and 1942.9 Gomez explores the designation of Mexican American as a race versus an
ethnicity through an examination the political, civil, and social standing of Mexican Americans
in the U.S. Southwest from 1846 through the turn of the century.10
Environmental degradation along the U.S./Mexico border began to attract national
attention during the 1970s and 1980s due to the rise of the maquiladora industry. Awareness
and concern regarding border environmental conditions grew to even greater prominence during
the negotiations leading up to the passage and implementation of the North American Free Trade

6 Oscar J. Martinez, Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez since 1848 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).
7 Mario T. Garcia, Desert Immigrants (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
8 Omar Valerio-Jiménez, River of Hope: Forging Identity and Nation in the Rio Grande Borderlands (Durham NC
and London, England: Duke University Press, 2013).
9 John McKiernan-González, Fevered Measures: Public Health and Race at the Texas-Mexico Borderlands, 18481942 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
10 Laura Gomez, Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race (New York: New York University
Press, 2007).
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Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s.11 Although the historiography of border environmental
history is quite limited, the works of John Wirth, William deBuys, Samuel Truett, Evan Ward,
and Monica Perales explore issues of environmental degradation, industrialization and natural
resource management along the U.S./Mexico border. Wirth’s work examines smelter-related
pollution at both the northern and southern borders of the United States from the late 1890s
through the early 1990s. It looks at the evolution of business practices and public policy related
to smelter-produced transboundary air pollution through two cases that span the North American
continent. According to Wirth, the pollution issues related to these smelters became the impetus
for transboundary negotiation and cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico during the 1980s.12
DeBuys’s work looks at the accidental formation of the Salton Sea in the Southern
California Imperial Valley. He traces the evolution of the region and the binational
consequences of the incessant efforts to control nature for the benefit of agriculture and
development.13 Similarly, Ward’s environmental history of the Colorado River delta illustrates
the ecological collapse that resulted from the development of an “agricultural oasis” in deserts of
Arizona, California, Sonora and Baja California during the mid-20th century. Ward artfully
presents the binational tensions that unfolded as a result of this environmental debacle. He also
sheds light on the complex political, economic and diplomatic battles that ensued within the U.S.
as the federal government worked through remediation options.14

11 Jesus Cañas and Roberto Coronado, “Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present, and Future,” El Paso Business
Frontier, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas El Paso Branch, no. 2 (2002):1-4.
12 John D. Wirth, Smelter Smoke in North America: The Politics of Transborder Pollution (Kansas: University
Press of Kansas, 2000).
13 William deBuys, Salt Dreams: Land and Water in Low-Down California (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1999).
14 Evan R. Ward, Border Oasis: Water and the Political Ecology of the Colorado River Delta, 1940-1975 (Tuscon:
University of Arizona Press, 2003).
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Truett weaves together the stories of native and immigrant inhabitants of the
Arizona/Sonora copper-producing region in order to restore forgotten histories of survival and
failure. He explores the efforts by entrepreneurs, investors, and area residents to dominate and
profit from the region’s natural resources at the turn of the twentieth century. Truett credits the
subaltern power of the fugitive landscapes with disrupting and derailing these economic schemes
through social unrest, revolutions, and other unanticipated barriers.15 Perales documents the
development, evacuation and eventual demolition of Smeltertown – a Mexican American
community that formed at the base of the highly polluting American Smelting and Refining
Company (ASARCO), in El Paso, from the late nineteenth century through the end of the
twentieth century. Perales chronicles the human health fallout caused by ASARCO’s operations
and social consequences that followed the razing of Smeltertown.16
This dissertation contributes to the border environmental historiography by exploring the
causal relationships between the industrialization of the U.S.-Mexico border and the
environmental degradation that ensued. Within this historiography, there has been much greater
attention given to transboundary water resources. This dissertation expands the limited
historiography of transboundary air resources, with a focus on the largest binational metropolitan
community along the border and its shared air basin. It documents the physical characteristics of
the Paso del Norte river valley and the ways in which these characteristics combined with a
number of socioeconomic factors to create the conditions for the progressive deterioration of the
air quality in the region. It also examines the human health consequences resulting from rapid
industrialization and population growth between 1940 and 2000. Perhaps most distinctively, this

15 Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008).
16 Monica Perales, Smeltertown: Making and Remembering a Southwest Border Community (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
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work documents a case study of a cross-border coalition that navigated complicated
jurisdictional barriers in order to more effectively address the shared air quality management
challenges they faced. In doing so, it created a model that was subsequently codified in the La
Paz Agreement and became the blueprint for the engagement of fronterizos in border
environmental resource management. This study is significant because it chronicles a binational
environmental crisis that actually led to a fronterizo-led shift in shared resource management.
My dissertation also contributes more broadly to borderlands historiography. It analyzes
the evolution of treaties, binational agreements and federal institutions related to the governance
and management of the U.S./Mexico border region and its natural resources. This work
demonstrates the slow progression of these regulatory structures from dictatorial mandates given
from Washington D.C. and Mexico City, to more inclusive spaces where civil society is a
recognized stakeholder. Furthermore, this study argues that the impetus for cross-border multisectoral environmental activism in the Paso del Norte region is rooted in the historical formation
of the fronterizo identity.

FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
My dissertation utilizes a borderlands framework that focuses on two primary concepts.
The first concept posits that the borderlands are situated at the periphery of nation-states but
those who live in the borderlands do not consider themselves peripheral – rather they see
themselves as central to a unique economic, political, and social transboundary dynamic. The
second concept is that the legal institutions responsible for oversight and management of the U.S.
Mexico border as a jurisdictional boundary are woefully insufficient for the management of the
dynamic flow of people and transboundary natural resources.

8

The first concept was heavily influenced by Samuel Truett and Elliott Young’s anthology
Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History, Juan Mora Torres’s The
Making of the Mexican Border: The State, Capitalism, and Society in Nuevo León, 1848-1910,
and Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel’s essay “Toward a Comparative History of
Borderlands.” The Truett and Young anthology extends the constructs of borderlands history into
a transnational dialogue that bridges historical periods, national boundaries, and academic
disciplines. The editors argue that borderlands histories are important to mainstream U.S. and
Mexican histories because the “periphery” is critical to understanding the history of the nationstates.17
Mora Torres explores what he calls Mexico’s “frontier to border” phase, focusing on the
northeastern state of Nuevo Leon. This narrative examines the period between the creation of
the U.S./Mexico border in 1848 and the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Mora
Torres argues that during this period, Mexico’s northern border region emerged as a distinct
geographic area with unique social, political, cultural, and economic characteristics that altered
the center-periphery relationship.18
Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel differentiate between the terms boundaries and
borders to make a critical conceptual distinction in the study of borderlands. Baud and Van
Schendel contend that the term boundaries conveys the existence of a physical or cultural divide,
essentially the end of something. The term borders, meanwhile, is more often utilized to
emphasize a region surrounding a line of demarcation - a shared space on either side of that line

17 Truett, Samuel and Elliott Young, ed., Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
18 Juan Mora Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border: The State, Capitalism, and Society in Nuevo León, 18481910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001).
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with its own unique idiosyncrasies.19 These three works present the borderlands as something far
greater than just the edges of political jurisdictions. Instead, they posit a reversal of the centerperiphery relationship that situates borderland residents as catalysts for that dynamic. They
acknowledge the unique cultures and identities that are born within what Mora refers to as the
“contact zones” created by nation boundaries.
The second concept is informed by the work of social science scholars whose theoretical
models reflect the changing order of transnational relations, whereby the boundaries between
domestic and foreign policy have become blurred because of increasingly globalized economies
and complex trading blocks. This scholarship points to a departure from traditional geopolitical
frameworks such as Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Analysis, that position nation-states
as the central actors in the capitalist world economy.20 Instead, these scholars recognize the
prominence of non-state actors, international organizations, NGOs, and multi-state actors in the
international political economy. Jan Aart Scholte and A. Schnabel’s Civil Society and Global
Finance has helped me think about this global transformation in the context of the U.S. Mexico
borderlands.21 Margaret E. Keck and Kathyrn Sikkink’s Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics also provides a valuable framework for understanding a
changing world order within which recognition of human rights and environmental protection
has become inseparable from trade negotiations.22

19 Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” Journal of World
History 8, no. 2 (1997): 213.
20 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
21 Jan Aart Scholte, “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance.” in Civil Society and Global Finance,
eds. J.A. Scholte and A. Schnabel, (New York: Routledge, 2002) 11-32. Also useful is John Foster, “The
Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA: Sinews of Solidarity” in Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest
and the Neoliberal Order, ed. Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004)
209-229.
22 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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Peter M. Haas has published several influential works related to social learning and
collective community formation as it relates to the evolution of multilateral environmental
governance and policy coordination. He provides a valuable theoretical framework within which
to consider the air quality improvement efforts in the Paso del Norte region. Specifically, Haas
utilizes the concept of ecological and transnational epistemic communities to explain the
advancement of human knowledge and global policy. He describes an epistemic community as a
network of professionals with expertise and competence in a particular area or domain who can
provide policy-relevant knowledge within that area or domain.23 Collectively, these works have
helped me contextualize cross-border coalitions such as the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task
Force within a global schema in which multiple stakeholders apply pressure to the levers of
power and policy.
This dissertation is written from the perspective of the fronterizos from the Paso del
Norte region. It provides a counter narrative to the center-to-periphery view that has dominated
governance of the border region. It is informed by the documents gathered from PDNAQTF
members, JAC appointees, and government officials over many years. This research began in
1995 when I initiated my academic inquiries into the fledgling PDNAQTF for my senior honors
thesis. In 1997-98, my master’s professional report explored the transboundary policy strategies
that could help to address border environmental challenges in the Paso del Norte Air Basin. For
this study, I revisited the volumes of meeting minutes, project reports, intergovernmental letters
and memos, and oral interviews with the benefit of two additional decades of historical context. I
also gathered additional documents from the U.S. EPA Border Region office in El Paso, from the
El Paso Electric corporate archives, as well as online archives of several federal and state

23 Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International
Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 17-20.
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agencies in both countries to properly situate this study within the context of U.S.-Mexico
borderlands history.24

STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION
Chapter one, “Transformation of the Paso del Norte Region,” situates the region within
the larger history of migration and development of what is now the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.
For thousands of years, the Paso del Norte region has been a strategic location by virtue of its
geographic positioning. The fertile river valley served as a hospitable respite for travelers
and settlers who traversed the rugged high-desert region. The indigenous trade routes and
seminomadic settlements that first ushered commerce and travelers through the desert mountain
pass evolved in concert with the political and industrial developments of the last five centuries.
This was particularly true starting in the late 1800s when railroad networks primed the region for
the natural resource and labor extraction that would grow in the decades to follow. Throughout
the 20th century the agriculture and manufacturing industries grew exponentially. By the latter
half of the 20th century, the Paso del Norte region was a global manufacturing hub hobbled by
insufficient infrastructure and rampant poverty.
Invariably, economic growth and industrialization without proper public infrastructure
and pollution controls comes at a cost to environmental and human health. Chapter two,
“Environmental and Human Health Fallout in the Paso del Norte,” examines the deterioration of
air quality and the related human health issues that accompanied the region’s growth. It begins
with some historical context for air pollution regulation in the United States and Mexico in order

24 Laura Margarita Uribarri, “The Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force: A Case Study in Binational Cooperation”
(senior honors thesis, Stanford University, 1996). Laura Margarita Uribarri Acuña, “Toward a More Perfect Union:
Transboundary Pollution Abatement Strategies for the Paso del Norte Airbasin” (master’s professional report,
University of Texas at Austin, 1998).
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to understand how each country developed and amended regulatory frameworks during the
twentieth century. By extension, it looks at how these frameworks were implemented along the
border. It explores how air pollution was monitored and regulated in the Paso del Norte air basin,
given the different regulatory regimes in this binational, tristate region. It also delves into the
principal sources of air pollution in the region, specific pollutants that are major contributors to
the air quality problems, and the human health effects of those pollutants. Finally, this chapter
considers the development of the region and the accompanying environmental protections from
the perspective of environmental justice and fractured governance in order to better understand
how environmental regulatory regimes failed to protect the residents of this borderland.
In order to better comprehend the environmental challenges and mismanagement along
the border, chapter three, “Governing Structures of the U.S. Mexico Borderlands,” considers
series of binational agreements between the US and Mexico intended to strengthen the
sovereignty and power of the federal governments on either side of the nascent boundary. Some
of these agreements were designed to create mutual, albeit disparate, benefit in economic and
environmental spheres. This chapter explores the development and evolution of treaties and other
mechanisms designed to manage shared natural resources and protect the environmental health
of the U.S.-Mexico border region. For comparative purposes, it examines a relevant treaty
related to the U.S.-Canadian border as well. It also analyzes the ways in which formal bilateral
frameworks became increasingly collaborative and responsive to frontera communities that
demanded solutions to address the challenges of managing and protecting transboundary natural
resources. While this is not an exhaustive analysis of environmental agreements between the
U.S. and its neighbors, it pays particular attention to those that have proven to be most
consequential to the borderlands in the second half of the twentieth century.
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Chapter four, “Fronterizo Advocacy in the Paso del Norte Air Basin Sets the Stage for
the Transformation of Border Environmental Management,” introduces the Paso del Norte Air
Quality Task Force (PDNAQTF). This fronterizo-led consortium of business leaders, NGOs,
physicians, researchers, and government officials operationalized cross-border cooperation and
transboundary natural resource protection in response to a failed environmental governance
structure that resulted in the worst air quality along the U.S.-Mexico border during the late 1980s
and early 1990s. This chapter looks at the origins and formation of the PDNAQTF, as well as
the impact of the projects it developed. The most significant of these projects was the adoption of
Appendix 1 to Annex V of the La Paz Agreement, which created the Joint Advisory Committee
on Air Quality Improvement for the El Paso – Ciudad Juárez – Doña County Air Quality
Management Basin (JAC). This chapter explores the early work of the JAC and concludes that
its structure became the blueprint for community engagement in the border environmental
management frameworks that had historically excluded frontera communities.
Chapter five, “Ciudad Juárez Brick Kilns: A Case Study in Innovative Cross-Border
Collaborations, Failed Good Intentions, and Appropriate Technologies,” explores one
particularly noteworthy pollution abatement initiative. In the late 20th century, Ciudad Juárez’s
primary sources of pollution were motor vehicles, unpaved roads, and open burning. All of these
emissions sources grew along with this sprawling city as industrialization took hold during the
1970s and 1980s. One informal sector that expanded in order to keep up with demand for new
housing construction was the brickmaking business. Ladrilleros, as brick makers are called in
Spanish, provided their community a valuable commodity, but their production methods
involved open burning of highly polluting fuels that produced tons of toxic emissions. This
chapter explores the innovative fronterizo-led binational efforts to work with the ladrilleros to
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develop more efficient production technologies, reduce emissions, and improve their well-being.
It examines the way in which the ladrilleros themselves helped reframe the challenges in order
to create appropriate technologies that could be adopted in their communities and replicated in
microenterprises worldwide. Finally, it illustrates the opportunity for significant and costeffective pollution reduction through cross-border emissions reductions credits.
Finally, chapter six “Frontera Collaborators and Stakeholders” highlights a few of the
individuals who provided leadership, continuity and direction to the PDNAQTF and eventually
the JAC. For years, the projects and initiatives of the PDNAQTF were carried out by individuals
who volunteered their time or stretched their official job descriptions in order to facilitate the
innovative cross-border collaborations explored in this dissertation. This chapter gives us some
insight into the personal and professional backgrounds of those individuals. Through a series of
oral interviews, we learn about the motivations, frustrations, and aspirations that guided their
engagement. These perspectives help inform our understanding of the diverse group of
fronterizos who helped redefine and reframe transboundary environmental governance.
Together, these chapters demonstrate that decades of flawed and short-sighted policies
originating in Washington D.C. and Mexico City to create strategic trading blocks and stimulate
the economies of the hemisphere came at an extraordinary expense to the frontera. Impoverished
communities along the border were left desperate for the infrastructure to meet their most basic
necessities and burdened with an environmental and human health crisis. In response to this
crisis, fronterizos in the Paso del Norte region and their allies formed an advocacy coalition that
sought accountable governance and solutions to their air quality. This coalition, rooted in their
fronterizo-identity, made remarkable progress in reframing the engagement of fronteracommunities in border environmental management and creating the precedent for innovative
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cross-border pollution abatement projects. Despite these notable accomplishments, I conclude
that so long as federal investment in environmental infrastructure and regulatory enforcement
continues to be misaligned with economic imperatives, border communities will live with the
inordinate and unjust burden of trade-related pollution.
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Chapter One: Transformation of the Paso del Norte Region
The US/Mexico border region is a geographically diverse area that spans two countries,
four U.S. states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California), six Mexican states (Tamaulipas,
Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, Baja California), twenty-six federally recognized US
tribal reservations, thirty-five Mexican municipalities, and twenty-five U.S. counties. The border
region also encompasses natural systems including three deserts, numerous rivers, the drainage
basins of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande, and the binational air basins of a series of
densely populated sister cities – all in a 2000-mile stretch between the Pacific Ocean and the
Gulf of Mexico. Despite the many political jurisdictions at play in this region, the people who
have lived along both sides of the US/Mexico border have formed part of a series of intricately
intertwined cross border communities since 1848. It was within this socioeconomic and
geographic context that extraneous political and economic forces brought unprecedented
population growth and industrial expansion to the border region between 1940 and 2000. By the
end of the 20th century, the US/Mexico border was the most crossed border in the world and the
Paso del Norte region was the largest contiguous binational metropolitan area along the
US/Mexico border. 25
For thousands of years, the Paso del Norte region has been a strategic location by virtue
of its geographic positioning at the lowest and easiest passage across the continental divide –
the mountainous, hydrological divide that bisects the Americas. The fertile river valley
located at the base of two mountain ranges, surrounded by barren plateaus, served as a

25 US Environmental Protection Agency, “Summary: Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area, First
Stage (1992-1994),” 1992, 6-7. Penelope J. E. Quintana, Paul Ganster, Paula E. Stigler Granados, Gabriela MuñozMelendez, Margarito Quintero-Núñez, and Jose Guillermo Rodriguez-Ventura, “Risky Borders: Traffic Pollution
and Health Effects at US–Mexican Ports of Entry,” Journal of Borderland Studies 30, no. 3 (August 2015): 288.
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hospitable respite for those who traversed the rugged high-desert region. Twelve
thousand years ago, indigenous peoples arrived at this desert pass, attracted by an abundance of
edible plants and animals and the natural ford in the Rio Grande. Over the centuries, travelers
and settlers have left archeological footprints. In the 1530s, when Spanish explorers first came
upon the area, they encountered the seminomadic Suma and Manso Indians, who utilized this
pass as a trade route to link the north and the south. In 1581, a Spanish missionary
expedition followed the indigenous pathways northward along the Rio Grande and came
upon the site they named El Paso del Norte (the Pass of the North). Attracted by the natural
ford in the river and the edible flora and fauna, El Paso del Norte became a rest stop for
subsequent expeditions. 26
In 1598, the Spanish explorer Don Juan de Onate took formal possession of this area
drained by the Rio Grande. El Paso del Norte w a s c l a i m e d by Spain for more than
two centuries.27 Formal settlements in El Paso del Norte began with the founding of the
mission of Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe in 1659, which is still standing in downtown
Ciudad Juárez. In 1680, there was a massive Pueblo revolt against Spanish rule in New
Mexico. This revolt caused Spanish settlers and several hundred Tigua Indians to flee
south to the Pass, where they found safety. These refugees formally established El Paso del
Norte (where Ciudad Juárez is currently located), San Lorenzo, Senecu, Ysleta, and
Socorro, as a chain of communities along the Rio Grande. In 1789, s e t t l e rs b ui l t a
presidio further downstream in San Elizario to protect against raiding Apaches. This area

26 Oscar J. Martinez, Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez since 1848 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), 3.
Oscar J. Martinez, Ciudad Juárez: Saga Of A Legendary Border City (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press,
2018), 10.
27 W.H. Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History (El Paso:Texas Western Press, 1990), xvii.
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was a trade center on the historic Camino Real and a flourishing agricultural site where
vineyards were said to produce top quality brandy and wine.28
By the mid-1820s, under Mexican rule, El Paso del Norte engaged in trade with the
U.S. via the Santa Fe-Chihuahuan trail. Trade along this trail grew until this area and the rest
of the Southwest became a target of American Manifest Destiny. In 1846, when clashes
broke out between Anglos and Mexicans, troops swept through El Paso del Norte to
battle further south in Chihuahua. In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe de Hidalgo was
signed, dividing El Paso del Norte with an international boundary that was fixed at the
Rio Grande. What we know today as Ciudad Juárez was called Paso del Norte
and El Paso was called Franklin. During that year, a military post that would later be
named Fort Bliss was established to house four Companies of the Eighth Infantry.29
In the mid-nineteenth century, the rush of gold prospectors traveling to California
introduced an east-west component of traffic to El Paso (Franklin became known as El Paso in
the 1850s). By 1857, regular stagecoach travel traversed the region on its way to San Diego,
formalizing the southern land route connecting the east and west. Between 1881 and 1884,
several rail lines, including the Southern Pacific Railroad, the Atchison-Topeka-Santa Fe,
the Texas-Pacific, the Galveston- Harrisburg-Topeka had reached El Paso while a line
from Mexico City had reached Paso del Norte (renamed Ciudad Juárez in 1888). This
development as a rail hub made El Paso an important point w i t h i n a g r o w i n g
transportation network that connected the continent’s economies. 30 During the four

28 Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History, 17-18.
29 Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History, xviii. Martinez, Border Boom Town, 10, 13.
30 Texas Centers for Economic and Enterprise Development, Paso del Norte Regional Economy: Socioeconomic
Profile (University of Texas El Paso, 1993), 1-2., Martinez, Border Boom Town, 22.
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decades that followed the a r r i v a l of the railroad, the small frontier town of El Paso with
fewer than 1,000 residents became a modern western city with 80,000 inhabitants.31
Paso del Norte did not fare as well during this period. Although the town was
bolstered by the implementation of a free trade zone in 1885 that enabled significant
economic growth and commerce, this prosperity was short lived. In 1891, the Mexican
government rescinded the free trade zone, thereby crippling Mexican border economies due to
the tariffs on imports from the U.S. and the enormous distance between border cities and
Mexico’s production center. Paso del Norte also benefitted less from the arrival of the railroad
because it did not have an east-west rail connection, therefore trade to and from the coasts had
to go through El Paso and was subject to tariffs. While El Paso was experiencing a population
boom, the population of Paso del Norte/Ciudad Juárez had dwindled from between 20,000 in
1885 to just over 11,000 in 1910.32
With a rail network that connected the farthest south of the east-west routes through
the Rockies with one that provided a gateway to Mexico’s natural resources, the Paso del
Norte region was poised to figure prominently in mineral extraction plans of American
financiers and industrialists. In 1887, a business partnership built a smelter known locally as
El Paso Smelter Works, establishing El Paso’s first major industry on the north bank of
the Rio Grande – near where Onate had crossed the river three hundred years earlier.
In 1899, this smelter was incorporated into the transnational smelting operation of
American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO). The ample transportation
facilities and the strategic location near Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and several northern

31 Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History, 169.
32 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 26-27, 33.
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Mexico mining operations meant that this would become the most important custom
smelter in the Southwest. El Paso soon became the site of miners’ conventions and the
home of a school for training miners.33
Growth in population and the agricultural industry along the border strained demands
for surface water amidst a water shortage at the turn of the century. In 1906, the U.S. and
Mexico signed the Water Allocation Treaty that divided the waters of the Upper Rio Grande.
The Treaty called for the U.S. government to build Elephant Butte Dam on the Rio Grande,
125 miles upstream from El Paso. Construction of the dam meant that the unpredictable
river flow, which was often responsible for flooding and property damage, would be
controlled. Furthermore, millions of dollars would be invested in constructing irrigation
ditches and diversion dams, thereby expanding the region's fertile farmland.34
By 1912, Elephant Butte was operational and reduced variability in annual flow from
the river by approximately seventy percent, while total annual flow from the river was thirty
percent shorter (as measured 1915-1927). This meant that the river produced a steady flow
throughout the year with a measured increase during the growing season. Water allocation, as
designated in the Water Allocation Treaty, provided for agricultural lands in the Mesilla valley
of New Mexico as well as for farmers in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez.35
Convinced of the opportunity the dam represented for El Paso, investors, speculators,
and settlers “arrived in droves.” The anticipated prosperity certainly materialized for the
affluent but bypassed the largely Mexican American working class. As a result of Elephant

33 Monica Perales, Smeltertown: Making and Remembering a Southwest Border Community (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 33, 34.
34 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 33; Norris Hundley Jr., Dividing the Waters – A Century of Controversy Between
the United States and Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 21.
35 Jerry E. Mueller, Restless River: International Law and the Behavior of the Rio Grande (El Paso: Texas Western
Press, 1975), 77-79. Reduction in total annual flow attributed to irrigation and evaporation.
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Butte Dam, the region's economic base expanded from one dominated by railroads,
mining, ranching, and trade, to include oil refining, natural gas, lumber, construction
materials, metal working, textiles, manufacturing, real estate, banking, and tourism.
Agriculture was also revolutionized, as large growers cultivating alfalfa and cotton with
modern farm machinery began replacing the small farms and the vineyard culture.36
The indigenous trade routes and seminomadic settlements that first ushered commerce
and travelers through the desert mountain pass evolved in concert with the political and
industrial developments of the last five centuries, and this was particularly true starting in the
late 1800s. As railroad networks connected the region to the US coasts and to the interior of
Mexico, it became a nexus for natural resource and labor extraction that would grow in the
decades to follow. Industries of mineral extraction and smelting were later joined by
manufacturing industries that would similarly benefit from the transportation network and the
abundance of labor.
Describing the development of the border region as a “contact zone,” Juan Mora-Torres
argues this was the result of migration, the external imposition of boundaries, and distant
governance without accountability. This confluence of factors created an environment in which
border residents – fronterizos – were forced to protect themselves, create their own economies,
and develop their own social structures, irrespective of the nation states that claimed this
contact zone. Mora-Torres describes a fronterizo identity that borderlanders developed over
decades of de facto self-rule. The concept of a fronterizo identity certainly seems appropriate

36 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 34. Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History, 199-201.

22

as one considers the development of the Paso del Norte region and the ways in which its
residents adapted to internal and external forces.37
GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE OF THE PASO DEL NORTE REGION
In order to more fully comprehend the environmental fall-out of rapid industrialization
and population growth in the Paso del Norte region, it is important to understand the geographic
characteristics which combined with industrial and socio-economic factors to create particularly
detrimental air quality conditions. The region is located in the Chihuahuan Desert of the Basin
and Range geomorphic province. There are strong topographical variations in the metropolitan
area. The river valley is formed by the Rio Grande (named the Rio Bravo in Mexico) river which
flows through the pass between mountain ranges. The Franklin Mountains are a north-south
oriented mountain chain that nearly bisects the City of El Paso. The Sierra de Juárez lines Ciudad
Juárez along the southwest, while Mount Cristo Rey and the Rio Grande Rift surround the
metropolitan area that is located in southern New Mexico. The Hueco Mountains flank the
region to the east. Surface elevations in this area range from 3750 feet above sea level along the
river to 7192 feet at the top of North Franklin Mountain. The mountains that surround the Paso
del Norte metropolitan area rise up over 3000 feet from the surrounding desert and the river
valley in some places, forming what looks like a bowl or what is commonly referred to as an air
basin.38

37 Juan Mora-Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border: The State, Capitalism, and Society in Nuevo León, 18481910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001.)
38 James A. Reynolds, Val J. MacBlain, “The Franklin Mountains of the El Paso, Texas Region And An Associated
Locally Produced Terrain-Forced Flow,” https://www.weather.gov/epz/research_papers_jarvmfranksnow#,
(accessed October 10, 2019.)
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Figure 1. Aerial View of Paso del Norte Region
From an aerial perspective, it is not possible to distinguish the numerous national, state, and local
political jurisdictions contained within the air basin. Naturally, the air moves through and within
this binational air basin without regard to regulatory structures or jurisdictional limitations. The
image above illustrates the tristate binational region with its mountain ranges denoted in yellow
text. Figure 2 illustrates the rise in elevation from the Rio Grande valley in Sunland Park, New
Mexico to the Franklin Mountains in El Paso in the background.39

39 James A. Reynolds and Val J. MacBlain, “The Franklin Mountains of the El Paso, Texas Region And An
Associated Locally Produced Terrain-Forced Flow,”
https://www.weather.gov/epz/research_papers_jarvmfranksnow#, (accessed October 10, 2019).; Peter M. Emerson,
Carlos Angulo, Christine L. Shaver, and Carlos A. Rincón,"Managing Air Quality in the Paso del Norte Region," in
Cooperation and Conflict: Environmental Management on North America's Borders, ed. John Wirth (College
Station, TX 1997.) Google Earth satellite image of Paso del Norte Region,
https://www.google.com/maps/@31.8051377,-106.4799678,118484m/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en-US (accessed March
28, 2020). Photograph by Author, taken April 21, 2012.

24

As a part of the Chihuahuan Desert, the region has a semi-arid climate that consists of
relatively
dry, cool
winters
and warm
summers
with a
monsoon
season. It
is rather
common
Figure 2. Rio Grande Valley - Sunland Park, NM.

in this high

desert environment for diurnal temperatures to have a 20 to 30 degrees range, meaning that the
high temperature is often 20 to 30 degrees higher than the low temperature experienced on a
given day. U.S. National Weather Service data from 1981 to 2010 indicates that the average high
temperatures recorded in the El Paso area for the months of June and December were 96.4 and
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58 degrees, respectively. The average low temperature for those same months were 67.5 and 32.1
degrees respectively.40
During winter months, the physical characteristics of the air basin combined with the

Figure 3. Temperature Inversion in the Paso del Norte Air Basin
diurnal temperature ranges provide the conditions for temperature inversions. Temperature
inversions occur when cool air drains from the nearby highlands and pools in the lower
elevations during the night when temperatures drop to their lowest. The cooler heavier air,
combined with pollutants produced by the residents, industries, and motor vehicles in the air
basin, is trapped by a layer of warmer air above it. When temperature inversions occur, the
region is covered by a dense smoky brown layer of pollutants that is visible throughout the night

40 National Weather Service Forecast Office, El Paso Area. https://www.weather.gov/images/epz/climat/01-2716%20%20El%20Paso%20-%20Average%20Monthly%20Low%20Temperatures%20-%20Copy.png,
https://www.weather.gov/images/epz/climat/01-27-16%20%20El%20Paso%20%20Average%20Monthly%20High%20Temperatures.png (accessed 10/25/19.) Average monthly high and
minimum temperatures for the El Paso area between 1981 and 2019.
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and into the early morning. During the morning hours, insolation from the sun heats the lower
layer of cool air, allowing it to mix with the warmer air above it and eventually dissipate the
trapped pollutants. Figure 3 illustrates what a temperature inversion looks like in the Paso del
Norte air basin.41
Dust storms are also common in the air basin during the windy months of March, April
and May. These wind events are often strong enough to cause air quality degradation and
decreased visibility due to the dust and sand particles carried by the winds. Meteorologists who
observe dust storms in the region may describe an event as “haze,” “suspended dust,” “blowing
dust” and “dust storm” based on the duration of the event, wind speeds, and visibility. The wind
carries dust particles that are a product naturally occurring surfaces as well as anthropogenic
activity that cause “fugitive dust” such as agriculture and unpaved roads. Studies have found that
the primary sources of dust emissions in the region during major windstorms are the playas (dry
lakes) and fallow agricultural lands in the surrounding areas.42
During the spring and summer, the hot and sunny days provide the perfect conditions for
the atmospheric chemical reactions that produce ground-level ozone. The barriers formed by the
mountain ranges make it especially difficult for pollutants to disperse, particularly because of the
absence of a regular wind current to help clear the air basin. Taken in combination with the

41 Christopherson, Robert, Geosystems: An Introduction to Physical Geography (Hoboken, NJ: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2005) 94. Kathryn Wilson, "The International Air Quality Management District: Is Emissions Trading the
Innovative Solution to the Transboundary Pollution Problem," Texas International Law Journal 30 (1995): 373-374.
Image from The University of Texas at El Paso Centennial Museum website,
http://museum2.utep.edu/chih/theland/landscape/volc.htm (accessed April 17, 2019)
42 Nancy I. Rivera Rivera, Thomas E. Gill, Max P. Bleiweiss and Jenny L. Hand, “Source Characteristics of
Hazardous Chihuahuan Desert Dust Outbreaks,” Atmospheric Environment 44 (2010): 2457-2468. Thomas E. Gill,
“Airborne Dust: A Primer for Clinicians,” The Southwest Respiratory and Critical Care Chronicles 6 no. 22 (2018):
4-7.
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geography, the industrialization, rapid population growth and unplanned urbanization resulted in
the significant degradation of the region’s air quality during the 1970s through the 1990s. 43

ECONOMIC POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
Despite a complicated and often conflictive history between the U.S. and Mexico, the
government leaders of the two countries have established mutually beneficial labor and
economic agreements that have become pillars of the bilateral relationship. These agreements
have had a significant impact on the development of the Paso del Norte region in the latter half
of the twentieth century. While this is not an exhaustive analysis of the bilateral agreements
between the two countries, it contemplates those that have been most transformational to the
region in terms of industrialization, infrastructure, and population growth.
In the early 1940s, the United States was in the midst of World War II and was facing a
labor shortage in the agriculture and railroad industries. Mexico was also entering the war effort,
while facing high levels of unemployment. In many ways, World War II linked Mexico’s
economic development interests with the United States’ national security imperatives. Between
1941 and 1942, the U.S.-Mexican Commission for Wartime Cooperation facilitated technical
assistance to improve Mexican railroads and the U.S. government invested more than $23.5
million on Mexican railroad bonds. The U.S. also spent $9.1 million on the construction of the
Pan American Highway, which connected the interior of Mexico to the U.S. border at Ciudad
Juárez. While the initial intent of the new transportation infrastructure was to enable the export

43 Wilson, Texas International Law Journal, 373.
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of Mexican oil and agricultural products to the U.S., it also become a tool for the movement of
Mexican labor to U.S. employers.44
Having identified an opportunity to address desperate labor situations in both countries –
utilizing the convenient and politically acceptable guise of supporting the Allied war effort Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Manuel Avila Camacho established the Bracero Program
through an exchange of diplomatic notes in August, 1942.45 Although the Bracero Program was
initiated to address wartime labor demands, it was kept in place long after the conclusion of
hostilities overseas due to economic expediencies and pressures from U.S. agribusiness. Between
1942 and 1964, over 4.5 million contracts were issued to Mexican laborers as a part of the
Bracero Program.46
For the duration of the Bracero Program, Ciudad Juárez served as a labor processing
center and as such became the recipient of thousands of internal migrants seeking labor contracts
in the U.S.47 According to US Border Patrol officials, the twin cities of El Paso and Ciudad
Juárez also became the crossing site for an unprecedented number of undocumented laborers
who sought entry to the U.S. but chose to bypass the formal contracting process. This meant that
Ciudad Juárez became a staging site for tens of thousands of migrant laborers documented
through the Bracero Program and undocumented.48

44 Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2010), 112-113.
45 Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor – The Mexican Bracero Program (Charlotte/Santa Barbara:McNally &
Loftin, 1964), 46-47.
46 Mireya Loza, Defiant Braceros: How Migrant Workers Fought for Racial, Sexual, and Political Freedom
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 2.
47 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 110.
48 Lytle Hernandez, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol, 114, 115.
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El Paso County was the site of several Bracero processing centers in addition to attracting
clandestine labor contractors seeking undocumented workers. An unknown number of those
migrant laborers also moved their families from the interior of Mexico to Ciudad Juárez in order
to facilitate off-season visits or migration to the U.S., should the opportunity arise.49 Between
1940 and 1950, Ciudad Juárez had an average annual percentage growth of internal migration of
.68 percent - that figure jumped to 2.93 percent per year for the period of 1950 to 1960.50 During
this same period, census figures show that the population of El Paso County grew from 131,067
in 1940 to 194,968 in 1950, a 48.8% increase in population. From 1950 to 1960 the population
grew to 314,070, a staggering 61.1% jump in population.51
Between 1944 and 1954, U.S. demand for cheap Mexican labor drove documented and
undocumented migration through border communities and into various locations throughout the
country.52 This influx of foreign-born workers during a post-war economy heightened antiimmigrant rhetoric and prompted deportation policies. During the 1940s, the US Immigration
and Naturalization Service policy called for apprehended undocumented persons to be released
all along the Mexican border. Displeased with this policy, Mexican officials requested that
deportees be released only in Ciudad Juárez and Nuevo Laredo, where rail service would
facilitate their reintegration to the interior of Mexico. Often, this new arrangement did not result
in a reintegration of migrants to the interior due to the difficulty and expense associated with
returning to their communities of origin. Instead, the deportees contributed to the expansion of an

49 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 111.
50 Adrian X. Esparza , Brigitte S. Waldorf, and Javier Chavez, “Localized
Effects of Globalization: The Case of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico,” Urban Geography 25, no. 2 (2004): 125.
51 Texas Association of Counties, The County Information Project. Historic El Paso County Population: 1850Present, http://www.txcip.org/tac/census/hist.php?FIPS=48141 (accessed September 22, 2019), Author is utilizing
County of El Paso census figures rather than City of El Paso because processing centers were located throughout the
county and not necessarily within the city limits.
52 Hernandez, Migra!, 169.
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unemployed border population. This migrant/deportee population surged in 1953 and 1954 as a
result of aggressive deportation initiatives including Operation Wetback - a massive deportation
campaign launched by President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration in May 1954. Many of
these deportees were released in Ciudad Juárez, with thirty-six thousand crossing into the city in
less than one week in July 1954.53
Facing mounting pressures from labor unions that accused Mexican laborers of
depressing wages for U.S. workers, the U.S. government unilaterally terminated the Bracero
Program in 1964. With Bracero contracts gone, tens of thousands of Mexican laborers were
returned to Mexican border cities with few options for employment. Local authorities were
overwhelmed by this sudden surge in population, with migrants forced to live in perilous
conditions.54
The Mexican Government was desperate to find a solution to the crises emerging in
border communities. It began evaluating economic development options through The National
Frontier Program of Mexico (in Spanish Programa Nacional Fronterizo – known by its acronym
PRONAF).55 That year, the PRONAF commissioned the consulting group Arthur D. Little de
Mexico, S.A. to assess the feasibility of developing manufacturing capabilities in Ciudad Juárez.
This coincided with efforts from the Ciudad Juárez business community to develop a Bonded
Manufacturing Zone similar to one established in Mexico City during the 1940s to facilitate the
integration of foreign automotive manufacturing. The premise of the Bonded Manufacturing
Zone was to create an enclosed industrial area under customs control where imported raw and

53 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 113.
54 Paul Ganster and David E. Lorey, The U.S.-Mexican Border Today: Conflict and Cooperation in Historical
Perspective. 3rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015), 111.
55 Ibid.
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semi-manufactured materials could be processed and finished for export markets without being
subject to duty payments.56
This feasibility study provided an assessment of the readiness of the region for
manufacturing. It included an inventory of the region’s critical production-related assets as well
as the established economic sectors in the state of Chihuahua, which could be supportive of
manufacturing in Ciudad Juárez. It highlighted the benefits of the geographic location with
proximity to the U.S. and connectivity to rail and ground transportation hubs with north/south
and east/west orientations. It looked at the availability of utilities, including access to potable
water through the use of wells and access to uninterrupted electricity – emphasizing the
advantages of grid interconnection with the U.S. for increased reliability. The report made clear
that Ciudad Juárez would be able to provide all of the infrastructure a manufacturer would need
to be successful.57
For the purposes of this analysis, the most compelling part of this report was related to
the availability of plentiful low-cost labor and the higher standard of living in Ciudad Juárez
relative to other parts of Mexico. It noted a seven-fold increase in the Ciudad Juárez population
between 1930 and 1960. It stated that only one third of that population growth was attributable to
natural increases, with the balance due to migratory flows from other Mexican states – as far
away as Oaxaca. It also referenced a “build-up” of approximately nineteen thousand applicants
from central Mexico who were in Ciudad Juárez awaiting “permanent working papers” for the

56 Arthur D. Little de Mexico, S.A. “Industrial Opportunities For Ciudad Juárez” Report to The National Frontier
Program of Mexico, August 1, 1964, 28. Copy with author.
57 Arthur D. Little de Mexico, 18, 23-26.
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U.S. It also referred to a group of about fifteen thousand workers who lived in Ciudad Juárez
and worked on the U.S. side of the border.58
Regarding labor costs, the report indicated that wages with fringe benefits for unskilled
workers amounted to about $3 per day, compared to $10 per day in the U.S. without benefits.
Wages for semi-skilled and skilled labor were correspondingly lower. The same assessment was
given for salaries of managerial and professional workers. The report concluded that although
wages would likely increase by some amount in the coming years, the continuous supply of labor
coming from the interior of Mexico, where wages were even lower, would limit the rate of wage
increases in Ciudad Juárez for the foreseeable future. This wage comparison was provided to
highlight the labor cost advantages that U.S. manufacturers would have if they established labor
intensive operations in Ciudad Juárez.59
As had occurred with the implementation of the Bracero Program, United States and
Mexican governments came together once again in an economic partnership that addressed their
respective goals - the U.S. was searching for labor markets that would allow it to improve its
standing in the global trade arena and Mexico was desperate to create employment opportunities
for former Braceros and other unemployed Mexicans who congregated in border communities.
In 1965, the U.S. passed a new tariff law which exempted U.S. goods assembled partially or
completely abroad from general import duties. These goods would only be subject to tariffs for
value added in manufacture, thereby creating an import structure that made it cheaper to
assemble some goods outside of the U.S.60

58 Arthur D. Little de Mexico, 2, 17.
59 Arthur D. Little de Mexico, 2, 19-21.
60 Ganster and Lorey. The U.S.-Mexican Border Today, 110.
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That same year, the Mexican Government introduced the Border Industrialization
Program (BIP) - also known as the maquiladora program – which eliminated tariff consequences
for foreign manufacturers that established operations and created jobs in Mexican border
communities. Maquiladoras were allowed to import equipment, parts, and supplies duty-free so
long as their output was exported back to the U.S. The BIP effectively provided a Mexican
government-subsidized manufacturing zone complete with abundant low-wage Mexican labor
for foreign investors willing to establish facilities and create jobs along the border. 61
Consistent with traditional trade theory that was prevalent in the 1960s that predicted that
capital and investment flows to where capital is scarce, labor is abundant, and returns are highest,
U.S. manufacturers responded to the BIP. Initially, there was slow but steady industrial growth
in the border region. The first industrial parks were built simultaneously in Ciudad Juárez and
Nogales, Sonora. Industrial parks were later established in Tijuana and Mexicali in Baja
California, as well as in Reynosa and Matamoros in Tamaulipas. Maquiladoras were set up by
U.S. companies such as RCA, Sylvania, Ampex and others. Early production included
electronics, textiles, toys, and footwear. In 1969, there were 147 BIP-registered companies
employing 17,000 workers.62
Between 1970 and 1974, the number of manufacturing facilities in Ciudad Juárez grew
from 22 to 89, with employment going from 3,165 to 17,484. Over the next two decades, the
facilities in Ciudad Juárez grew to be larger-scale operations, with more employees per plant
than those in other border cities. This meant that although there were fewer plants in Ciudad
Juárez than Tijuana, the total number of maquiladora employees was higher in Ciudad Juárez by

61 Jesus Cañas and Roberto Coronado, “Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present, and Future,” El Paso Business
Frontier, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas El Paso Branch, no. 2 (2002):1-4.
62 Cañas and Coronado, “Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present, and Future.”
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1998.63 In terms of industrial firms, by 1995 more than 500 maquiladoras were operating in the
Paso del Norte region. Ciudad Juárez had attracted 278 large maquilas, including General
Electric, A.O. Smith, General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and Johnson & Johnson,
which employed some 129,000 Mexican workers. In addition, about 2,000 administrators,
managers, and engineers commuted from El Paso to Ciudad Juárez on a daily basis. There
w e r e also 72 Fortune 500 companies located in El Paso, manufacturing products including
apparel, leather, food, electronics, and plastic component parts.64
It is also important to note that in the early stages of the BIP, 80 to 85 percent of these
new job opportunities were largely afforded to women, who were considered more dexterous and
adaptable to the nature of assembly work. For many former Braceros and other unemployed
male migrants in Mexican border communities, the BIP did not produce the intended outcomes.65
This gender imbalance persisted through the first 15 years of the maquiladora industry - the most
labor-intensive phase. Beginning in the 1980s, automated production and technology
applications reshaped the industry and more male employees joined the ranks of the
maquiladoras.66
By 1980, maquiladora employment had reached 120,000. During the next decade, the
maquiladora industry entered a period of accelerated growth. This growth spurt started with the
1982 Mexican peso devaluation, which had the effect of substantially reducing operating costs
for foreign-owned manufacturers (whose budgets were set in U.S. dollars but who paid costs in
pesos). The trade environment in Mexico was also altered when it joined the General Agreement

63 Esparza , Waldorf, and Chavez, “Localized Effects of Globalization,” 127.
64 Texas Centers for Economic and Enterprise Development, Paso del Norte Regional Economy: Socioeconomic
Profile. El Paso: The University of Texas at El Paso, 1993, 3-1. Copy with author.
65 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 132.
66 Esparza , Waldorf, Chavez, “Localized Effects of Globalization,” 123.
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, opening the country to trade with countries other than the
U.S. In doing so, Mexico relaxed more than four decades of protectionist and antitrade policies
that where characteristic of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model that the country
adopted in the 1940s.67 Tariff rates in Mexico fell from 60 percent to 15 percent by 1990,
attracting more foreign companies – including Asian and European firms - to begin
manufacturing operations along the border. Maquiladora employment grew at an annual rate of
19.2 percent between 1983 and 1989.68
The aperture of Mexico to foreign trade and foreign investment continued during the
1990s. In 1992, Mexico entered into a free trade agreement with Chile. The following year, it
joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Between 1990 and 1994, maquiladora
employment grew at an average annual rate of 6.3 percent. In 1994, Mexico, the U.S. and
Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement, creating a trading block intended to
enhance competitiveness vis-à-vis European and Asian trading blocks. A combination of the
NAFTA and a peso devaluation in 1994 resulted in another surge in maquiladora growth. This
time, as a result of NAFTA provisions that opened tariff-free manufacturing to the entire
country, U.S. companies were able to establish manufacturing facilities beyond the border.
Between 1995 and 2001, maquiladora employment grew at an annual rate of 11 percent –
employment in this industry was 1.3 million, a 300-fold increase since 1967. By 2000, despite

67 Haber, Paul Lawrence, "Import Substitution Industrialization (Isi)." Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society &
Culture, ed. Michael S. Werner (Routledge, 1998), http://0search.credoreference.com.lib.utep.edu/content/entry/routmex/import_substitution_industrialization_isi/0?institution
Id=9821, (accessed: January 18, 2020). According to Haber, the collapse of global markets between 1929 and 1932
forced Latin American countries that had been reliant on an export-import economic model to develop their own
industrial capabilities focused on meeting domestic demand. The ISI model, adopted throughout Latin America,
consisted of policies that protected “infant industries” from competition from established or “adult” international
firms. The so-called Mexican Miracle, when the economy grew an average of 6.5 percent per year between 1940
and 1970, is often cited as a success of ISI.
68 Cañas and Coronado, “Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present, and Future.”
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NAFTA provisions, 77 percent of that employment was still concentrated in Mexican border
states.69
A critical component of the NAFTA negotiations that was as significant to the border
region as the treaty itself was the establishment of the environmental and labor side agreements.
Activists and grassroots organizations throughout the North American continent mobilized to
block passage of the trade agreement, citing among many concerns, the widespread
environmental degradation and labor exploitation that occurred along the U.S./Mexico border as
a result of the BIP and the maquiladora-related industrialization.70 While the involvement of civil
society in the trade policy debates did not result in the blockage of the NAFTA, it was
instrumental in raising the profile of environmental concerns faced by residents along the
U.S./Mexico border.71
Ultimately, these environmental and labor coalitions helped pave the way for the creation
of the NAFTA side agreements – the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) – which provide
an official tri-national infrastructure for denouncing labor and environmental violations.72 The
NAAEC called for the creation of two critical institutions – the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADB). The BECC was
created to assist states, municipalities, public entities, and private investors with the development

69 Cañas and Coronado, “Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present, and Future.”
70 John Foster, “The Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA: Sinews of Solidarity,” In Coalitions across Borders:
Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order ed. Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith (Lanham, Md: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 214.
71 Jan Aart Scholte, “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance,” in Civil Society and Global Finance, ed.
J.A. Scholte and A. Schnabel (New York:Routledge, 2002), 11-32. “Civil Society” is defined by Jan Aart Scholte as
“a political space where voluntary associations explicitly seek to shape the rules (in terms of specific policies, wider
norms, and deeper social structures) that govern one or other aspect of social life.”
72 Foster, “The Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA: Sinews of Solidarity,” 214-215.
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of environmental infrastructure, including water, wastewater, solid waste, and air quality
projects. Their mandate was to provide the technical assistance and project certification that
would prepare projects for financing through the NADB. The NADB in turn was charged with
working with project stakeholders to identify project financing through a combination of loans
and grants funded by the federal governments of both countries. The record for the effectiveness
of these institutions is mixed, with criticism focused on the lack of authority and insufficient
funding to address their mission. 73

EFFECTS OF MASS MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN CIUDAD JUÁREZ AND EL PASO
For decades, residents of the border region have been compelled to adapt to the economic
policies and geopolitical developments described above. The period between 1940 and 2000 was
transformational for the region in terms of industrialization, physical footprint, and population
expansion. Not surprisingly given the aforementioned economic policies, that transformation was
much more acutely manifested in Ciudad Juárez than in the City of El Paso. Figure 4 illustrates
the comparative growth in this border population.74 While this section considers growth in
population on both sides of the border, it focuses primarily on Ciudad Juárez because of the
dramatic changes that occurred over the course of these sixty years.

73 Protocol of Amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation
Commission and a North American Development Bank, Signed November 16 and 18, 1993.
www.becc.org/uploads/content/images/BECC-NADB-Charter.pdf (accessed December 11, 2017).; Public Citizen’s
Global Trade Watch and Red Mexicana de Accíon Frente al Libre Comercio, NAFTA’s Broken Promises: The
Border Betrayed, (Washington D.C.: Public Citizen Publications, 1996).
74 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, “Censo General de la Población,” 1940-2000,
http://www.inegi.org.mx/default.aspx (accessed November 5, 2017). U.S. Census Bureau, “Population of the 100
Largest Cities and Other Urban Places In The United States: 1790 to 1990,”
https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/1998/demo/POP-twps0027.html (accessed November 10, 2019).
Ganster and Lorey, The U.S.-Mexican Border Today, Table 6.2.
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Table 1. Ciudad Juárez and City of El Paso Population Growth
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Beginning with the waves of migrants prompted by the Bracero Program and continuing
through the BIP and then NAFTA, Ciudad Juárez experienced a population growth rate that
exceeded 450% between 1950 and 1990 - ballooning from approximately 122,000 to 800,000 in
40 years.75 While a fraction of this massive population increase was the result of natural growth,
the vast majority was driven by a large flow of migrants from the interior of Mexico who were
searching for employment opportunities. Utilizing a base year of 1940 with a population of
48,881, the chart above provides a graphic depiction of the population surge to over 1.2 million
by 2000.76

75 Adrian X. Esparza , Brigitte S. Waldorf, and Javier Chavez, “Localized
Effects of Globalization,” 120-138.
76 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, “Censo General de la Población,” 1940-2000,
http://www.inegi.org.mx/default.aspx (accessed November 5, 2017).
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Table 2. Chihuahua/Zacatecas Comparative Growth
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To put Ciudad Juárez’s population growth within a state-level context for comparison, it is
telling to look at the border state of Chihuahua and the central state of Zacatecas. The state of
Chihuahua, where Ciudad Juárez is located, was growing at an accelerated rate as a result of
migrant influx while the state of Zacatecas was growing very slowly and residents were leaving.
These two states had a very similar population size in 1940, but the difference in growth
trajectories over 60 years can be assessed from the figure above.77
Beginning in the late 1940s, the growing population of Ciudad Juárez encountered
significant challenges in accessing safe drinking water, securing adequate housing, finding
schools for their children, and any number of other basic services. Local newspapers reported
horrific conditions due to the total absence of water for basic necessities in some areas. In July
1953, the newspaper El Fronterizo reported that three quarters of the city lacked drinking water
and sewage services – a condition that they presumed had precipitated the death of four hundred
children during a three-month period. Municipal authorities worked to dig wells and extend

77 Ibid.
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water services, but their progress in reaching a larger percentage of the population was stunted
by the continuous flow of migrants into the city and an increasing demand for water. At this
time, migrants were flowing into Ciudad Juárez from the north as well as from the south, as U.S.
immigration officials dumped thousands of deportees at the border as a result of Operation
Wetback.78
In addition to water shortages, officials contended with the mushrooming of colonias
populares, unplanned and undeveloped squatter enclaves consisting of shacks without basic
services. These colonias emerged in outlying areas of the city, creating dangerous and unhealthy
conditions for its residents given the lack of water, transportation, communication, and law
enforcement infrastructure and capacity. By 1953, more than 12,000 children were unable to
attend school due to the shortage of classrooms and teachers. The desperation of the migrants
and the officials attempting to provide them with adequate services is captured by Mayor Rene
Mascareñas Miranda’s address as he left office in 1959:
Migrants arrive in the northern ports in search of a better way of life, thinking that
extraordinary employment opportunities exist in these border cities or having high
hopes of earning dollars in the United States. When they cannot achieve their
goals, and without an immediate possibility of returning to their places of origin,
they give rise to problems of housing, law enforcement, health, diet, education,
and employment. These problems are of serious proportions for local authorities.
At the same time, municipal revenues fail to increase at the rate of demand for
public services because the income level of the great majority of these families
barely allows for the satisfaction of basic needs, and they are unable to contribute
toward public expenditures. Then, the municipality does not have its own sources
of income in proportion to the tasks and responsibility it is obliged to carry out.79

These desperate living conditions would persist as migrants continued to flow into the region
through the 1960s. The population of Ciudad Juárez swelled from 270,279 in 1960 to over

78 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 108, 113.
79 Martinez, Border Boom Town, 109.
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424,000 in 1970, with the end of the Bracero program in 1964 and initiation of the BIP in 1965
serving as driving forces for this growth. By the 1980s, the nonnative population in Ciudad
Juárez had reached 53 percent. 80
Table 3. Percentage of Houses with Sewage Disposal
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disposal. The proportion of households without something as basic as sewage service would
continue virtually unchanged through 1990, when the population was approaching 800,000.
These living conditions were consistent with the low-income levels that were promoted with the
initiation of the BIP and which have persisted for decades. In 1995, 64.3 percent of the families
in Ciudad Juárez lived on less than $2,710, placing them below the poverty level. Only 14
percent of the population earned more than $4,517.82

80 Ganster and Lorey. The U.S.-Mexican Border Today, 138.
81 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, “Censo General de la Población,” 1940-2000,
http://www.inegi.org.mx/default.aspx (accessed November 5, 2017).
82 Enrique Suarez Toriello and Octavio E. Chavez Alzaga. "Profile of the United States-México Border." (FEMAP,
1996) p.69-70. Copy with author.
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A study investigating the localized effects of globalization on Ciudad Juárez during the
early 1990s examined the morphological and quality of life impacts of rapid urban growth on the
city and its residents. The authors of this study found that the most significant period of
territorial expansion coincided with the Bracero program and the BIP. During the years between
1940 and 1995, Ciudad Juárez expanded by over 15,000 hectares - growth that made the city’s
footprint 28 times larger than it was before 1940. As the spatial expansion of industry and the
population grew, it spread farther and farther away from the pre-industrial city center where
public services and infrastructure were most developed. This also shifted the city into a new
urban form with polycentric morphology and away from the monocentric form that dated back to
the Spanish colonial era.83
In order to assess the effects of the spatial dispersion of the residents of Ciudad Juárez,
the authors developed a deprivation scale that considered a number of quality-of-life variables
that included access to water, wastewater, schools, hospitals, retail establishments, police, paved
roads, electricity, communication (telephone), and mass transportation. Using a neighborhood
level unit of analysis utilized by the census, the authors found that the “highly developed”
neighborhoods in the city were closest to the historic center and nearest the border. These were
areas well developed prior to industrialization. Neighborhoods to the south and west of the city
center that developed as industrialization was taking hold were considered “moderately
deprived” and “more deprived.” The newest and most peripheral areas that were considered
“highly deprived” were located in the far south, where the majority of the colonias populares
were located. New settlements in the south and west that encroach on the skirts of the Sierra de
Juárez were among the most deprived neighborhoods in the city, given the difficulty and expense

83 Esparza, Waldorf, and Chavez, “Localized Effects of Globalization,” 123.

43

associated with providing services in sloped topography. In sum, this study concluded that the
levels of deprivation experienced by residents of Ciudad Juárez worsened as development moved
outward from the pre-industrial city center to the periphery. As such, they argued that residents
of those peripheral neighborhoods felt the negative effects of globalization and industrialization
more acutely than those in the pre-industrial city center.84
Indeed, the dramatic growth that resulted in countless unplanned housing developments
lacking basic services also led to the development of a city roadway system that consisted of
3069 total kilometers, half of which were unpaved or unfinished.85 The prevalence of unpaved
roads further diminished access to public safety and basic utility services. Homes built without
gas or electric services were dependent on highly polluting wood-burning stoves for cooking and
heating. In absence of solid waste disposal services, many burned their trash – creating unsafe
and unhealthy conditions.86
Despite the extensive industrial presence and a population base that neared 1.2 million in
1997, the Ciudad Juárez municipal government struggled to meet with needs of its citizens with
an annual budget of $53 million. For comparison, the annual budget of the City of El Paso that
year was $411 million. With more than double El Paso’s population and a fraction of the
operating budget, Ciudad Juárez had woefully insufficient resources to provide adequate public

84 Esparza, Waldorf, and Chavez, “Localized Effects of Globalization,” 132, 135.
85 Isabelle Romieu, Matiana Ramirez Aguilar, Hortensia Moreno Macias, Albino Barraza Villarreal, Leticia
Hernandez Cadena, and Luz Carbajal Arroyo, “Health Impacts of Air Pollution on Morbidity and Mortality among
Children of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico.” Commission for Environmental Cooperation, (Montreal, Canada:
2003), 3.
86 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area, 8.
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infrastructure. One manifestation of this inadequate infrastructure is the capacity to provide street
cleaning. While El Paso operated a fleet of 100 street sweepers, Ciudad Juárez had six.87
The City of El Paso was almost twice the size of Ciudad Juárez in 1940, but by 2000,
Ciudad Juárez was more than twice as large as the City of El Paso. Although that relative
population distribution reversed – especially after 1960 – El Paso also experienced challenges
related to U.S./Mexico economic policies and the associated population growth, lagging
incomes, and insufficient public infrastructure for a physically expanding city. During the course
of six decades, the City of El Paso not only grew in population but also in its physical footprint.
The table below maps the growth in land area of the city from 13.6 square miles in 1940 to 245.4
square miles in 1990, which paralleled the population growth from 98,810 to 515,342.88

87 Frank Clifford and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Borderline Efforts on Pollution,” Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1997. It
is important to note that while the City of El Paso had a much larger budget than Ciudad Juárez, the City of El Paso
also lagged in its public infrastructure as compared to other U.S. cities due to its depressed tax base and insufficient
revenues. Median household incomes and related data for the City of El Paso are examined in the next section. As
such, this comparison is between two resource-poor communities.
88 U.S. Census Bureau, “Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places In The United States: 1790 to
1990.”
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Table 4. City of El Paso Land Area
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Like most U.S. cities, the City of El Paso expanded its jurisdictional territory by means of
annexation of surrounding unincorporated areas in anticipation of new economic development
and population growth. The dramatic post-1970 land area growth coincided with the adoption of
the BIP, which led to a significant expansion in the region’s manufacturing sector. Much like the
growth experienced by its sister city, El Paso was now responsible for an expanded jurisdiction
that required affordable housing and publicly-funded basic services, including paved roads,
water/wastewater services, and first responders for the residents in this larger municipal
footprint.89
The City of El Paso’s population surged by almost two hundred thousand residents
between 1970 and 1990. Unfortunately, the incomes of these residents did not grow along with
the size of the city. In 1975, per capita income in El Paso was $4335, lagging behind Texas per
capita income, $5,705, by 24 percent. By the mid-1990s the per capita income of El Paso was

89 U.S. Census Bureau, “Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places In The United States: 1790 to
1990,” https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/1998/demo/POP-twps0027.html (accessed November 10,
2019).
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only $13,702, lagging behind the U.S. at $23,196 and Texas at $21,118. Given the depressed
incomes in the region and limited affordable housing options for low-income residents within the
city, over seventy thousand people settled into unincorporated subdivisions with limited access
to critical services including running water and paved roads. By 1996, there were 151 such
unincorporated subdivisions, known as colonias, in El Paso County. As was the case with
colonias populares in Ciudad Juárez, residents in El Paso County’s colonias also had diminished
access to public safety and basic utility services. Most of these developments were located far
from established water, waste water, and natural gas utility lines, making connection to these
services cost prohibitive. Shanty homes often built with scrap materials had access to electricity
but residents avoided expensive electricity services, instead utilizing highly polluting woodburning stoves for cooking and heating. While some colonias had access to potable water, none
had waste water services, creating unsanitary conditions for many residents. In absence of solid
waste disposal services, many also burned their trash.90
Economic conditions for many El Pasoans worsened with the passage of NAFTA, as
manufacturing jobs in the city migrated to Ciudad Juárez and eventually to other lower-wage
markets in Central America and Asia. In 1992, over 20 percent of the jobs in El Paso County
were in the manufacturing sector. In January 1994, shortly after NAFTA was ratified, there were
approximately fifty thousand manufacturing jobs in El Paso – half of which were in the apparel
and textile industry. By 2000, seventeen thousand manufacturing jobs, approximately 34 percent
had been lost in NAFTA-related dislocations.91

90 Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Border the Future: Challenge and Opportunity In the Texas Border
Region, Austin, TX. July 1998, 23, 127. Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, Policy Research Project
Report Number 124: Colonia Housing and Infrastructure, Volume 1, University of Texas at Austin, 1997.
91 Texas Centers for Economic and Enterprise Development, Paso del Norte Regional Economy: Socioeconomic
Profile, 1-8. United States General Accounting Office, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Experience of Six Trade-
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These dislocated workers, often with less than a high school education and limited
English proficiency, struggled to transition from their manufacturing jobs to other employment
opportunities that required English language proficiency and other post-secondary skill sets. For
many, this transition meant losing employment at an hourly wage that was three to four times the
minimum wage, plus benefits, with employers such as Levi-Strauss. The large volumes of
displaced workers overwhelmed the federally-funded transitional retraining programs and few of
the programs were bilingual. Many workers found themselves unable to progress beyond English
proficiency classes and were therefore unemployable in an evolving job market.92
Conclusion
For both Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, the years between 1940 and 2000 brought
significant changes in population, urbanization, and infrastructure development. The economic
agreements and treaties entered into by the U.S. and Mexico during this period resulted in
growth and economic transitions that were unsustainable for the population and the resources of
the region. The result was a binational community overwhelmed by mass migration, depressed
wages, and a woefully insufficient public infrastructure that created unsafe and unhealthy living
conditions for all of its residents. The following chapter explores the environmental and human
health degradation that accompanied this economic transformation of the region.

Impacted Communities, Washington D.C., August 2001, 56. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-01-838.pdf (accessed
November 11, 2019).
92 United States General Accounting Office, Trade Adjustment Assistance, 59-60.
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Chapter Two: Environmental and Human Health Fallout in the Paso del Norte

Invariably, economic growth and industrialization without proper public infrastructure
and pollution controls comes at a cost to environmental and human health. This chapter
examines the deterioration of air quality and the related human health issues that accompanied
the region’s growth. It begins with some historical context for air pollution regulation in the
United States and Mexico in order to understand how each country developed and amended
regulatory frameworks during the twentieth century. By extension, it looks at how these
frameworks were implemented along the border. It explores how air pollution was monitored and
regulated in the Paso del Norte air basin, given the different regulatory regimes responsible for
those activities. It also delves into the principal sources of air pollution in the region, specific
pollutants that are major contributors to the air quality problems, and the human health effects of
those pollutants. Finally, this chapter considers the development of the region and the
accompanying environmental protections from the perspective of environmental justice and
fractured governance in order to better understand how environmental regulatory regimes failed
to protect the residents of this borderland.
REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
Air pollution first became a source of widespread concern and federal government
intervention in the United States in October of 1948 when the communities of Donora and
Webster, Pennsylvania experienced a tragic smog-related event. Over the course of five days,
the effluent produced by the American Steel and Wire Company and Donora Zinc Works along
with local coal stoves and coke ovens combined with an unusual weather system and the
mountainous river valley geography to create a temperature inversion that trapped a toxic layer
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of air at 150 feet. As the air grew denser with smog and roads became impassible due to a lack
of visibility, reports of respiratory distress became widespread. By the time the temperature
inversion lifted, 20 residents had died, 1440 were seriously ill and another 4470 had mild to
moderate respiratory symptoms – accounting for nearly half of the working-class population of
the region.93
At the request of the local borough leaders, the United Steel Workers Union, the State of
Pennsylvania and American Steel and Wire, the United States Public Health Service (USPHS)
initiated the country’s first large scale epidemiological study conducted in response to an
environmental health disaster. This USPHS study and subsequent investigations that looked at
long term effects of exposure to lower levels of industrial pollutants served to reframe prevalent
attitudes that had associated industrial air pollution with jobs and economic progress.
Ultimately, this tragic event and the epidemiological findings that linked air pollution to serious
human health issues became a critical catalyst for local, state, and federal level efforts to mitigate
air pollution in the decades that followed.94 From the late 1940s until 1970, the number of states
and local governments that enacted laws and ordinances to regulate air pollution from mobile
and fixed sources accelerated dramatically.95
Although Donora brought air pollution into dramatic relief because of the scale of human
fatalities and illness, it was soon overshadowed by the daily smog in the Los Angeles area that

93 Elizabeth Jacobs, Jeffrey L. Burgess, and Mark B. Abbott, “The Donora Smog Revisited: 70 Years After the
Event that Inspired the Clean Air Act,” American Journal of Public Health 108, no. 2 (April 2018): S85-S88.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5922205/ (accessed November 6, 2019).
94 Ibid.
95 Arthur C. Stern, “History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States,” Journal of the Air Pollution Control
Association 32, no.1 (1982): 44-61. Municipal legislative efforts to address smoke emissions began on a very limited
scale between 1880 and 1890 (only 2 cities- Chicago, IL and Cincinnati, OH) and grew slowly during the first half
of the twentieth century. By the 1950, 80 municipalities and two counties had enacted air pollution control
legislation. By 1960, only eight states had enacted legislation to regulate air pollution.
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was growing in intensity by the late 1940s and early 1950s. The California congressional
delegation led the legislative charge to dedicate the resources of the federal government to the
research and regulatory efforts that had been shouldered by state and local governments. The
first advancement came in 1955 when Congress passed the Air Pollution Control Act (APCA),
which gave the Public Health Service responsibility for assisting state and local air pollution
control agencies with research, training, and technical assistance.96
There were several subsequent pieces of legislation that augmented the APCA, but none
provided the resources or regulatory reach necessary to make significant changes. Then in the
early 1960s, several critical events focused the public’s attention on environmental issues among them were the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and her congressional
testimony, a smog-related environmental health disaster in London, a high- profile air pollution
episode in Birmingham, Alabama, and a National Conference on Air Pollution that drew record
attendance. By 1963, there was sufficient political momentum for Congress to pass the Clean Air
Act (CAA), through which the federal government began to appropriate significant funding for
air pollution control. The CAA created a regulatory structure that combined health-based and
technology standards to achieve “safe” ambient air to the extent that it was technologically and
economically feasible.97 It also provided federal grants to establish and improve state and local
air pollution control programs, established a procedure to resolve interstate air pollution issues,
and provided continuity for air pollution research.98
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Despite these advances, pollution control across the United States was still woefully
lacking. In an effort to build on the momentum of the early 1960s and “force this issue
permanently onto the national political agenda,” U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin
worked with environmental activists to organize the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970.99
Approximately twenty million Americans participated in demonstrations in cities across the
country. This large-scale engagement of civil society indeed created the political momentum
necessary to move Congress to authorize the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in July
1970.100
A subsequent and truly significant breakthrough came when Congress passed the Clean
Air Act Amendments that same year. Among the most important aspects of this legislation were
that Congress mandated the EPA do the following: 1) set national air ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS); 2) create stationary source emission standards; 3) allow for standards to be
set for hazardous air pollutants (HAPs); 4) call for the regulation of fuel and fuel additives; and
4) require drastic reductions in automobile emissions. These were critical developments because
they moved the country away from a patchwork of local and state regulations to a set of uniform
federal standards that would become the basis for all air quality regulatory efforts in the United
States. Based on air pollution monitoring data, EPA assigned states and regions therein NAAQS
attainment or nonattainment status designations. Each state was required to develop its own state

99 History.com, “The First Earth Day,” https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-first-earth-day, (accessed
August 16, 2020). Earth Day is also credited with building the political support for the passage of the Clean Water
Act and the Endangered Species Act.
100 United States Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA History: Earth Day,” https://www.history.com/this-dayin-history/the-first-earth-day, (accessed August 16, 2020).
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implementation plan (SIP) in order to meet federal mandates for mobile and stationary
sources.101
The EPA set NAAQS for certain pollutants – often referred to as criteria pollutants. For
the period contemplated in this study, the EPA regulated six pollutants: suspended particulates,
nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide, and lead. Suspended particulates
(referred to as total suspended particles or TSPs) are liquid or solid particles that remain airborne
after being released by natural, agricultural, or industrial processes. TSPs cause and exacerbate
respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses. Nitrogen dioxide is most commonly a byproduct of
automobiles and coal-fired electric utilities. This pollutant aggravates cardiovascular and
respiratory diseases, inhibits plant growth, and impairs visibility. Sulfur dioxide is a gas created
in the combustion of fossil fuels and is a major cause of acid rain. Ozone is the product of a
photochemical reaction that occurs when volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides are
exposed to sunlight, and is a principal component of smog. Ozone gases are toxic, causing
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, impairing visibility, and damaging crops. Carbon
monoxide is an odorless, colorless, poisonous gas that is generated primarily by motor vehicle
emissions. This pollutant impairs the transmission of oxygen to vital organs and tissues, harms
fetal development, and contributes to cardiovascular disease. Finally, lead is a naturally
occurring element that is introduced into the air through fuel combustion and some industrial
processes. High concentrations of lead in the body can impair bone growth, cause neurological
disorders, and pose health risks for infants and fetuses.102
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The CAA was subsequently amended in 1977 and 1990, with provisions that had
significant economic development repercussions for attainment and non-attainment areas alike.
The 1977 amendment included provisions to prevent significant deterioration (PSD) of air
quality in areas that already met or exceeded federal standards, utilizing emissions permits as a
tool to limit new or modified major stationary sources. (This did nothing to curb the proliferation
of numerous smaller emissions sources, which could be equally damaging.) Non-attainment
areas were also at risk of losing federal highway funds for new road construction since new
roadways would presumably contribute to emissions in the area. The 1990 amendment included
Section 818, which provided relief for cities along the international border that could
demonstrate that their emissions levels would meet federal standards but for emissions
emanating from another country. I explore the relevance of these provisions to this study later in
this chapter.103
Another noteworthy amendment to the CAA in 1990 was that Congress expanded the list
of regulated air pollutants to include 189 new chemical compounds known as Hazardous Air
Pollutants (HAPs). These HAPs range from hydrocarbons and fibers to heavy metals – including
substances such as benzene and asbestos. HAPs have deleterious effects on human health,
causing cancer, immune system dysfunction, and harm to the neurological and reproductive
systems. Some HAPS are also associated with respiratory and developmental problems. The
presence of particulate matter further intensifies the dangerous health effects of HAPs.
Particulate matter, especially PM10, can assimilate chemical contaminants on irregular surfaces or
within porous interiors and become a vehicle for transporting HAPs into the lungs. Once inside

103 Tabb, “Twenty-Five Years of the Clean Air Act in Perspective,” 14. U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
S. 1630, 101st Congress, 11/15/90. https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/senate-bill/1630/text (accessed
February 1, 2020). There have been numerous amendments to the CAA. I focus on the 1977 and 1990 amendments
because they are particularly relevant to this study.
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the lungs, HAPs can enter the bloodstream and damage the body’s organs. Given the dangerous
nature of these compounds and the opportunistic interaction with other pollutants, this regulatory
addition to the CAA was critical to the protection of human health.104
In Mexico, concerns regarding air pollution first appeared in the legal code in 1928 as a
matter of private law, specifically relating to the construction of chimneys on private property
and the distance required from adjacent properties. This was intended to address the proliferation
of chimneys and the density of chimney smoke, which was a significant source of air pollution.
In 1940, the federal government enacted regulations on minimum height requirements for
chimneys and pollutant concentrations. However, it was not until 1971 that Mexico enacted
comprehensive legislation to control and prevent pollution.105
The primary impetus for this legislative action was the severe air pollution plaguing
Mexico City. In the two decades leading up to this legislative action, Mexico City’s population
had ballooned more than 400 percent, to 8.3 million inhabitants. The Valley of Mexico also
housed 50 percent of the country’s industrial production. All of this anthropogenic activity was
taking place within a topographic bowl surrounded by volcano ridges. These emissions must rise
to 9100 feet in order to be able escape through a narrow pass called Milpa Alta, located southeast
of the population center. The emissions from domestic sources, motor vehicles, and industrial
operations combined with geographic and meteorological factors to create temperature
inversions that trapped pollutants in this valley for extended periods of time.106
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In 1968, the Mexican Institute of Chemical Engineers held El Primer Simposium Sobre
La Contaminación De Aire En la Ciudad De México in response to the rapidly deteriorating air
quality in Mexico City. By the 1950s, this city built on a desiccated lakebed was subject to
raging dust storms and effectively unregulated emissions driven by the import substitution
industrialization of the 1940s. Concerns over air quality permeated beyond scientific circles,
appearing in political discourse as well. An article published in 1971 in the official magazine of
Mexico’s ruling party described the Valley of Mexico as “grey and opaque, surrounded by
industrial centers and polluted by dust storms, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
particles of asbestos and rubber.”107
Beyond Mexico City, the United Nations and other multinational coalitions were
promulgating international accords to address the environmental crisis unfolding around the
world. Mexican officials considered the environmental laws of the U.S., Canada, West Germany
and several other countries in order to develop legislation for the Mexican legal framework. In
the ensuing years, international treaties would become the foundation for Mexico’s
environmental laws, including the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972 and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in
1992.108 Mexico’s 1971 legislative initiative consisted of three constitutional reforms intended to
address several public health issues, namely the use and sale of alcohol, narcotics and other
degenerative substances, and environmental pollution, by expanding the powers of the Consejo
de Salubridad (Council on Health). The amendment of Article 73 of the Mexican Constitution

107 Ibid. Matthew Vitz, A City on the Lake: Urban Political Ecology and the Growth of Mexico City
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charged the Consejo de Salubridad with developing a program and legal system for addressing
environmental pollution. In addition, the Mexican Congress enacted the Ley Federal Para
Prevenir y Controlar la Contaminación Ambiental (Federal Law for the Prevention and Control
of Environmental Contamination). Commentary published from the congressional deliberations
indicates that these legislative actions were taken in order to move away from failed piecemeal
efforts and enable a comprehensive and centralized approach to dealing with environmental
pollutants and polluting activities which degrade ecological systems.109
The Ley Federal Para Prevenir y Controlar la Contaminacion Ambiental specified that
the federal executive would create regulations to control emission and protect air, water, and soil
from contamination. Subsequent legislation and regulations in 1973, 1982, and 1983 were aimed
at reducing industrial pollutants and establishing national norms for pollutants in order to
conserve, protect, and restore the environment. However, despite these legislative efforts the
regulatory reach and enforcement of the federal government was limited outside of the Mexico
City metropolitan area. To address that limitation, in 1987 the Mexican Congress once again
amended the Constitution thereby enabling concurrent jurisdictions for federal and local
governments for the purposes of environmental protection. This led to the 1988 passage of the
Ley General de Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al Ambiente through which individual states
and local governments could enact environmental laws and create enforcement mechanisms for
both fixed and mobile sources.110
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In 1993, Mexico adopted the Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs) which set the
emissions standards for measuring concentrations of certain contaminants. These included
ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter. Like the
NAAQS in the U.S., the NOMs were intended to provide a metric by which to determine air
quality as recorded by air monitoring stations throughout the country. If the readings of air
monitoring stations exceeded the NOMs for individual contaminants, an area would be
considered in violation of air quality standards and be subject to develop a plan for remediation
that would be developed by state and local governments.111
It is important to understand the development of these national air quality standards
during the 1960s and 1970s because just as these protections were being promulgated in the U.S.
(and to a much lesser extent in Mexico), the BIP was enabling the rapid industrialization of the
border region. Hundreds of American-owned companies were establishing operations along the
Mexican side of the border where air quality regulatory mechanisms were lacking until the early
1990s, along with their twin plants on the U.S. side of the border.112 The following section
explores how this dynamic of industrial growth and urbanization coupled with decades of an
absent air quality regulatory regime played out in communities along the border generally and in
the Paso del Norte region specifically.
ENVIRONMENTAL FALL-OUT IN MAQUILADORA BOOM TOWNS
Consistent with the growth in the Bracero Program and later the BIP and NAFTA, urban
border communities became home to hundreds of thousands of migrants who relocated from
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central and southern Mexico in order to avail themselves of employment opportunities in the
U.S. and in the maquiladoras. During the 1940s and 1950s, the largest surges in population were
felt in the states of Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Sonora as a result of Bracero-related migration
and the location of processing centers for those migrants. By the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion
in the maquiladora industry would bring population growth to all Mexican border states.113 The
dramatic population increases seen in urban centers like Ciudad Juárez strained every aspect of
public infrastructure – roads, drinking water, electric/gas services, wastewater treatment
facilities, housing, solid waste disposal, and public transportation. Communities that did not
have wastewater treatment facilities had no way of managing the volumes of household and
industrial (hazardous) wastewater other than to dump it into nearby streams, rivers, and oceans.
Unplanned housing developments dependent on unpaved roads introduced unhealthy levels of
particulate matter into the air. The population boom took an equally deleterious toll on the
region’s environment and the health of border residents 114
By 1989, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was monitoring 145
industrial facilities on the U.S. side of the border and reported the release of about 32.5 million
tons of toxic chemicals into the air, water, or land that year. These industrial facilities were
largely the twin plants associated with a Mexican maquiladora. At that time, EPA’s Mexican
counterpart, the Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecología (SEDUE), lacked the resources or
capabilities to conduct similar environmental monitoring for industries in Mexico, so the full
extent of environmental pollution due to releases of toxic chemicals in the border region is
unknown. In addition to the pollution produced by the facilities themselves, there was a

113 Esparza, Waldorf, and Chavez “Localized Effects of Globalization,” 125, 126.
114 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area, 8.

59

tremendous amount of pollution introduced into the environment by the idling semi-trucks
awaiting inspection of maquiladora-produced goods at the international ports of entry for hours
at a time.115
The acceleration of trade between the U.S. and Mexico continued throughout the 1990s,
expanding from BIP-related trade into unprecedented volumes enabled by NAFTA. That twoway trade soared from US$65.1 billion in 1991 to US$160 billion in 1998.116 By 1996, two years
after NAFTA initiated, 3,254,084 semi-trucks idled at ports of entry all along the southern border
awaiting entry into the U.S.117 Everyday, these idling trucks spewed diesel emissions and related
particulate matter containing endocrine disrupting chemicals (ERC) into the neighborhoods that
surrounded the ports of entry.118
In many border communities, the industrial facilities responsible for the cargo carried by
those trucks were also contaminating the environment, with tragic human health consequences.
In communities from Tijuana, Baja California Norte to Brownsville, Texas, health authorities
identified clusters of rare and often fatal neural tube birth defects. These clusters were located in
close proximity to industrial facilities that released toxic chemicals into the air or nearby
waterways. Without adequate environmental regulatory enforcement, multinational corporations
responsible for the contamination escaped accountability.119
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AIR QUALITY IN THE PASO DEL NORTE REGION
As with the rest of the border region, the existence of the CAA and the adoption of the
NOMs did not mean that there was a robust environmental protection apparatus operating in the
jurisdictions within the Paso del Norte. It would take decades for the governing entities in the
region to develop air monitoring networks, regulatory enforcement, and comprehensive reporting
of air quality. It would also take some time and significant cross-jurisdictional collaboration to tie
those efforts together and have the data necessary to inform an effective air quality control strategy
for the air basin.120
In 1972, Texas developed its first “Implementation Plan For Attaining National Ambient
Air Quality Standards,” commonly referred to as a state implementation plan (SIP), as required by
the 1970 amendment to the Clean Air Act. In that SIP, Texas provided a description for Region
11, a six county area covering the westernmost part of the state including El Paso County. (See
figure below.) For El Paso County, the SIP reported a population of 359,291. However, it stated
that given the proximity to Ciudad Juárez and its estimated population of 400,000, the region
should be considered a single metropolitan area of 800,000 for purposes of air pollution control. It
described the region as being traversed by the eastern range of the Rocky Mountains, with at least
seven peaks with an altitude of 8000 feet or higher, and numerous peaks exceeding 7000 feet. In
addition to providing demographic, climatic, and geographic characteristics for the six county
region, the SIP also projected moderate population and industrial growth in El Paso County that
was expected to affect the air quality of the region.121
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Figure 4. Region 11 SIP MAP
The SIP stated that the “only major influx of industry that could possibly affect air quality”
was the development of a large sulfuric acid plant that was under construction. Although the SIP
did not specifically name ASARCO, the smelter was actively working on strategies to mitigate
sulfur dioxide emissions, including erecting taller smoke stacks and converting sulfur-dioxide byproducts into marketable commodities such as elemental sulfur and sulfuric acid. 122 The SIP then
stated that adherence to existing and proposed Texas Air Control Board Regulations “should
provide adequate control of air pollution within the region.” The SIP went on to identify that the
major air pollution problems in the region were “the control of sulfur compounds from metal
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smelting; particulates from cotton gins, cement plants, asphalt batching plants, and automotive
emissions in El Paso.” It clearly identified the major pollution sources in El Paso but characterized
them as manageable so long as polluters adhered to the Texas Air Control Board regulations. Of
note, although the SIP stated that El Paso and Ciudad Juárez “must be considered a single
metropolitan area” for the purposes of air pollution control, it made no mention of Ciudad Juárez
in its assessment of pollution sources in the region.123
ASARCO
Oddly, the 1972 SIP does not mention that by 1970, the City of El Paso, the State of Texas,
the Texas Air Control Board and the Centers for Disease Control filed suit against ASARCO for
violating the 1967 Air Safety Code. ASARCO was processing copper, lead, zinc, and other ores
in an area surrounded by residential neighborhoods on either side of the border. The smelting
resulted in the release of air emissions that contained toxic byproducts such as lead, sulfur, arsenic,
and cadmium. Local and state authorities initiated the legal battle after health officials found that
43 percent of the people living within 1.6 kilometers of the smelter exhibited lead blood levels in
excess of the limit of 40 micrograms per 100 milliliters. Over 100 children from the surrounding
community had abnormal and potentially life threatening levels of lead in their blood, according
to the health screenings.124
In an effort to quantify the pollutants that ASARCO was emitting, the City of El Paso
Department of Health utilized a series of air samples. According to the Centers for Disease Control,
the air sample testing revealed that ASARCO “had emitted more than 1000 tons of lead, 560 tons
of zinc, 12 tons of cadmium and over 1 ton of arsenic into the atmosphere” between 1969 and
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1971.125 By 1972, concerns regarding the amount of lead contamination in the soil of properties
surrounding the smelter led City of El Paso political and health officials to recommend the
relocation of all residents of the community known as Smeltertown, a company town adjacent to
the smelter that ASARCO built in the late 1880s. By early 1973, Smeltertown’s property owners
evicted residents from their homes.126

Figure 5. ASARCO Smelter in El Paso, source NPR.org
ASARCO would continue to operate and emit toxins into the environment for more almost
three decades following this legal battle with the City of El Paso and the State of Texas. According
to the U.S. EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory, a database of estimated emissions reported by major
industries, ASARCO reported over 600 tons of toxic chemicals into the air between 1990 and
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1996. This included over 41 tons of arsenic, 7.2 tons of cadmium, 50.8 tons of lead, and 52.6 tons
of sulfur dioxide. A 1997 study of children living in Anapra, Mexico, within one mile of the
ASARCO El Paso smelter, produced similar findings to the study conducted in Smeltertown in the
early 1970s. Researchers found elevated blood lead levels in almost half of the children tested and
lead levels in surface soil was seven times higher than the standard.127
However, the emissions inventory reports to the TRI provided an incomplete and
inaccurate picture of ASARCO’s actual emissions profile. Those reports did not account for the
illegal hazardous waste that ASARCO’s El Paso smelter received between 1992 and 1997 from
the ASARCO-subsidiary Encycle - a waste management company contracted by the state of
Colorado to treat and dispose of highly corrosive and toxic waste from the U.S. Department of
Defense’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Beginning in 1992, the El Paso smelter ramped up operations
to blend the Encycle waste with the copper concentrate, especially during the night shifts when
smoke stack emissions could not be seen or when winds were blowing pollutants toward Ciudad
Juárez. The Encycle waste was treated like copper ore, despite the fact that it was hazardous waste
(likely pyridine and tetrachloroethylene) and not metal waste that could be recycled. This illegal
incineration of hazardous chemicals via ASARCO’s El Paso smelter continued until 1997, when
the U.S. EPA and the Texas Natural Resources Conversation Commission (TNRCC) finally
investigated the Encycle/ASARCO illegal operations. According to El Paso State Senator Eliot
Shapleigh and U.S. Congressman Silvestre Reyes, more than 5000 tons of hazardous waste,
including more than 300 tons of chemical warfare agents from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, were
incinerated in El Paso.128
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Despite ASARCO’s efforts to obscure its emissions, a study conducted in 1995 clearly
connected arsenic emissions in the region to ASARCO. The 1995 Texas Center for Policy Studies
publication, the Texas Environmental Almanac documented a special purpose air monitoring study
conducted by the TNRCC in 1993 in El Paso following findings of high arsenic levels in ambient
air analyses. The study site was Vilas Elementary School, located approximately two miles from
ASARCO. The study results indicated that arsenic readings consistently exceeded the annual and
24-hour screening levels. By comparing this monitoring data to data gathered in 1980 when
ASARCO was shut down due to a strike, the TNRCC was able to conclude that ASARCO’s
smelting activity was responsible for the elevated arsenic levels in the air. During a subsequent
permit hearing, ASARCO agreed to reduce its arsenic emissions by a factor of ten in order to
secure a permit renewal.129
ASARCO’s El Paso smelter operations continued until 1999, when depressed global copper
prices forced the company to place the smelter in “care and maintenance” status. This dormant
status allowed ASARCO to shut down operations without triggering remediation action on the
contaminated site that would have been required following a complete closure. In 2008, while the
company was navigating bankruptcy proceedings, the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ, formally TNRCC) granted ASARCO an emissions permit renewal for the El Paso
smelter, despite widespread community opposition. The same permit renewal request was
subsequently denied by the U.S. EPA in February 2009. Immediately thereafter, ASARCO
decommissioned the El Paso smelter.130
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BEYOND ASARCO
Although ASARCO was a notorious and destructive industrial polluter in the region, it was
certainly not the only source of air pollution contributing to the air quality issues in the Paso del
Norte air basin. A precise assessment of the region’s air quality is difficult to determine for the
period from the 1970s through the late 1980s due to the complete absence of air monitoring stations
in Ciudad Juárez. In 1989, U.S. EPA and the Mexican Secretaria de Desarrollo Social collaborated
to install and operate the first monitors in Ciudad Juárez. Additional monitors were installed in
1993 and 1996 to enable monitoring of ozone, PM-10 and CO.131 However, because this border
community shares an air basin in which air currents travel without regard to political boundaries,
it can be assumed that the air pollution levels recorded in El Paso County and Southern Doña Ana
County were indicative of air pollution levels throughout the Paso del Norte Region. This
assumption is also consistent with the 1972 Texas SIP, examined earlier, which stated that El Paso
and Ciudad Juárez “must be considered a single metropolitan area” for purposes of air quality. 132
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. EPA began to designate attainment status for the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards in areas throughout the country. Those designations are
recorded in the U.S. EPA Green Book – with the initial year of status designation correlating to
the year a particular NAAQS standard was implemented. The Green Book indicates that El Paso
County was designated to be in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide in 1971. El Paso
County was the only Texas county listed in non-attainment for carbon monoxide that year. It was
also listed as in serious non-attainment for the one-hour ozone standard in 1979 and moderate non-

131 INE/SEMARNAP, Primer Informe Sobre la Calidad del Aire en Ciudades Mexicanas, 57. Copy with Author.
This report indicates that the monitoring stations were operated by the Municipio de Ciudad Juárez in 1996, but
according to Jesus Reynoso, three of the air quality monitoring stations were still managed by the El Paso City
County Health and Environmental District in 1998. Jesus Reynoso, El Paso City County Health and Environmental
District’s environmental health program manager, interview by author, February 16, 1998, El Paso, Texas.
132 State of Texas, “Implementation Plan For Attaining National Ambient Air Quality Standards,” I-69.
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attainment for particulate matter (PM 10) in 1987. Southern Doña Ana County is listed as a nonattainment area for certain criteria pollutants. Specifically, Anthony, NM is listed continuously as
a moderate non-attainment area for PM 10 beginning in 1987. The Sunland Park, NM area is listed
as being in marginal non-attainment for the one-hour ozone standard beginning in 1995.133
With the implementation of the 1990 amendments to the CAA, the EPA designated El Paso a
serious non-attainment area for ground level ozone, and a moderate non-attainment area for carbon
monoxide and particulate matter.134 By the early 1990s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
reported that the El Paso/Ciudad Juárez sister cities had the worst air quality along the 2,000 miles
of border. At that time, El Paso had the worst air pollution in Texas and ranked among the ten most
polluted cities in the United States.135 With the availability of comprehensive air pollution data for
Ciudad Juárez for 1996, it is known that the city exceeded Mexican NOMs on 28 days, 15 days
due to ozone exceedances, 13 days due to PM-10 exceedances, and one day due to carbon
monoxide exceedances.136 A study conducted by Mexican authorities revealed that Ciudad Juárez
ranked second among Mexican cities, behind only Mexico City, in emissions produced by mobile
sources.137
While the air pollution monitoring data from both U.S. and Mexican regulators pointed to
exceedances for several criteria pollutants in the region, it is useful to understand what that

133 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Green Book,
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/anayo_tx.html,
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/anayo_nm.html, (accessed June 6, 2020). Non-attainment/attainment
designations for carbon monoxide are first reported in the Green Book for 1971; particulate matter designations are
first reported for 1987; and ozone one-hour standard designations are first reported for 1979.
134 Jesus J. Reynoso, Air Quality Program Manager, El Paso City-County Health & Environmental District.
Presentation to the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force Meeting, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua January 13, 1998.
Copy with author.
135 Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force, “Solving the Air Pollution Problems in Paso del Norte,” EI Paso,
Texas, 1994. Copy with Author.
136 INE/SEMARNAP, Primer Informe Sobre la Calidad del Aire en Ciudades Mexicanas, 61.
137 Martín Orquiz, "Juárez Capital del Smog." Diario de Juárez, August 26, 1995.
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meant for the health of the region’s residents. The U.S. EPA utilizes an annual air quality index
(AQI) to categorize air quality based on the measured levels of criteria air pollutants within a
geographic area. The AQI uses the following descriptions to relate daily air monitoring data to
the effects of air pollution on human health over the course of a year: good days, moderate days,
unhealthy for sensitive groups days, unhealthy days, very unhealthy days, and hazardous days.
The bar chart below provides the number of days in each category for the El Paso metropolitan
area (zero hazardous days were observed). Of note is the number of days classified as “unhealthy
days” or “unhealthy for sensitive groups days.” During 1980 there were 132 days in one of those
two “unhealthy” classifications – slightly more than a third of the year. By 1985 that number
rose to 248 days, with 138 of those days deemed unhealthy for the entire population. That is to
say that the region was living with air considered unhealthy for over two thirds of the year. By
1990, there were still more days in some unhealthy classification than those considered moderate
or good days. 138

138 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Outdoor Air Quality Data - Air Quality Index Report,”
https://www.epa.gov/outdoor-air-quality-data/about-air-data-reports, (accessed May 17, 2020).
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Table 5. U.S. EPA Annual Air Quality Index for El Paso Metropolitan Area

U.S. EPA Annual Air Quality Index for
El Paso Metropolitan Area
114

2000
1995

66

1990

67
38

1985

210
191

0%

128

78

10%

91

102

138

147
20%

30%

40%

60%

70%

Good Days

Moderate Days

Unhealthy for Sensitive Groups Days

Unhealthy Days

80%

0
1

104
50%

20
17 0

68

110

67

1980

40

28 1
90%

100%

Very Unhealthy Days

NON-ATTAINMENT FOR CRITERIA POLLUTANTS
As noted earlier, El Paso County and Doña Ana County were in non-attainment of the
NAAQS for certain criteria pollutants beginning in the 1970s, continuing through the 1990s.
Ciudad Juárez was also out of compliance with the NOMs during the 1990s, when monitoring
began there. In order to better understand the criteria pollutants that exceeded air quality
standards in the region (ground level ozone, PM 10, and CO) and the pollution sources that
contributed to those exceedances, it is necessary to examine each pollutant as it was manifested
in the Paso del Norte air basin. Below is a brief description of the three pollutants and the main
sources for these pollutants.139

139 For the purposes of this study, I am focusing on the criteria pollutants that have exceeded air quality standards.
These are pollutants for which official air quality monitoring data is available – albeit to a limited degree for Ciudad
Juárez.
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Ground level ozone (O3) is a photochemical compound that results from the reaction
between three key ingredients: sunlight, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds.
Combustion mechanisms such as boilers, heaters, incinerators, and engines commonly produce
nitrogen oxides (NOx). Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are emitted from hundreds of sources,
but the most common sources are gasoline loading terminals, gas stations, dry cleaners, and
automotive body shops. The presence of these chemicals in conjunction with light winds, sparse
cloud cover, heat, and plenty of sunlight, provides the perfect conditions for the formation of
ground level ozone, a major component in urban smog. Ozone is a very unstable contaminant that
decomposes just as easily as it forms.140 This type of ozone is unlike the stratospheric ozone which
occurs 9 to 18 miles above us and which actually helps to protect the earth from harmful ultraviolet
rays.141 During the 1990s, automobiles were responsible for approximately 58 percent of the
ground level ozone in the region. Other contributors were paint and body shops that use paints,
solvents, and thinners high in VOCs.142
Carbon Monoxide (CO) is a colorless, odorless, poisonous gas that is the product of
incomplete combustion of fossil fuels. Vehicle emissions were largely responsible for the
production of carbon monoxide in the air basin during the mid to late 1990s, with local traffic and
trade transports were responsible for 93 percent of the carbon monoxide in the air basin. The region
had a large and old vehicle fleet consisting of over 360,000 vehicles in Ciudad Juárez, close to
300,000 in El Paso, and approximately 70,000 vehicles in Doña Ana County. In El Paso, 34 percent

140 Gobierno del Estado de Chihuahua, Gobierno Municipal de Juárez, Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos
Naturales y Pesca, and Delegacion Federal SEMARNAP Chihuahua, “Programa de Gestión de la calidad del Aire de
Ciudad Juárez 1998-2002,” Mexico, May 1998, 36. Copy with author.
141 Austin AIR Force, "Ozone Action Days," Informational Booklet, April 1995. Copy with author.
142 Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force, “Sharing a Common Airshed,” Pamphlet (El Paso, TX, 1994.) Copy
with author.
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of the vehicle fleet was over 10 years old, while 63 percent of the vehicles in Ciudad Juárez were
over 10 years old. Given socioeconomic conditions, government officials suspected that the Doña
Ana County fleet was similar to that of Ciudad Juárez.143 In the early 1990s, the majority of Ciudad
Juárez’s public transport vehicles were 1979 models.144 Environmental officials estimated that El
Paso and Ciudad Juárez contributed equally to the overall emissions of carbon monoxide because
although vehicles in Ciudad Juárez were generally older and many lacked pollution control devices
such as catalytic converters, El Paso vehicles were generally driven more miles by single
occupants.145
Particulate matter (PM-10), consists of inhalable particles that measure less than 10
microns in diameter. PM-10 is generated by natural sources such as soil, pollen, and dust storms.
However, anthropogenic activities such as open burning, sandblasting, use of unpaved roads,
construction, residential wood burning, quarries, and motor vehicle emissions contributed
substantially to the PM levels in the region.146 Some PM-producing activities considered an
integral part of everyday life included: agricultural burning and tilling, practiced extensively in the
river valley prior to the planting season; open-air trash burning, a commonly used method of trash
disposal in peripheral communities that are not serviced by municipal trash collection; and wood
burning, used as a primary source of energy for food preparation and indoor heating in many
underdeveloped areas in the region.147 In Ciudad Juárez, a significant source of particulate matter

143 Carlos Rincón, "Issue Paper: Transportation Sector Within the Paso del Norte Region," Paper presented at the
Joint Advisory Committee Strategic Plan Symposium, University of Texas at El Paso, February 18, 1998. Copy
with author.
144 Juan Salcido, Comité Ecológico de Cd Juárez. Presentation to the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission Meeting, Oct. 7, 1993. Copy with author.
145 Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force, “Sharing a Common Airshed.”
146 Ibid.
147 Rincón, February 18, 1998.
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was the brick kiln industry, consisting of over 300 informal small businesses that produced bricks
for the construction industry.148 In addition, throughout the 1990s Ciudad Juárez residents
traversed the city on a transportation network that consisted of 1,480 kilometers of dust-producing
unpaved roads – about 48 percent of the roadways.149 These and other sources combined in the air
basin, resulting in health threatening levels of particulate matter.
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
As was evident from the non-attainment designations on both sides of the border, each of
the contaminants described above existed in levels considered unhealthy for Paso del Norte
residents. Generally, adverse effects of air pollution include asthma and allergy attacks, irritation
of the eyes, nose, and throat, and damage to the lungs.150 However, it is clear from numerous
scientific studies and research publications that the effects of poor air quality manifest themselves
throughout the human body – in cardiac, respiratory, reproductive, and neurological systems. For
those border residents who live or work near high-traffic areas such as freeways and ports of entry,
the health effects are more acute.151
More specifically, the health effects of ground level ozone include increased incidences of
respiratory diseases. People who suffer from lung diseases such as emphysema, bronchitis,
pneumonia, asthma, and colds have more difficulties breathing when the levels of ozone in the air

148 Allen Blackman, Jhih-shyang Shih, David Evans, Michael Batz, Stephen Newbold, and Joseph Cook, “The
Benefits and Costs of Informal Sector Pollution Control: Mexican Brick Kilns,” Environment and Development
Economics 11, (2003): 603-627.
149 Gobierno del Estado de Chihuahua, Gobierno Municipal de Juárez, Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos
Naturales y Pesca, and Delegación Federal SEMARNAP Chihuahua, “Programa de Gestión de la calidad del Aire de
Ciudad Juárez 1998-2002,” México, May 1998, 22.
150 Kirk P. Watson and Peter Emerson, "Border Towns Need Air Pollution Program." Austin American-Statesman
July 14, 1993.
151 Penelope J. E. Quintana, Paul Ganster, Paula E. Stigler Granados, Gabriela Muñoz-Melendez, Margarito
Quintero-Núñez, and Jose Guillermo Rodriguez-Ventura, “Risky Borders: Traffic Pollution and Health Effects at
US–Mexican Ports of Entry,” Journal of Borderland Studies 30, no. 3 (August 2015): 291.
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are high.152 Other symptoms associated with ozone include shortness of breath, coughing,
headaches, nausea, chest pains, and even permanent lung damage.153 A U.S. EPA study found that
cases of asthma among children rose by 118 percent between 1980 and 1993, and it was the leading
cause of child hospital admissions during the late 1990s. It was suspected that ozone pollution
was the leading culprit in this alarming trend in the U.S. – a conclusion that can be extrapolated to
the Paso del Norte Air Basin where ozone levels were also a concern.154
Particulate matter is known to cause lung and respiratory tract irritation.155 Findings from
a 1996 study conducted by the Natural Resources Defense Council show that the estimated annual
cardiopulmonary deaths attributable to particulate air pollution in the El Paso metropolitan
statistical area were 1,390 (for 1989).156 Particulate matter can be even more dangerous because
it serves as transporter of endocrine disruptors and hazardous air pollutants such as benzene,
asbestos, and other heavy metals, into the body. PM-10, characterized by irregular and porous
surfaces, can assimilate and transport chemical contaminants known to have carcinogenic effects
into the blood stream and organs via the lungs.157

152 Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, "Ozone Action Days: Do Your Share for Cleaner Air,
Ground Level Ozone and Health," Educational Leaflet. Copy with author.
153 Pam Reed, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, "Austin Metropolitan Area Air Care: Summary
Report." Copy with author.
154 Lee Simmons "Ozone at Lowest Level in 25 years, Still a Problem," The Daily Texan, April 1, 1997.
155 Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force, “Sharing a Common Airshed”.
156 Natural Resources Defense Council, "Breath Taking: Premature Mortality due to Particulate Air Pollution in
239 American Cities," May 1996, 70.
157 Shelley Scalzo, “Health Effects of Air Pollution in the U.S.-Mexican Border Region,” in The U.S.-Mexican
Border Environment:Binational Quality Management, ed. Ross Pumphrey (San Diego, CA: San Diego State
University Press 2006), 171. Sukh Sidhu, Brian Gullett, Richard Stiebich, Joy Klosterman, Jesse Contreras, and
Michael DeVito, “Endocrine Disrupting Chemical Emissions from Combustion Sources: Diesel Particulate
Emissions and Domestic Waste Open Burn Emissions,” Atmospheric Environment 39, Issue 5 (February 2005): 801.
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The high carbon monoxide levels in ambient air are known to cause dizziness, headaches,
and chest pains. At low levels, carbon monoxide reduces oxygen levels in the bloodstream. 158 A
U.S. EPA study estimated that 40,000 Americans died prematurely each year from respiratory
illnesses and heart attacks linked with air pollution, of which carbon monoxide is a major
component.159 Again, while many of these studies cite data for U.S. cities, the effects of these
pollutants on people in Ciudad Juárez would be the same.
In addition to the commonly recognized effects of air pollution, researchers and public
health officials have pinpointed very serious health impacts that extended to learning disabilities
in school age children who are exposed to higher levels of air pollution by virtue of where they
live and the proximity to pollution sources (like freeways, power plants, and industrial
facilities).160 One study of fourth and fifth graders in El Paso Independent School District found a
positive correlation between air toxins and academic performance, exposing a clear relationship
between on-road mobile sources such as diesel transports and non-road mobile sources such as rail
transports with lower grade point averages.161
Other studies have found linkages between elevated levels of air pollution and increased
risk of infant mortality.162 In 2002, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North

158 Thomas A. Cahill, I Can Breathe Clearly Now – Protecting Yourself From Air Pollution (Davis, CA: EditPros
LLC 2017), 15.
159 Simmons, "Ozone at Lowest Level in 25 years, Still a Problem."
160 Manuel Pastor, Jr, James L. Sadd, and Rachel Morello-Frosch, “Reading, Writing, and Toxics: Children’s
Health, Academic Performance, and Environmental Justice in Los Angeles,” Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy 22, no. 2 (2004): 271-290.
161 Stephanie E Clark-Reyna, et al. "Residential Exposure to Air Toxics Is Linked to Lower Grade Point Averages
among School Children in El Paso, Texas, USA." Population and Environment 37, no. 3 (March 2016): 319-340.
162 Isabelle Romieu, Fernando Meneses, Juan Jose . Sienra-Monge, Jose Huerta, Silvia Ruiz Velasco, Mary C.
White, Ruth A. Etzel, and Mauricio Hernandez-Avila, “Effects of Urban Pollutants on Emergency Visits for
Childhood Asthma in Mexico City,” American Journal of Epidemiology 141, no. 8 (1995): 546-553. Isabelle
Romieu, Matiana Ramirez Aguilar, Hortensia Moreno Macias, Albino Barraza Villarreal, Leticia Hernandez
Cadena, and Luz Carbajal Arroyo, “Health Impacts of Air Pollution on Morbidity and Mortality among Children of
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico.” Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Montreal, Canada, 2003.
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America funded a study that examined the health effects of air pollution on children in Ciudad
Juárez. Under the direction of Isabelle Romieu, a team of researchers looked at five years of data
of mortality and emergency hospital visits for respiratory related illnesses for children ages 0 to
16.163 Researchers gathered emergency visit data from 1997 to 2001 for the two major hospitals
within the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, the public healthcare system that provides
healthcare to approximately seventy percent of the population in Ciudad Juárez. They tracked
emergency room visits related to upper-respiratory illness, lower respiratory illness, and asthma
by age groups. For children ages 0-5 alone, they found 36,087 emergency room visits.164 They
also gathered mortality data from the Health Ministry of Chihuahua, including variables such as
age, cause of death, and zip code (to assist in determining socio-economic status). The researchers
then took air pollution data from the Ciudad Juárez monitoring network system as well as air
monitoring stations located along the border, on the U.S. side.165
Applying a series of complex statistical analyses, researchers combed through the air
pollution, climatic, and health data to assess whether the elevated levels of air pollutants such as
ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter affected the respiratory health of children in Ciudad
Juárez. Researchers found significant associations between elevated ozone ambient levels and
emergency room visits for upper-respiratory illnesses and asthma in children of all ages. Children
five years or less also experienced lower-respiratory illnesses in the days following elevated
ambient ozone levels. With regard to mortality, the data suggested that elevated levels of
particulate matter increased the risk of respiratory mortality among infants (1 month to 1 year old)

163Romieu, et.al., Health Impacts, ii.
164 Diana Washington Valdez, “Pollution Kills Juárez Children, Study Says: Report Calls NAFTA Traffic Likely
Source.” El Paso Times. November 11, 2003.
165 Romieu, et.al., Health Impacts, 3-5.
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from lower socio-economic status. Vehicle exhaust and unpaved streets are leading sources of
particulate matter in the air.166
The findings of this study provide yet another source of information that indicates the
effects of air pollution on human health. In this case, we see the effects on the region’s youngest
and most vulnerable residents. Given the nature of the region’s air basin and the pollution levels
observed in this study, the conclusions regarding health effects on children can reasonably be
applied to children living in similar conditions throughout the Paso del Norte region.167 These and
other studies also point to the long-term ramifications of air pollution on the health and economic
well-being of children in the region.168

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND FRACTURED GOVERNANCE
Definitions of environmental justice vary broadly across communities and among
environmental activists in the U.S. and globally. However, most definitions tend to focus on the
unfair burden of environmental risk carried by communities of color and low-income
communities. Historically, environmental justice movements in the U.S. have focused on the
disparate development and enforcement of environmental laws and policies that has facilitated
concentrations of highly polluting industries in working class communities.169 In Mexico and

166 Ibid, 3.
167 Ibid, 13.
168 Stephanie E Clark-Reyna, et.al., "Residential Exposure to Air Toxics Is Linked to Lower Grade Point Averages
among School Children in El Paso, Texas, USA," 336. Robert Urman, Rob McConnell, Talat Islam, Edward L Avol,
Frederick W Lurmann, Hita Vora, William S Linn, Edward B Rappaport, Frank D Gilliland, and W. James
Gauderman. “Associations of Children’s Lung Function with Ambient Air Pollution: Joint Effects of Regional and
near-Roadway Pollutants.” Thorax 69, no. 6 (June 1, 2014): 540. https://doi.org/10.1136/thoraxjnl-2012-203159
(accessed July 5, 2020).
169 Robert Bullard ed., Confronting Environmental Racism – Voices From The Grassroots (Boston: South End
Press, 1993), 8-13.
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other parts of Latin America, environmental justice activists have been less focused on hazardous
siting inequities and more rooted in popular mobilization for social justice. Meanwhile, at an
international level, calls for environmental justice tended to focus on governmental policies that
enable multinational corporations to exploit indigenous and low-income communities by
externalizing the environmental costs of their production and exploiting lax environmental and
labor protections.170 As with most issues affecting the binational region, environmental justice
demands along the border melded concerns regarding hazardous industrial development as well
as larger questions of social justice and equity to create unique manifestations of environmental
justice activism.171
These largely poor, Mexican/Mexican American border communities contended with a
quagmire of fragmented jurisdictional failures where multiple local, state and federal
governments eluded regulatory accountability through policies that blamed pollution on sources
outside of their control. One example of such a policy is Section 818 of the 1990 amendment to
the Clean Air Act, which provided relief for cities along the international border that could
demonstrate that their emissions levels would meet federal standards but for emissions
emanating from another country. By enacting this clause, the U.S. Congress allowed state and
local governments to submit air quality modeling which demonstrated that their abatement
efforts were sufficient to meet NAAQS requirements, even if emissions data showed violations
of the standards for the affected communities. On the Mexican side, insufficient resources
limited the federal and local governments’ ability to effectuate a meaningful environmental

170 Robert R. Kuehn, "A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice," Environmental Law Reporter
News & Analysis 30, no. 9 (September 2000): 10681, 10683.
171 David V. Carruthers ed., Environmental Justice in Latin America – Problems, Promise, and Practice
(Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2008), 2-6, 151-152.
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protection apparatus through the 1990s. In effect, this meant that industrialization could continue
undeterred, with new emissions permits issued on both sides of the border while border residents
suffered the health consequences of worsening air quality without governmental remedy.172
In 1994, the U.S. President Bill Clinton issued an executive order titled, “Federal Actions
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.” This
executive order directed federal agencies to:
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing,
as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations in the United States.173
However, this executive order was meaningless in border communities where imperatives related
to national security, illegal immigration, and drug interdiction have outweighed any directives
related to environmental justice – particularly with regard to trade traffic at the ports of entry.174
In theory, the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and
Improvement of the Environment in Border Areas, also known as the La Paz Agreement of 1983,
provided a protective framework intended to address the environmentally damaged and fragile
region. Although the La Paz Agreement did not include the term environmental justice, the
Agreement called on the parties to undertake appropriate measures to address sources of

172 United States Congress, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, S. 1630, 101st Congress, 11/15/90.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/senate-bill/1630/text (accessed February 1, 2020). U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Texas, El Paso Area, Ozone Attainment Plan Summary,
https://www.epa.gov/sips-tx/texas-el-paso-area-ozone-attainment-plan-summary (accessed May 3, 2020).
INE/SEMARNAP, Primer Informe Sobre la Calidad del Aire en Ciudades Mexicanas, 57.
173 United States Presidential Documents, Executive Order 12898 as of February 11, 1994, Federal Register Vol.
59, No. 32, February 16, 1994.
174 Penelope J. E. Quintana, Paul Ganster, Paula E. Stigler Granados, Gabriela Muñoz-Melendez, Margarito
Quintero-Núñez, and Jose Guillermo Rodriguez-Ventura, “Risky Borders: Traffic Pollution and Health Effects at
US–Mexican Ports of Entry,” Journal of Borderland Studies 30, no. 3 (August 2015): 292. Ganster and Lorey, The
U.S.-Mexican Border Today, 207-233.
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pollution that affected the border area of the other. The agreement also called on the Parties to
assess and take appropriate measures to mitigate or avoid policies and projects believed to have
significant environmental impacts on the border.175
CONCLUSION
Despite the La Paz Agreement and numerous subsequent agreements between the U.S.
and Mexico (examined in the next chapter), federal policies in both countries have subjected
border residents to an inordinate environmental burden in the name of free trade and economic
development. As a result of federal customs policies and woefully inadequate investment in
trade-related infrastructure, border communities have been contaminated by thousands of tons of
toxic emissions. For those low-income, minority communities located adjacent to ports of entry,
the inequitable exposure to environmental hazards is even more pronounced. Furthermore,
insufficient investment in environmental regulatory resources has enabled polluters ranging from
multinational corporations to family-owned brick kilns to pollute border communities with
minimal, if any, accountability.176
This was most certainly the case for the Paso del Norte region. As this chapter illustrated,
the widespread industrialization of the region for the purposes of expanding global trade, without
the necessary regulatory and infrastructure resources from the U.S. and Mexican governments,
placed an unsafe and unsustainable burden on Paso del Norte residents. In turn, border residents
and environmental activists have responded with cross-border collaborations that capture both
local and global dimensions of environmental justice. The following chapters will examine the

175 La Paz Agreement, Articles 1 – 7.
176Esparza , Waldorf, Chavez “Localized Effects of Globalization,” 135-136. Penelope J. E. Quintana, et.al. “Risky
Borders: Traffic Pollution and Health Effects at US–Mexican Ports of Entry,” 289, 291, 298.

80

evolution of border environmental policy as well as one of those cross-border environmental
coalitions that advocated for transboundary management of shared resources.
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Chapter Three: Environmental Governance Structures of the U.S. Mexico Borderlands

In 1853, the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty Relating to the Boundary line,
Transit of Persons, Etc., across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, also known as the Gadsden Treaty.
This treaty involved the
sale of thirty thousand
square miles of
Mexican territory to the
US for a sum of $15
million. The Gadsden
Treaty came on the
heels of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo of
1848, which ended the
Mexican War, or as
Mexicans referred to it,
Figure 6. Territory Acquired from Mexico

the War of the North

American Invasion.177 Mexico emerged from this conflict and treaty having ceded one half of its
territory to the United States – which in turn increased the latter nation’s size by one third. This
map illustrates the territory Mexico lost to the U.S. between 1848 and 1853. It was under the pall

177 “Treaty relating to the boundary line, transit of persons, etc., across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.” December 30,
1853. United States Statutes at Large 10 Stat. 1031; TS 208; 9 Bevans 812. “Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.”
February 2, 1848. United States National Archives.
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of this conflict, resentment, and loss that border relations between the US and Mexico
commenced.178
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo called for the creation of the Joint United States and
Mexico Boundary Commission – a body charged with surveying, mapping and demarcating the
newly defined boundary line. Beginning in 1849, this endeavor involved teams of scientists,
diplomats, bureaucrats and military personnel from both countries, who toiled for more than
seven years to carry out the mission of mapping out this border region. Joined in this common
mission, the teams of American and Mexican surveyors faced hardships and challenges that
could not have been anticipated or understood by officials in Washington D.C. or Mexico City.
Those who negotiated the boundary line did so without knowledge or consideration of
geographic conditions, climate, and other factors critical to the demarcation process.179
In addition to the terrain they were sent to chart, these survey teams discovered that their
very survival would require cooperation and collaboration. They faced significant difficulties
with transportation, extreme weather, equipment failures, lack of funding and hostilities from
indigenous communities who rejected the sovereignty of the Commission. According to Rachel
St. John, the teams worked with a great deal of mutual respect, placing their mission above
divisive national politics.180 While this binational expedition may have established a cooperative

178 Clint E. Smith, The Disappearing Border: Mexico-United States Relations to the 1990s (Stanford, CA: Stanford
Alumni Association, 1992), 17. Ganster and Lorey, The U.S.-Mexican Border Today, 32-33. Figure 6. The map was
featured in the Dallas Morning News Article by Eva Limon, “How did the U.S.-Mexico border come to be where it
is today? Curious Texas digs into history” June 22, 2018. https://www.dallasnews.com/news/curioustexas/2018/06/22/how-did-the-u-s-mexico-border-come-to-be-where-it-is-today-curious-texas-digs-into-history/
(accessed August 30, 2020.)
179 Norris Hundley, Dividing the Waters: Century of Controversy Between the United States and Mexico (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966), 18, 19. Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.Mexico Border (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 23.
180 St. John, Line in the Sand, 23-26.
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relationship that enabled them to survive the unfamiliar environment, C.J. Alvarez explains that
they also shared cultural and racial biases that reflected their derisive views of the border and its
residents. Their correspondence and official reports often referred to the desert environment as a
wasteland and associated the adobe homes that facilitated survival in the desert climate with
filth, misery and uncivilized living. One surveyor described the border as a “worthless region,
where boundary disputes are not likely to occur.”181
From the perspective on binational governance, the survey expeditions established a
mixed legacy. On the one hand, these teams of professionals established a foundation for
US/Mexico cooperation among government officials charged with managing border issues.
These teams of foreigners with little knowledge of the territory completed an arduous, and at
times life-threatening, joint mission in collaborative manner. On the other hand, Alvarez
contends that they “inaugurated a long tradition of…skepticism, dismissiveness and revulsion
about desert environments and the people.”182 In the decades that followed, regional
government officials and community leaders who understood the needs of the border region were
forced to navigate through these traditions of bias and dismissiveness prevalent within numerous
federal agencies. These local leaders would make the case for cooperation across national
jurisdictions in order pursue regional goals, despite the tendency toward nationalist agendas.
Since 1853, there have been a series of binational agreements between the US and
Mexico, intended to strengthen the sovereignty and power of the federal governments on either
side of the nascent boundary. Some of these agreements were designed to create mutual, albeit
disparate, benefit in economic and environmental spheres. This chapter explores the

181 C. J. Alvarez, Border Land, Border Water: A History of Construction On The US-Mexico Divide (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2019) 19, 27-30, 51, 52.
182 Alvarez, Border Land, Border Water, 26, 52.
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development and evolution of treaties and other mechanisms designed to manage shared natural
resources and protect the environmental health of the U.S.-Mexico border region. For
comparative purposes, it examines a relevant treaty related to the U.S.-Canadian border as well.
It also analyzes the ways in which formal bilateral frameworks became increasingly
collaborative and responsive to border communities who demanded solutions to address the
challenges of managing and protecting transboundary natural resources. While this is not an
exhaustive analysis of environmental agreements between the U.S. and its neighbors, it pays
particular attention to those that have proven to be most consequential to the borderlands in the
second half of the twentieth century. Finally, this chapter also introduces the case study of the
Paso del Norte region that illustrates the progress and tangible transformations achieved in
redefining border environmental policy and creating legally-recognized collaborative,
stakeholder-driven governance structures.

BOUNDARIES VERSUS BORDERS – MODELS OF SHARED RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel differentiate between the terms boundaries and
borders to make the critical conceptual distinction in the study of borderlands. Whereas the
former conveys the existence of a physical or cultural divide, the latter is more often utilized to
emphasize a region rather than delineations on a map.183 We can see the application of this
conceptual distinction as we look at the early U.S.-Mexico treaties and bilateral organizations
that were most concerned with the administration of jurisdictional authority and control of shared
natural resources during the late 19th and early 20th century. The pervasive theme of border
policy during this period was controlling the fluidity of people and natural resources – in an

183 Baud, Michiel, and Willem Van Schendel. “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.” Journal of World
History 8, no. 2 (1997): 213.
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attempt to impose stasis in a region characterized by mobility. Utilizing Baud and Van
Schendel’s framework, this period was characterized by boundary policy rather than border
policy.184 During the latter half of the 20th century when globalization intensified the economic
stakes for both the U.S. and Mexico, and the environmental degradation of the borderlands
became clearer and more pronounced, the language of bilateral environmental treaties and
organizational frameworks began to focus more broadly on the border as a region rather than on
the location of a boundary.185
One of the first examples of a boundary-focused organization was the International
Boundary Commission (IBC), authorized by a treaty signed by the United States and Mexico in
1889. The IBC, formally organized in 1894, was established to monitor and survey the portions
of the U.S.-Mexico border where the boundary is formed by either the Rio Grande or the
Colorado River. The IBC was deemed necessary because of the changes and shifts in the beds of
both rivers. It was also imperative to have an organization charged with administering the
stipulations of all relevant treaties. The jurisdiction of the IBC included the examination of all
differences or questions that arose regarding alterations in the course of the rivers or any works
constructed on the river that might affect its course. For the Paso del Norte region, the IBC was
instrumental in the Rio Grande Rectification Project that spanned the period of 1934 to 1938.

184 Alvarez, Border Land, Border Water, 5.
185 That is not to say that border control policy subsided in the late 20 th century. Rather, that bilateral agreements
during this period began to address management and protection of shared environmental resources that span the
US/Mexico boundary. For more on late 20th century border control policy, see Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra!: A
History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); C. J. Alvarez, Border Land,
Border Water: A History of Construction On The US-Mexico Divide (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2019).
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This boundary dispute project required the reconstruction and straightening of the path of the
river, and ultimately involved the exchange of approximately 3500 acres of land.186
In accordance with the treaty, the IBC consists of two sections, each country having its
own section headed by a commissioner with an ambassador-level appointment, selected by the
president of the respective country. These commissioners were (and continue to be) required to
be professional engineers and their section staffs include engineers, interpreters, and legal
specialists. The commissioners present their findings on given disputes to the U.S. State
Department and the Mexican Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.187 In 1944, the Commission's
name was changed to its current name, the International Boundary and Water Commission, and
given several added responsibilities regarding the joint use of international surface waters for the
following purposes: domestic and municipal uses; agriculture and stock raising; electric power
and other industrial uses; navigation; and fishing and hunting.188
Over the years, the Commission has faced issues regarding riverbeds and surface water
distribution as well as disputes regarding ground water, water quality management, and border
sanitation problems.189 One such dispute took place when U.S. farmers along the Colorado River
caused the water’s salinity level to rise, rendering several thousand acres of downstream
Mexican farmland useless. In this case, the IBWC was at odds with the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation with regard to the cause of and solution to this problem. Ultimately, the U.S.

186 “Convention-Mexico-Boundary,” 51st Congress 1889-1891. Vol. 26, 1513, United States Statutes at Large.
Mueller, 43-45. Joanne Tortorete Kropp, “Constructing a River, Building a Border: An Environmental History of
Irrigation, Water Law, State Formation, and the Rio Grande Rectification Project in the El Paso/Juárez Valley” (PhD
diss., The University of Texas at El Paso, 2016), 7-8.
187 “Convention-Mexico-Boundary.”
188 “Mexico-Water Utilization,” 79th Congress, 1st session. 1945 Vol.59. Part 2, 1222. United States Statutes at
Large.
189 Stephen Mumme, "The Politics of Water Apportionment and Pollution Problems in the United States-Mexico
Relations." U.S.-Mexico Series, no.5. (Overseas Development Council: Washington D.C., 1982) 9.
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government charged the IBWC with building a desalinating facility in the Yuma valley that
attempted to correct the salinity problem in the Mexicali Valley. The 260 million dollar project
took almost two decades to bring online and turned out to be a solution that was ill-suited for the
complexity of the problem.190 True to its charge regarding boundaries, the IBWC also played an
integral role in the construction of the border control infrastructure including border fencing and
barricade building projects all along the boundary line.191
Although it has performed its prescribed duties in accordance with its mandate and some
have considered it a model of international cooperation related to its mandate, the IBWC has drawn
criticism from border communities because of its limited jurisdiction and the disconnected role it
has occupied within the border region. For decades they had been visibly present with their offices
situated along the border; however, the strict technical staffing and IBWC office reporting
procedures did not allow for community input regarding solutions to what are essentially their
problems. That is to say, the 1944 treaty did not codify engagement with the communities they
serve, which was therefore not a practice of the IBWC. In their attempts to keep the IBWC as
focused on managing boundary issues as possible, the federal governments created an institution
that was largely disengaged and out of touch with the communities within which they operated.192
The IBWC bridged some of this lack of outreach and community engagement via other
binational agreements and initiatives, which created new channels to bring border community
concerns to its attention. For example, following the passage of the NAFTA in 1994 and the
subsequent creation of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), both IBWC

190 Evan R. Ward, Border Oasis: Water and the Political Ecology of the Colorado River Delta, 1940-1975
(Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 2003), 138-143.
191 Alvarez, Border Land, Border Water, 5, 9, 190, 206-207.
192 Ward, Border Oasis, 151. Oscar Carrillo, “Managing Scarce Water Resources in the El Paso del Norte Region”
(professional report, The University of Texas at Austin, 1995), 36-37.

88

section leaders were required to serve as ex-oficio members of the BECC board of directors. The
BECC board of directors was required to consult with community stakeholders regarding critical
environmental infrastructure projects and hold quarterly public forums throughout the border
region.193 These forums provided a welcomed opportunity for border communities to communicate
directly with both IBWC section leaders. For the IBWC Commissioners, these forums and
community contact they enabled were possible only because the bilateral agreements that created
the BECC superseded the rather hidebound and rigid guidelines of the 1944 treaty that established
the IBWC and had heretofore made such engagement impermissible.194
For comparative purposes, it is useful to look at a similar binational organization created
to manage shared natural resources along the U.S./Canada border. The International Joint
Committee (IJC) is an organization established through the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
between the United States and Canada. The IJC was created in order to supervise the
observance of obligations of the two countries under the 1909 treaty, as they pertain to the
planning and management of water resources in the Great Lakes Basin. As prescribed by the
treaty, the IJC is led by six commissioners, three political appointees named by the president or
prime minister of each country. Notably, the commissioners are required to sign a declaration
that she/he will “impartially perform the duties imposed upon him under this treaty,” presumably

193 BECC was created parallel with NAFTA in order to work with the North America Development Bank and
other financial institutions to supply capital for environmental infrastructure projects and sustainable development in
the border region. International Boundary and Water Commission, United States Section Website, “History of U.S.
Section Commissioners” https://www.ibwc.gov/About_Us/Commish_History.html (accessed 12/27/2020)
194 Carlos Rincón, interview by author, November 20, 1995. Unfortunately for border communities, the public
forums and community input facilitated by the BECC Board of Directors meetings were eliminated in 2017 when
the U.S. and Mexico merged the BECC into the North American Development Bank (NADB). The NADB board
does not include the IBWC Section Commissioners. For more on this merger see: “NADB-BECC Board of
Directors moves forward with institutional integration; approves US$82.3 million in financing for new infrastructure
projects along the U.S.-Mexico border,” https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-becc-board-of-directors-moves-forwardwith-institutional-integration-approves-us823-million-in-financing-for-new-infrastructure-projects-along-the-usmexico-border.

89

to emphasize that they are not to serve nationalist aims. Much like the reporting structure of the
IBWC, the IJC is under the direct purview of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and
the State Department in Washington D.C.195
The IJC has an investigative and fact-finding function that it exercises through referrals
that it receives from either country. Although the treaty allows for a unilateral referral to be made
to the IJC, traditionally both countries have cleared their referrals with one another before
forwarding them to the IJC. Some scholars believe this custom has served to depoliticize the
IJC's work. They argue that the IJC has further depoliticized its work by placing a tremendous
amount of emphasis on technical expertise. They have done this by establishing a scientific
board that draws staffing resources from government agencies on both sides of the border.196
Other scholars argue that the IJC has been considered a highly technical and depoliticized body
because the referrals it has received over the years are those for which the two governments were
largely in agreement regarding potential solutions. Said differently, the two governments rarely
referred issues to the IJC for investigation and recommendations if there were serious
disagreements regarding the desired outcomes.197
Perhaps because of both the technical nature of the IJC and the issues referred to it, the
commission has eschewed publicity and political sensationalism - making it a rather obscure entity.
The general commitment to impartiality among the commissioners is reflected in its referral
record, which indicates that of the more than one hundred referrals they have received since 1912,

195 Alan M. Schwartz and Joseph T. Jockel, "Increasing Power of IJC," International Perspectives
(November/December 1983): 3. Stephen Brooks, “The International Joint Commission: The Promise and Limits of
an Ambitious Model,” in Transboundary Environmental Governance Across the World’s Longest Border, ed.
Stephen Brooks and Andrea Olive (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 5-6.
196 Schwartz and Jockel, "Increasing Power of IJC," 3.
197 Brooks, “The International Joint Commission: The Promise and Limits of an Ambitious Model,” 10.
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only three have resulted in divisions along national lines. This is a very unique characteristic for
a bi-national institution given the tendency for parties to become entrenched in national interests
and lose sight of the common goal of resource protection.198 Of course, there are also examples of
highly controversial projects where the IJC was essentially sidelined and therefore was not allowed
to issue a recommendation. Such was the case with the dam construction and subsequent flooding
in the Columbia River valley. The IJC had investigated the matter and issued two environmental
impact reports, but ultimately the 1961 Columbia River Treaty was settled through governmentto-government negotiations rather than through IJC, despite their early involvement.199
During the first half of the twentieth century, the IJC was a strong proponent of ecologically
damaging water-control megaprojects. By the 1950s, the role of the IJC consisted of managing or
promoting many small and several major projects affecting boundary water levels and flows as
well as negotiating some water apportionment and air pollution issues. After the 1960s, consistent
with the growing societal environmental awareness discussed in the previous chapter, the IJC
transformed into a more environmentally-minded governance body. The IJC took on several
investigations regarding the cooperative development of transboundary resources at the request of
both governments. In the following decades, the commission transitioned from an engineering
and legal role to one of environmental protection that now characterizes it.200
In 1972, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement gave the IJC ongoing surveillance and
monitoring responsibilities, which was in effect an ongoing referral that allowed the IJC to become

198 Schwartz and Jockel, "Increasing Power of IJC," p. 3.
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an internal environmental lobby. Nevertheless, the IJC lacked the authority to carry out any
pollution reduction measures. Instead, the IJC focused on pointing out shortfalls in pollution
reduction goals and new problems in the lakes such as toxic substances from non-point, or mobile,
sources. In 1978, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement extended the IJCs watchdog role and
established stringent municipal and industrial pollution abatement deadlines. In 1982, the IJC
issued a critical First Biennial Review as required by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
The review targeted the United States for its hypocrisy and failure to fulfill its international
obligations. In addition, the report suggested that the IJC begin to incorporate "matters of social
relevance, institutions, and human concerns," in order to better assess if the requirements of the
Agreement were being met.201
This unprecedented rebellion by the IJC would bring it backlash from the Reagan
Administration in the years following the 1982 report. In 1987, the Great Lakes Agreement
Protocol limited the IJC's role to monitoring and evaluating through its biennial reports. In
addition, other management and coordination roles were withdrawn. The U.S. and Canada also
limited referrals to the IJC to those issues dealing with the Great Lakes, turning to other bodies to
investigate shared problems such as air quality.202
Despite its reputation for being an impartial, fact-finding arbiter, the IJC remained an
institution at the mercy of national politics. That once again demonstrated the vulnerability of a
body that, regardless of its internal common priorities, was subject to the politics of sovereignty,
which inevitably outweighed the value of a shared commons. In absence of an empowered
binational governance body, the void along the U.S.-Canadian border was eventually filled to some
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extent by several subnational compacts and non-binding agreements established through the
leadership of governors, local governments, tribal governments and other stakeholders during the
early twenty-first century.203 Despite the challenges in binational environmental cooperation at the
federal level beginning in the 1980s, successful subnational agreements on the northern border
mirrored the transition from a focus on boundaries to border environmental resource management
that was occurring along the U.S. Mexico border during the late twentieth century.

BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
As we saw in chapter 2, the United States and Mexico entered into a series of mutually
beneficial economic agreements during World War II that addressed the labor shortages of one
country and high levels of unemployment in the other. Under the guise of supporting the Allied
war effort, Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Manuel Avila Camacho established the Bracero
Program in 1942. By the mid-1950s, over 400,000 Mexican workers toiled in the United States
every year, as a part of the Bracero Program.204
In 1964, almost two decades beyond the expressed term of the initial agreement, the
Bracero Program was terminated and tens of thousands of Mexican laborers were returned to
Mexican border cities with few options for employment, insufficient housing and inadequate
public services. The Mexican Government was desperate to find a solution to the crisis in border
communities. In 1965, the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) - also known as the
maquiladora program – eliminated tariff consequences for foreign manufacturers that established

203 Mcfarlane and Hall, “Transboundary Water Management and Governance in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
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operations and created jobs in Mexican border communities. By marketing low-wage Mexican
labor to lure US manufacturers, the BIP brought industrial growth to the border region. 205
Consistent with the growth in industry, urban border communities became home to tens
of thousands of families who relocated in order to avail themselves of employment opportunities
in the maquiladoras. This dramatic population increase over a short period of time strained every
aspect of public infrastructure – roads, drinking water, electric/gas services, wastewater
treatment facilities, housing, solid waste disposal, and public transportation. The population
boom attributed to the industrialization process took an equally deleterious toll on the region’s
environment and the health of border residents.206
The degradation of natural resources and the proliferation of environmental pollution
associated with rapid industrialization was made worse in the border region due to absent or
incongruent environmental regulation. Indeed, the state or federal protective regimes in place at
the time were limited to their respective jurisdictions – making it impossible to provide adequate
protection for natural resources that flowed irrespective of such boundaries. Furthermore, the
environmental regulatory authorities on the Mexican side of the border were ill equipped and
under-funded to provide effective oversight of this new industrial presence.207
In acknowledgement that the economic and social well-being of the region was
inextricably tied to environmental health and that protection of such required cooperative and
coordinated efforts, the federal environmental agencies of the United States and Mexico, EPA
and SEDUE, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in 1978 (hereafter MOU of 1978),

205 Ganster and Lorey, The U.S.-Mexican Border Today, 111. Maquiladoras were allowed to import equipment,
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which called for cooperation in the protection of the environment in the border region. Through
the MOU of 1978, the two federal agencies agreed to meet annually to discuss shared
environmental concerns and engage in parallel projects and activities. The three page document
included the word “parallel” five times in its text.208 This is an important point because it
signaled that U.S. and Mexican officials considered that environmental protection in the border
region could be managed through a series of coordinated parallel projects that would be managed
unilaterally on either side of the border rather than as single projects managed jointly, taking into
account the complexity of transboundary natural resources.
The reality was that the “parallel” approach was not a successful strategy and
environmental conditions in communities along the border continued to deteriorate. The twin
cities of El Paso/Ciudad Juárez and San Diego/Tijuana had been out of compliance with the US
Clean Air Act standards since the 1970s. Copper Smelters in Arizona and Sonora had been
damaging crops and sickening people for decades. A six-mile stretch of the beach north of the
international border at Tijuana/San Diego was under a public health quarantine due to the high
concentration of sewage in the water. U.S. border communities, led by state governors,
congressional delegations, and grassroots organizations began to organize and demand a crossborder agreement to address these complex environmental challenges.209
At that time, U.S. President Ronald Reagan was not particularly attuned to the
environmental concerns of the border, but he was feeling significant pressure from his political

208 “Memorandum of Understanding between the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States and the
Subsecretariat for Environmental Improvement for Mexico for the Cooperation on Environmental Programs and
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base in Southern California to do something to address their polluted beaches. Mexican
President Miguel de la Madrid was concerned with expanding bilateral economic relations with
the U.S. and Mexico and also felt pressure to resolve the sewage problem in Tijuana. These
political and economic considerations came to a head shortly before the two presidents were
scheduled to meet for a summit in La Paz, Baja California in 1983. Both parties urged their
foreign affairs officials to prepare a cross-border pollution control agreement that could be
signed during this summit.210
In August 1983, Presidents Reagan and de la Madrid signed the first transnational
environmental agreement in North America. The protective framework intended to address this
environmentally damaged and fragile region was formalized as the Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States
on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in Border Areas, also
known as the La Paz Agreement of 1983 (hereafter the La Paz Agreement). The La Paz
Agreement consisted of twenty three articles, which laid out the details that would be critical to
operationalize its objectives.211

Articles 1 through 7 articulated the objectives and general parameters of the La Paz
Agreement. The objectives of the Agreement were stated as such:
to establish a basis for cooperation between the Parties for the protection, improvement
and conservation of the environment and the problems which affect it, as well as to agree
on necessary measures to prevent and control pollution in the border area, and to provide
a framework for the development of a system of notification of emergency situations.212
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These articles call on the Parties to undertake appropriate measure to address sources of pollution
which affect the border area of the other. The articles allow the Parties to cooperate and make
arrangements for the solution of common problems in the border region, which is defined as “an
area 100 kilometers on either side of the inland and maritime boundaries between the parties.”213
This cooperation included cooperation in program coordination, scientific exchanges,
environmental monitoring, impact assessments, and the exchange of data and information. They
also called on the Parties to assess and take appropriate measures to mitigate or avoid policies
and projects believed to have significant environmental impacts on the border.214 Notably absent

Figure 7. U.S.-Mexico Border as Defined by La Paz Agreement
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“U.S.-Mexico Border Region Map,” https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/Border2020-map.pdf
(accessed 12/31/20).
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in the La Paz agreement are the directives to develop parallel activities. As detailed below, it
emphasized collaborative projects and binational working groups. (Figure 7 illustrates the border
region, as defined by the La Paz Agreement.)
Articles 8 through 16 designated national coordinators for each Party (EPA and SEDUE)
and prescribed the formal meetings that must occur between the two Parties to review
implementation of the agreement. These articles also outlined the communication between the
Parties and their respective national coordinators. Of significance, these articles authorized the
national coordinators to invite and engage governmental officials at the local, state and federal
level, as well as non-governmental organizations. This was a critical because it acknowledged
the complexity of jurisdictions and stakeholders involved and recognized the contributions these
stakeholders could make in developing solutions.215
Articles 17 through 21 include such details as the term of the La Paz Agreement, the
process for amending and/or terminating it, as well as the dependence of the Agreement on the
funding, laws and regulations of each Party. Article 22, comprised of two lines, prescribes the
process for the adoption of annexes – the vehicles by which collaborative projects could
ultimately be developed and executed. Finally, Article 23 stated that the La Paz Agreement
superceded the MOU of 1978.216 This last article can be interpreted as a recognition that the
MOU of 1978 represented an important first step in providing a collaborative framework for the
protection of the border environment, but was insufficient in its scope, reach, and substantive
engagement.217 In fact, the La Paz Agreement included language that reflected the spirit of the
MOU of 1978, indicating that it clearly served as a foundation. However, the La Paz Agreement
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carried the weight and authority of a treaty and it prescribed far more focused coordination,
exchange, and collaboration toward the goal of remediating and protecting the environmental
health and well-being of the border region.
The La Paz Agreement served as a turning point – a pivot in the way the U.S. and Mexico
would approach environmental management and conservation along a 100km wide swath of land
that runs the length of the 2000-mile international boundary. It clearly signaled the transition
from the boundary approach of previous agreements and treaties to a border approach to shared
resource management. By the time the La Paz Agreement was signed in 1983, the U.S./Mexico
border region had endured the significant, and in some instances, devastating environmental
consequences brought by the proliferation of the maquiladora industry over the span of more
than two decades. As such, there was no shortage of environmental hazards for which to engage
the La Paz Agreement in collaborative ways.
Structurally, the La Paz Agreement itself only provided a vehicle for environmental
authorities on either side of the border to begin to collaborate. It would require the development
and approval of a series of annexes to the La Paz Agreement in order to enable cross-border
collaboration around specific environmental challenges. An analysis of these annexes illustrates
the ways in which border communities and environmental officials leveraged the authority of the
La Paz Agreement in truly significant ways for the benefit of the regional border environments
and the inhabitants of the region.
In July 18, 1985, the United States and Mexico signed the first Annex to the La Paz
Agreement. Annex I established an agreement of cooperation between the Parties for the
solution of the border sanitation problem in the San Diego, California – Tijuana, Baja California
region. This agreement brought to bear the resources of the IBWC and the Inter-American
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Development Bank for development of potable water and wastewater infrastructure in Tijuana.
Specifically, Annex I put in place a structure by which the U.S. and Mexico agreed to: 1)
anticipate the effects of this infrastructure development and take measures to protect the regional
environment; 2) create a mechanism for bilateral consultation during the planning phase of the
project; 3) perform immediate repairs on the system in the event of a breakdown or interruption
in service and employ a mechanism through the IBWC by which to request assistance from the
U.S. if required; 4) take timely corrective action in the event that the IBWC identifies a problem
in the construction, operation, and maintenance of the waste water facilities; 5) take joint action
in the event that a sewage spill from Tijuana enters the U.S.218 By way of the La Paz Agreement
and Annex I, the U.S. and Mexico had the legal framework to augment and extend the scope of
work of institutions such as the IBWC and the Inter-American Development Bank to address this
urgent border infrastructure crisis. This project began to address the water and wastewater needs
of over 700,000 residents of Tijuana while simultaneously protecting the ecosystems in the
Tijuana estuary and the beaches in the Tijuana-San Diego area.219
The second annex to the La Paz Agreement, also signed on July 18, 1985 in San Diego,
called for an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to protect the inland international
boundary from discharges of hazardous substances. Recognizing that such discharges
constituted a threat to public health and welfare, the Parties agreed to establish a Joint Response
Team (hereafter JRT) and develop the “United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan” as a
cooperative mechanism to effectively address incidents. This agreement called on the Parties to
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commit themselves to the development of response plans designed to detect existing or imminent
polluting incidents and mitigate the effects to the environment and the public. It outlined in
detail the structural elements of the Joint Contingency Plan, which directs each Party to divide its
territory into areas and designate On-Site, Advisory, and Liaison Coordinators to oversee,
manage, and respond to polluting incidents in collaboration with their counterparts based on a set
of common criteria. The agreement also details the binational membership of the JRT, the
reporting/communication between the JRT co-chairs and the National Coordinators, as well as
the mechanisms for executing the work of the JRT in collaboration with the On-Site
Coordinators, in the event of a pollution incident that warranted a joint response. This elaborate
structure was established in order to be able to mobilize resources across national jurisdictions to
respond as rapidly and effectively as possible to the discharge of hazardous substances and the
related threats posed to the public and the environment of the U.S.-Mexico border region.220
Signed on November 12, 1986, Annex III provided for cooperation between the U.S. and
Mexico regarding the transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes and hazardous substances.
The preamble for this agreement acknowledged the health and environmental damage that can
occur as a result of improper handling of hazardous wastes. As such, this agreement sought to
minimize the risk and potential damage associated with the transboundary transport of hazardous
materials. Elaborated in extensive detail, this agreement establishes a protocol for collaboration
in monitoring of transboundary shipments. Specifically, it articulates requirements for:
notification of exports/imports, notifications for regulatory changes that affect export/import of

220 “Annex II To The Agreement Between The United States Of America And The United Mexican States On
Cooperation For The Protection And Improvement Of The Environment In The Border Area Agreement Of
Cooperation Between The United States Of America And The United Mexican States Regarding Pollution Of The
Environment Along The Inland International Boundary By Discharges Of Hazardous Substances,” July 18, 1985.
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements.
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hazardous substances, readmission of exports, exchange of information and assistance,
protection of confidential information, and other procedures necessary to track and safely
manage transboundary shipments. The agreement also articulates procedures for remediation and
compensation in the event that this Annex is violated and damages occur. Much like Annex II
addressed polluting incidents, Annex III was intended to create a robust structure of
collaboration and coordination in an effort to jointly manage and mitigate risk associated with
the transport of hazardous materials within the border region.221
Less than three months later, on January 29, 1987, the Parties signed Annex IV, an
agreement of cooperation regarding transboundary air pollution caused by copper smelters along
the US-Mexico border. This Annex was developed in the midst of a maelstrom of communityled protest and legal action against the operations of three copper smelters in the Arizona-Sonora
border region known as the Gray Triangle. The deleterious effects of smelter-related
contamination on human health, crops, and property were so extensive that the EPA forced the
closure of the copper smelter in Douglas, Arizona on January 15, 1987. The Mexican
government had also agreed to require the installation of cleaner technology for the copper
smelter in Nacozari, Sonora.222 Annex IV set in place several measures to further protect and
improve the air quality along the entire border region. The agreement set a limit for the
allowable emissions of sulphur dioxide for any copper smelters in operation within 100
kilometers of the U.S.- Mexico border. It prescribed monitoring and record keeping
requirements for such operations. The agreement called for the creation of a working group of

221 “Annex III To The Agreement Between The United States Of America And The United Mexican States On
Cooperation For The Protection And Improvement Of The Environment In The Border Area Agreement Of
Cooperation Between The United States Of America And The United Mexican States Regarding The Transboundary
Shipments Of Hazardous Wastes And Hazardous Substances,” November 12, 1986. United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements.
222 Wirth, Smelter Smoke in North America, 107, 163.
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technical government experts known as the U.S.-Mexico Air Quality Working Group (hereafter
Air Working Group). The Air Working Group was charged with meeting every six months to
review progress toward the abatement of smelter-related pollution and presenting
recommendations for additional corrective actions to the National Coordinators. The Air
Working Group was authorized to include participation of local and state officials “as
appropriate or necessary.” Both Parties agreed to promote legislation required to secure
regulatory authority should additional measures be necessary to address smelter-related
pollution.223
The last of the annexes, Annex V was an agreement for cooperation between the U.S. and
Mexico regarding the movement of urban air pollution across international boundaries. Signed
on October 9, 1989, this agreement recognized that there were urban areas along the border that
failed to meet their respective air quality standards and had no hope of making significant
improvements without addressing the flows of air pollution across international boundaries. The
effects of these poor air quality conditions were two-fold: 1) residents of the affected areas
suffered the harmful health effects of urban air pollution; and 2) U.S. border communities faced
limitations to economic growth because permits for industrial developments were limited, if not
halted altogether, as a result of being in non-attainment of air quality standards. It is also
important to note that at this time, NAFTA debates and negotiations were ongoing. Politically, it
was critical to acknowledge and begin to address the failures in air quality regulation in border
communities that would be expected to sustain additional growth in industry and trade-related

223 “Annex IV To The Agreement Between The United States Of America And The United Mexican States On
Cooperation For The Protection And Improvement Of The Environment In The Border Area Agreement Of
Cooperation Between The United States Of America And The United Mexican States Regarding Transboundary Air
Pollution Caused By Copper Smelters Along Their Common Border,” January 27, 1987. United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements.
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congestion under NAFTA. This agreement called on affected areas to install and operate a
comprehensive web of air monitoring technology that would enable air modeling analysis and
the creation of an air pollution source inventory. The Parties agreed to share data, harmonize air
quality standards, and develop a plan to address individual sources of pollution in their
respective territories, as identified in the pollution source inventories.224 Annex V represented a
critical expansion in the reach of the La Paz Agreement in that it allowed for collaborative efforts
to address air pollution from all sources and industries in the border region.
For the Paso del Norte community, Annex V provided a vehicle by which to advocate for
change in the air quality management of the region. A significant step toward transboundary
management came in the form of an appendix seven years after Annex V was executed. On May
7, 1996, Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs Angel Gurria and U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher signed Appendix 1 to Annex V, which created the Joint Advisory Committee on Air
Quality Improvement for the El Paso - Ciudad Juárez - Dona Ana County Air Quality
Management Basin (Hereafter JAC). The Appendix identified the air basin as the geographic
area including El Paso County, Texas, the metropolitan area of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and
parts Doña Ana County that are within one hundred kilometers from the border. The objective of
the JAC was to develop and present recommendations for regional pollution control and
prevention strategies to the Air Working Group established in Annex IV.225

224 “Annex V To The Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The
Government Of The United Mexican States On Cooperation For The Protection And Improvement Of The
Environment In The Border Area Agreement Of Cooperation Between The Government Of The United States Of
America And The Government Of The United Mexican States Regarding International Transport Of Urban Air
Pollution,” October 3, 1989. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements.
225 “Appendix I Annex V To The Agreement Between The Unites Mexican States And The United States Of
America On The Cooperation For The Protection And Improvement Of The Environment In The Border Area
Agreement For Cooperation Between The United Mexican States And The United States Of America Regarding
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The JAC structure called for a body consisting of 20 persons , ten from each
country, appointed by the SEMARNAP and the EPA. The U.S. section must include
one representative of the federal government; one representative of the States of Texas and New
Mexico; one representative from local government in El Paso, TX; one local representative from
Doña Ana County, NM; and five non- government members who reside in the area, at
least one of whom is a representative of the business community a n d one
representative of a non-governmental organization whose activities relate to air quality. The
Mexican section must include a representative of the National Institute of Ecology; one
representative of the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection; one representative of the
federal health and welfare agency; one representative of the environmental authorities of the
State of Chihuahua; one representative of the environmental authorities of the Municipality of
Ciudad Juárez; and five Mexican citizens who reside in Ciudad Juárez, at least one of whom is a
representative of the private sector, one who is a representative of a non-governmental
organization whose activities relate to air quality, one who is a representative of the academic
institutions in Ciudad Juárez, and one who is a representative of the Consulting Council for
Sustainable Development in the Northern Region.226
The JAC was charged with developing recommendations for the Air Working Group
related to a broad scope of activities. These activities included monitoring and modeling air
pollution prevention and abatement strategies, exchange of data and information, technical
assistance and technology exchanges/transfers, education and public outreach initiatives, and
innovative strategies for pollution abatement including emissions trading and other economic
incentive programs. The scope of activities mirrored many of the innovative projects that

226 Ibid.
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collaborators in the air basin had been developing and carrying out in the years leading up to this
approval.227
Appendix I to Annex V is quite noteworthy for a couple of reasons. The first is that it

formally recognized the binational, tristate air basin as a transboundary geographic formation
that required collaborative air quality management strategies in order to affect change. Another
ground breaking aspect of Appendix I is that the JAC was the first formally recognized U.S.Mexico border environmental advisory body in which the participation of non-governmental
stakeholders from the border region was codified. The approval of Appendix I came after years
of advocacy from community stakeholders who insisted on the recognition of the region as a
joint air basin rather than a conglomeration of distinct jurisdictions. The following chapter
explores the efforts of these community stakeholders and their allies that led to this important
advancement in transboundary air quality management.
CONCLUSION
In Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History, Samuel Truett
and Elliott Young wrote:
Few border people considered themselves peripheral – most saw their own
communities as central – but empires and nations mattered, and part of what made
frontiers and borders distinctive was their position at the edges of states and state
making.228
As one examines the evolution of industrialization, community-based advocacy and the
emergence of collaborative transboundary governance in the U.S./Mexico border region during
the mid to late twentieth century, Truett and Elliott’s statement rings true. The Bracero program,

227 Ibid.
228 Samuel Truett and Elliott Young, ed., Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History,
(Durham NC and London, England: Duke University Press, 2004), 13.
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the BIP, and the many associated intended and unintended outcomes, were initiatives driven by
nation-states. However, it was the “border people,” fronterizos, who demanded changes in
governance structures and protective mechanisms for their environment, their natural resources,
and their quality of life. Through their activism and protests, communities spanning the U.S.Mexico border made their concerns central to the economic discourse of the nation-states that
ultimately led to the adoption of the La Paz Agreement and its critical Annexes. It was because
of these efforts that the U.S. and Mexico began to shift from boundary-focused treaties and
agreements to agreements that acknowledged and encouraged collaboration in the protection of
the border region’s environmental resources. The next chapter explores how one group of
fronterizos created a binational, multi-sector stakeholder coalition named the Paso del Norte Air
Quality Task Force (PDNAQTF) - which became a catalyst for the environmental protection of
their community.
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Chapter Four: Fronterizo Advocacy in the Paso del Norte Air Basin Sets the Stage for the
Transformation of Border Environmental Management

During the early 1990s, the United States, Mexico, and Canada were in the midst of
negotiations for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This trade agreement was
of highest priority on the foreign policy agenda of newly elected U.S. President Bill Clinton.229
Environmental and labor activists and grassroots organizations throughout the North American
continent mobilized to block passage of the trade agreement, citing among many concerns, the
widespread environmental degradation and labor exploitation that occurred along the
U.S./Mexico border because of the BIP and the maquiladora industry.230 While the involvement
of civil society in the trade policy debates did not result in the blockage of the NAFTA, it was
instrumental in raising the profile of environmental concerns faced by residents along the
U.S./Mexico border.231 Ultimately, these environmental and labor coalitions helped pave the way
for the creation of the NAFTA side agreements – the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC) – which provided an official tri-national infrastructure for denouncing
labor and environmental violations.232

229 Laura MacDoñald, “Gendering Transnational Social Movement Analysis: Women’s Groups Contest Free Trade
in the Americas.” in Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order, ed. Joe Bandy and
Jackie Smith (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 30.
230 John Foster, “The Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA: Sinews of Solidarity.” in Coalitions across Borders:
Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order ed. Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith (Lanham, Md: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 214.
231 Scholte, Jan Aart. “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance.” in Civil Society and Global Finance,
ed. J.A. Scholte and A. Schnabel (New York:Routledge,2002), 11-32. “Civil Society” is defined by Jan Aart
Scholte as “a political space where voluntary associations explicitly seek to shape the rules (in terms of specific
policies, wider norms, and deeper social structures) that govern one or other aspect of social life.”
232 Foster, “The Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA: Sinews of Solidarity,” 214-215.
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For fronterizos in the Paso del Norte region and their allies, these international debates
regarding trade and border environmental conditions provided the necessary context and public
pressure to prime federal and state support in the U.S. and Mexico for the projects and initiatives
they believed would help address their environmental challenges. As we saw in Chapters 3 and
4, residents of the Paso del Norte air basin suffered from air pollution-related health problems
and industry faced government-imposed limitations to growth due to El Paso’s non-attainment
status. Meanwhile unilateral air quality governance measures failed to address growing
transboundary challenges. Given the grim state of the air quality and the ineffectiveness of
government oversight, many concerned fronterizos from various sectors of the community
initiated projects and investigations aimed at improving their region's air quality. Drawing on the
fronterizo identity described in Chapter 2, these individuals and organizations took it upon
themselves to seek solutions. Some initiatives were spearheaded by different business and civic
organizations, such as the Sunturians of El Paso and FEMAP (Federacion Mexicana de
Asociaciones Privadas de Salud y Desarrollo Communitario) in Ciudad Juárez. There were also
researchers from the academic institutions in the region who focused their efforts on gathering
data and developing data-driven strategies. Often this research involved cross-border
collaborative research between institutions.233
Initially, many of these efforts were not coordinated with other interested parties.
Increasingly, however, these individuals and organizations became convinced that due to the
natural characteristics of the air basin, transboundary cooperative endeavors were necessary. At

233 Howard G. Applegate & Richard Bath, “Air Pollution along the United States-Mexico Border with Emphasison
the El Paso - Ciudad Juárez-Las Cruces Air Shed,” Natural Resources Journal 18 (1978):97. Dr. Elaine Mowinski
Barrón, Internist and TACB board member, Chair of the TACB Advisory Committee on El Paso/Ciudad Juárez Air
Quality and the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force, interview by author, El Paso, TX, April 19, 1996. Dr. Carlos
Rincón, Program Director, Environmental Defense Fund, interview by author, El Paso, TX, November 20, 1995.
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that point, however, there was no effective coordinating mechanism in place to bring together
these stakeholders. This chapter looks at the formation of the binational, tristate environmental
advocacy organization named the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force (PDNAQTF) – a multisectoral group that came together in order to address deteriorating air quality conditions in the
Paso del Norte region. It examines the origins of the organization as well as the impact of the
projects it developed. The most significant of these projects was the adoption of Appendix 1 to
Annex V of the La Paz Agreement, which created the Joint Advisory Committee on the Air
Quality Improvement for the El Paso – Ciudad Juárez – Doña County Air Quality Management
Basin (JAC). This chapter will also explore the formation and early work of the JAC, which in
many ways continued the work of the PDNAQTF through institutionalized channels. It also
concludes that the JAC became the blueprint for community engagement in the border
environmental management frameworks that had historically excluded border communities.

EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES ON THE FRONTERA
Political scientist Peter M. Haas has published influential works related to social learning
and collective community formation as it relates to the evolution of multilateral environmental
governance and policy coordination. Haas provides a valuable theoretical framework within
which to consider the air quality improvement efforts in the Paso del Norte region. Specifically,
Haas utilizes the concept of ecological and transnational epistemic communities to explain the
advancement of human knowledge and global policy. He describes an epistemic community as a
network of professionals with expertise and competence in a particular area or domain who can
provide policy-relevant knowledge within that area or domain. The epistemic community may
include professionals from diverse fields who share the following: 1) a common set of beliefs
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that provide a value-based rationale for social action among community members; 2) a shared set
of causal belief related to a central problem in their domain that then informs policy
recommendations; 3) shared criteria for considering and validating knowledge in their domain of
expertise; and 4) a common policy objective or enterprise. In the area of transnational
environmental policy, Haas argues, epistemic communities have informed multinational
organizations and have helped craft international environmental regimes for the protection of
endangered habitats and shared natural resources. As this chapter will illustrate, this model of
collective expertise and advocacy applies well to the PDNAQT and JAC. But the processes that
this model describes were, in the case in question, overlaid on a community with an ethos and an
identity centuries in the making. As such it is critical to consider this epistemic community as
one with a strong fronterizo identity.234

FORMATION OF THE PASO DEL NORTE AIR QUALITY TASK FORCE
In 1990, Texas elected Governor Ann Richards – a democrat who committed herself to
making state government more inclusive. One mechanism she utilized to do that was the
appointment of African-Americans, Hispanics, and women to state boards and commissions.
According to a brief biography published by her campaign, Richards appointed more
underrepresented minorities than both of her predecessors combined.235 At the end of 1992, a
position on the Texas Air Control Board (TACB) became vacant. The TACB was a nine-member

234 Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International
Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 17-20. Mora-Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border, 23.
235 Governor Ann Richards Biography, Author and date of publication unknown. Published by the Ann Richards
Committee. Copy with author. Authors note: Although appointments of minorities and women from diverse
communities to state boards and commissions does not necessarily translate into a more inclusive government, this
strategy was intended to broaden gender, racial and geographical representation in state government and thereby
amplify the voices of previously unrepresented communities.
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body, appointed by the governor, which was charged with protecting the air resources of the state
through air pollution abatement and control, while balancing human health and economic
considerations.236
At that time, there were four areas in Texas that were in non-attainment of federal air
quality standards - one was El Paso. Given the imperative to address the state’s non-attainment
areas and the timeliness of addressing border air quality, the governor’s appointments staff was
focused on finding an El Paso appointee to help the TACB develop effective strategies for the
region. In early 1993, Richards appointed Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón to fill this vacant
position. When the governor’s staff reached out to Dr. Mowinski Barrón, she was the
Chairperson of the Public Relations Committee for the El Paso County Medical Society. That
year, Dr. Barrón had been working to get more physicians involved in community activities to
speak out and educate people about the need to protect health through environmental protection.
She was also an active member of the Texas Medical Association Environmental Health
Committee – the volunteer service that most likely brought her to the attention of the governor’s
appointments staff, given that she was not a campaign contributor or political operative. She
began serving on the TACB, chaired by Kirk Watson, in January of 1993.237
As TACB began to examine the air pollution situation in El Paso, they concluded that
because of the low-income levels in the city and the inextricable ties to Ciudad Juárez, they had
to develop a cross-border cleanup solution. This solution needed to be minimally disruptive to
people's everyday lives and somehow include Ciudad Juárez in the process to ensure a more
comprehensive problem solving approach. Watson consulted with the Environmental Defense

236 Texas Historical Association, “Texas Air Control Board” in “Handbook of Texas,”
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/texas-air-control-board (accessed April 17, 2021).
237 Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón, interview by author, El Paso, Oct. 6, 2015.
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Fund (EDF) staff in Austin and Region VI EPA officials located in Dallas regarding the situation
because of the work they were doing in the border region. They concurred that it would be
advantageous to form an advisory committee and have it chaired by a local resident such as Dr.
Mowinski Barrón. This TACB Advisory Committee would include concerned individuals from
the private and non-profit sectors as well as officials from federal, state, and local governments
on both sides of the border.238 Its purpose, according to Watson, was to "provide advice and
guidance on how to clean up the air basin of El Paso/ Ciudad Juárez so that mandates of the U.S.
Federal Clean Air Act can be met and Mexico's commitment to improving air quality for its
citizens can be realized.”239
Having appointed Mowinski Barrón to chair the Advisory Committee, the TACB
arranged the first meeting to take place in El Paso in May 1993. The TACB sent invitations to
over thirty individuals from the region who were already on their communications mailing list.
This included EPA officials, EDF representatives, and civic organizations such as EPISO (El
Paso Interreligious Sponsoring Organization) and the El Paso Community Foundation. The
Mexican counterparts included Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL) officials, members
of the Ciudad Juárez municipal government, representatives of FEMAP, and academics from the
Instituto Tecnológico de Ciudad Juárez. Francisco Núñez, the Director of the Municipio de
Ciudad Juárez Direccíon de Ecología provided assistance with identifying business and nonprofit leaders who he thought should be invited to participate. He felt that in order for this
initiative to be fruitful, there needed to be substantive participation from the Mexican side.240

238 Carlos Rincón, interview by author, November 20, 1995.
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The TACB Advisory Committee on El Paso/Ciudad Juárez Air Quality (hereafter TACB
Advisory Committee) met for the first time at the Camino Real Paso del Norte Hotel in El Paso
on May 20, 1993. The day-long meeting convened with two goals in mind: to compile a list of
recommended changes that could be addressed within one month, by the TACB, the EPA,
SEDESOL, and the business sectors of both countries; and to evaluate and provide
recommendations regarding long-term actions by August 15, 1993. The group heard
presentations from the TACB, U.S. EPA, SEDESOL, the El Paso City County Health and
Environmental District and Municipio de Ciudad Juárez. They then proceeded to a brainstorming
session to identify critical air quality issues. Through this brainstorming, the group identified 45
issues that they grouped into six categories: auto emissions, health issues, industrial issues,
particulate matter, governance, and general issues. The participants broke up into six work
groups, each group assigned one of the issue categories. These work groups were charged with
brainstorming strategies and potential short and long-term solutions. They focused on what
federal, state, and local governments on both sides of the border could do, as well as the role of
private industry in improving the region’s air quality.241
When the six work groups reported to the entire committee, several main themes
emerged. A central, recurring theme was the need for an increased binational approach to shared
problems in their common air basin. Participants agreed that the means by which to achieve this
binational approach was through some form of legally constituted international air quality
management district. They felt that the timing was good because it could be promoted within the
context of the ongoing negotiations of the supplemental agreements of the NAFTA. Another

241 Texas Air Control Board Advisory Committee on EI Paso/ Juárez Air Quality, Agenda and Summary of
Meeting, May, 20, 1993. U.S. EPA Border Office Archive.
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theme was the need to decrease auto emissions in both El Paso and Ciudad Juárez with improved
and aligned regulations and enforcement. There was also discussion about the long-standing
problems of insufficient inventories of pollution sources and the lack of a registry of diseases in
the border region. By the end of the meeting, the committee had agreed upon several primary
goals: 1) to meet again in the near future; 2) to use this committee to coordinate efforts
concerning border air quality issues; 3) to identify a fiscal agent to receive funding for projects
the committee might want to initiate; 4) to make the Pan American Health Organization aware of
the committee; 5) to have high visibility, educate the public, and to involve individuals from
Health and Human Resources; and 6) to invite residents from Dona Ana County, New Mexico.242
The second meeting of the TACB Advisory Committee on El Paso/Juárez Air Quality
took place on June 17, 1993, in conjunction with a TACB meeting that was scheduled for the
following day. During this meeting, TACB Chairman Kirk Watson addressed the TACB
Advisory Committee and conveyed his support for their cooperative efforts. To get things
started, he asked that the TACB Advisory Committee work with him to develop a letter that
Governor Richards might send to the appropriate individuals to request their support for a
“Regional Air Quality District for the Paso del Norte region.” It was also during this meeting
that Danny Vickers, president and CEO of EDM International, Inc., proposed six projects based
on brainstorming from their first meeting and subsequent discussions by a Project Development
sub-committee.243
The first project was titled “Assisting Paint and Body Shops Located in Ciudad Juárez to
Reduce Emissions.” The group focused on paint and body shops because these largely

242 Ibid.
243 Texas Air Control Board Advisory Committee on EI Paso/ Juárez Air Quality, Summary of Meeting, June 17,
1993. U.S. EPA Border Office Archive.

115

unregulated small enterprises utilized highly toxic paints and solvents without any emissions
capture technologies, thereby emitting large volumes of VOCs into the air basin. VOCs are a
critical ingredient in the creation of ground-level oxone – a contaminant for which the region
was in non-attainment. This project, championed by Dr. Howard Applegate, President of Applied
Environmental Services and UTEP professor, proposed a multi-pronged strategy. Applegate had
worked collaboratively with universities in Ciudad Juárez for over a decade and had a good
network to execute the project. The project group planned to conduct a comprehensive survey of
auto paint shops in Ciudad Juárez in order to describe a "typical" auto paint shop. They would
also prepare a report on the regulatory framework for these shops and estimate the environmental
impact of their activities. They proposed to design a spray-painting stall appropriate and
accessible to paint and body shop owners in Ciudad Juárez. Finally, they would present their
recommendations to the committee once they gathered all of the data. The project group
indicated that they would be seeking funding sources in order to be able to carry out the
proposal.244
A second project, titled “Voluntary Toxic Emission Reduction Program,” was modeled
after the U.S. EPA's 33/50 program that targeted a 33% reduction of pollution releases and offsite transfers and a 50% reduction within a specific timeframe. This project group wanted to
encourage large companies such as the multinational operations in Ciudad Juárez to reduce 17
high-volume target chemicals identified by the U.S. EPA as posing environmental and health
concerns, through pollution prevention. The group hoped to be able to provide companies with
technical assistance that would help them determine the most cost-effective methods for reducing

244 TACB Advisory Committee on El Paso/ Juárez Air Quality, Project Development Subcommittee. "Project
Proposal," June 17, 1993. U.S. EPA Border Office Archive. Howard G. Applegate and Richard Bath, “Air Pollution
Along the United States-Mexico Border with Emphasis on El Paso-Ciudad Juárez-Las Cruces Air Shed,” Natural
Resources Journal 18, no.1 (1978): 97.
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emissions. In doing so, the group was filling a gap created by the lack of environmental
inspections and enforcement resources in the region. The group proposed working with Mexican
and U.S. officials to develop a unified strategy and find ways to fund this project. They also
discussed seeking funding from the American Lung Association to assist with this project.245
The third project, titled "Paso del Norte Air Quality Management District," was
championed by Jim Yarbrough of the Region VI, U.S. EPA office, and Dr. Peter Emerson,
Senior Economist with the EDF. The proposal recognized the need to coordinate the requisite air
programs and policies in order to combat the air quality problems of the El Paso/Juárez / Dona
Ana County air basin. This management district would serve to bring local, state and federal
government institutions together with local stakeholders through a formalized agreement. The
proposed district would begin as a coordinating forum for air policy among the participants, and
could then further develop according to the desires of the Committee. The first step was to report
the Committee's support for the district to the TACB at their meeting the following day and
present a resolution for their consideration at their July meeting. The group would then present
the plan to local and regional political leaders along with an invitation to participate in the
discussions with the Committee to develop the district framework. After these discussions, the
appropriate measures would be taken to formalize the district. The significance of this initiative
was that the basin would be locally managed, something which had never been done before. It
required the federal regulators to cede some of their authority and trust in the expertise of local
residents and experts.246
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The idea of establishing a locally managed international air basin was promoted by three
professors from The University of Texas at El Paso during the 1980s and was published in an
article in the Journal of Borderland Studies in 1989. The article, written by Dr. Howard
Applegate, professor of Civil Engineering, Dr. Richard Bath, professor of Political Science, and
Dr. Jeffery T. Brannon, associate professor of Economics, recommended a series of measures
that would help move the two countries toward attainment of their respective ambient standards.
They suggested that the region needed to create a comprehensive emissions inventory and
establish an air quality accounting system to be managed by a local board of managers. This
framework would enable the board to issue operating permits based on existing standards and
allow for the development of a transboundary emissions credits trading mechanism. They
pointed out that using transboundary emissions credits trading as a means of pollution cleanup in
the air basin was less costly than the traditional command-and-control methods employed by
government regulators, a very important factor to consider in an economically depressed area
such as the Paso del Norte region.247
The fourth project was titled “EPA Border Affairs Office in El Paso.” The project group
indicated that at the time all border issues fell under the jurisdiction of both Region VI in Dallas
and Region IX in San Francisco. They hoped that by creating this office solely focused on the
border and relations with Mexico, policies affecting the border region would involve more input
from border communities, leading to better planning and coordination in their development and
implementation. They felt that the border office would facilitate interactions with SEDESOL and
contribute to ongoing cooperative efforts with Mexico. For Mexican state and local officials, the

247 Howard G. Applegate, C. Richard Bath, and Jeffrey T. Brannon, “Binational Emissions Trading in an
International Air Shed: The Case of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 4, no. 2
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prospect of having an EPA presence in El Paso was promising because they had already
benefitted significantly from EPA-funded technical training and program support. The group
argued that El Paso was a natural location for the office because of "its geographic location
midway along the border and because of its economic, historical, and environmental
importance." Given the advocacy that would be required within the U.S. government to attain
this objective, the first step was to prepare a letter for Chairman Watson to send, on behalf of the
TACB and the TACB Advisory Committee, to EPA Administrator Carol Browner requesting
that a border affairs office be established in El Paso. The president, and designated federal, state,
and local officials would also receive a copy of this letter. Other lobbying strategies were to be
developed once the project was initiated. Although this project had binational benefits, it was led
by Raul Muñoz, Associate Director of the El Paso City-County Health District and championed
primarily by U.S. members.248
The fifth project, titled “Vehicle Maintenance Program for Maquila Employees,”
envisioned a program to assist maquiladora employees with proper vehicle maintenance in light
of new emissions control requirements. The project group had concluded that a major cause of
the polluting emissions from automobiles was the lack of adequate engine maintenance. The
resulting condition of incomplete combustion and excessive fuel usage lead to increased levels of
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and other contaminants. The project group believed that
providing technical assistance and equipment for tune-ups for many of these vehicles could
significantly reduce their emissions. They focused on employees of maquiladoras in Ciudad
Juárez because they were an easy group to reach and therefore a good place to start. The project
group would work together with business groups in Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, including
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COPARMEX (Centro Empresarial de Ciudad Juárez), AMAC (the Maquiladora Association),
and the Sunturions, which perhaps would be willing to sponsor periodic, subsidized maintenance
for the employees' vehicles. Although the U.S. EPA had already offered $10,000 in seed money,
the project group would need to solicit funds from private sources. In addition, they needed to
establish a method to identify both those employees in greatest need of assistance and the
vehicles that were emitting the most pollutants. If successful, the Committee could work to
expand beyond the maquiladora industry. This project was championed by Jose González,
Director of Software Development Division for EDM International, Inc.249
The last project, titled “Reduction of Vehicle Emissions at the International Bridge
Crossings,” was headed by Walter Bradley, Executive Assistant to the Director of the TNRCC
Office of Air Quality and Mowinski Barrón. This project was particularly important because
many studies had shown that emissions from vehicles waiting to cross the international bridges
contributed significantly to the total emissions in the region and were therefore an important
factor in El Paso’s non-attainment status. It is important to note that Ciudad Juárez was also in
violation of air quality standards but there were no regulatory consequences for these violations
at the time. In El Paso, business faced limitations to growth and new business had difficulty
attaining air permits due to federal and state regulations for non-attainment areas. The committee
argued that expediting bridge traffic, while maintaining proper traffic monitoring systems, would
significantly improve air quality. Given that the vast majority of port of entry bottlenecks were
caused by U.S. inspections protocols for both passenger and cargo vehicles, these efforts were
directed primarily at U.S. officials. The first step for the Committee was to identify and contact
those individuals who were involved in activities that affected the flow of traffic across the
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international bridges. They would then invite these individuals to a meeting during which
participants could discuss initiatives that might facilitate traffic flows.250
Despite initial conversations about short and long-term projects the Advisory Committee
began to work on these six long-term projects, which they considered good starting points
toward attaining healthier air. The project leadership included both U.S. and Mexican
representatives from the private, public and non-profit sectors, depending on the nature of the
project and the country in which the project was taking place. While this was a binational
initiative, it is important to keep in mind that it was still an advisory group to a U.S. state agency
and the funding for many of the projects they worked on came from the U.S. government or
foundations. It is also critical to acknowledge that without the committed participation of the
Mexican members, the initiative would never have moved past the conceptual stage.
When the Advisory Committee reconvened on July 14, 1993, five of the project
champions updated the Committee on their progress. Dr. Howard Applegate and Conrado Diaz,
of the Instituto Tecnólogico de Ciudad Juárez, reported that they had secured partial funding for
their study of paint and body shops in the region. They said they had already identified 250 paint
shops in Ciudad Juárez and they were working with another Committee member, Robert Gray, of
Accugraph Corporation, to create a computerized map that included all paint and body shops in
El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. Data for the paint and body shops in El Paso was available because
state and local authorities regulated these operations. The project leads indicated that they were
gathering emissions inventory data from the 250 locations in Ciudad Juárez. That would help
Ciudad Juárez’s efforts to create a comprehensive emissions inventory and, combined with El
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Paso’s data, enable the region to have a better understanding of the flows of VOCs between the
two cities.251
Danny Vickers reported that the Voluntary Toxic Emissions Reduction Program was
actively developing its proposal and that they had received indication from a U.S. EPA official
that they could apply for $50,000 in support of this program. Vickers also indicated that they
were communicating with Mexican officials regarding this initiative. Dr. Pete Emerson and Chris
Shaver, both from the EDF, reported that the Paso del Norte Air Quality Management District
project group distributed a draft working paper for review by the Committee. They also indicated
that TACB Chair Kirk Watson had presented a draft letter to Gov. Ann Richards for either
President Bill Clinton or EPA Administrator Carol Browner, supporting the creation of this
international air quality management district (IAQMD). Raul Munoz, of the El Paso City-County
Health District, reported that the EPA Border Affairs Office project had also submitted a draft
letter to Chairman Watson for Governor Ann Richards to send to President Bill Clinton in
support of the El Paso location for the EPA Border Affairs Office.252 Jose González, with EDM
International, indicated that they had expanded the Vehicle Emissions Program for Maquiladora
Employees project to include employees of any industry. The group had already secured support
from COPARMEX (Centro Empresarial de Ciudad Juárez) and were seeking support from other
industry groups. The U.S. EPA also committed to providing $10,000 to support this project.
After only one month in existence, the project teams were already making progress.253
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In addition to the progress reported on the Committee’s projects, this meeting was
noteworthy because there were representatives of the Mexican Procuraduría Federal de
Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA) in Chihuahua and the State of Chihuahua Office of Urban
Development and Ecology in attendance to address the Committee. In Mexico at that time, the
federal government had regulatory jurisdiction over all fixed source emissions as well as the air
quality monitoring facilities. This caused significant frustration among state and local officials
who were unable to address environmental issues their states and municipalities. Miguel Orozco,
with PROFEPA, attempted to address some of this frustration by providing an overview of
SEDESOL’s role in environmental regulation and the ongoing decentralization efforts that would
shift the responsibility for emissions inspections and monitoring to the states. He also shared that
they were in the process of developing an emissions inventory of the maquiladoras in Ciudad
Juárez as well as conducting aerial inspections in search of clandestine hazardous waste dumps.
Francisco Jose Prieto, with the State of Chihuahua Office of Urban Development and Ecology,
indicated that the state was moving forward with mandatory vehicle inspections in January 1994.
He also shared that it was his opinion that officials in Mexico City and Washington D.C. did not
have an idea of the extent of the environmental problems in the border. He shared Chihuahua
Governor Barrio’s support for the Committee’s projects and offered to petition federal authorities
for support on their behalf. The presence of these Mexican environmental officials at this
meeting provides a strong indication that they had taken notice of this binational effort. At least
at the state level, they were already comfortable expressing support for the collaboration. 254
When the Committee met again on August 25, 1993, almost 50 attendees were present to
hear that there was significant progress to report regarding what was now being referred to as the
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International Air Quality Management District (IAQMD) for the El Paso/Juárez/Doña Ana
County region. Danny Vickers and Dr. Pete Emerson shared that at the request of TACB Chair
Kirk Watson, Governor Ann Richards had sent a letter to President Bill Clinton on July 26
requesting his support for the IAQMD. They had subsequently learned that the president had
directed the EPA Administrator to designate a deputy administrator to work on developing the
IAQMD. Vickers also indicated that he and Jose González had met with Alfonso Murgía from
Chihuahua Governor Francisco Barrio’s office on July 30th and had received his commitment
that the governor would send a letter of support for the IAQMD to Mexican President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari.255
The Committee members discussed the possible frameworks for the development of the
IAQMD, including utilizing a memorandum of understanding tied to an existing La Paz
Agreement Annex or developing a new Annex to the La Paz Agreement. Based on the discussion
and research done by various committee members, Archie Clouse, the TACB Regional Director
in El Paso, suggested that the most effective approach would be to propose Annex VI to the La
Paz Agreement. U.S. EPA Region 6 representatives Jim Yarbrough and Dr. Stan Meiburg both
spoke about the importance of the Committee’s “unique and innovative” work, noting that there
was a “long-standing need” for such collaborative efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border. They
reiterated U.S. EPA’s support for the IAQMD and indicated that the initiative had the advantage
of having attained high profile interest. PROFEPA representative Miguel Orozco similarly
communicated their support. He indicated that President Salinas had recently visited Ciudad
Juárez and that PROFEPA Director Salvador Oñate had instructed him to provide support for the
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development of the IAQMD. Although the U.S. EPA had been supportive of the IAQMD
concept all along, Mexican federal officials had not indicated their support publicly before this
meeting. Given the importance of this project to the region’s air quality management and the
significant support and traction that the IAQMD was gaining, Danny Vickers recommended that
the Committee focus its efforts primarily on this project. That said, other project champions
reported progress and plans to continue pursuing their objectives as well.256
Throughout the summer of 1993, the Advisory Committee worked to establish the
necessary binational networks and gain the government recognition needed in order to advance
its agenda. Mowinski Barrón reported on the Committee's progress to the TACB in June and
August, requesting TACB staff support to amplify the efforts of Committee members on specific
projects. In his final weeks as TACB Chair, Watson sent letters to the state officials in
Chihuahua and New Mexico as well as U.S. Port of Entry officials, encouraging their support for
TACB Advisory Committee projects. On the last day of his chairmanship, he sent a letter to the
U.S. EPA Acting Regional Administrator expressing the TACB’s endorsement of the IAQMD
and urging the support of Region IV EPA staff. Kirk served as an important champion, but his
departure did not diminish the momentum of this frontera coalition. A fledging epistemic
community, the Task Force was now organized, connected, and creating synergies for the
improvement of the region’s air basin specifically and the management of transboundary natural
resources more broadly.257
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On September 1, 1993, the state of Texas merged the TACB with the Texas Water
Commission to form the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC.) This
merger, of course, had implications for the TACB Advisory Committee. Mowinski Barrón would
not be representing El Paso within this agency board. Nevertheless, TNRCC Commissioner Pam
Reed sent Mowinski Barrón a letter requesting that she stay on as chair and offered the continued
support of the TNRCC. She also recommended changing the name of the group to the Task
Force on Paso del Norte Air Quality (Task Force.) This name, Reed suggested, "reflects the
active role of the group and the regional nature of the group's activities and membership."258
In alignment with its binational focus and perhaps foreshadowing its changing role, when
they met again on October 7, 1993, they assembled at the Presidencia Municipal in Ciudad
Juárez. During this meeting, Mowinski Barrón discussed the recent developments with the state
environmental agency and the implications for the group. She shared Reed’s commitment and
her suggestion for the name change. The members adopted the new name and the Task Force
continued its work, now with the support of the TNRCC.259
During that same meeting, Dr. Stanley Meiburg with U.S. EPA Region VI shared that a
subgroup of Task Force members had developed a proposed Annex VI to the La Paz Agreement,
based on the IAQMD draft proposal that had been presented to the group during the July 14th
meeting. That proposal had received the support and endorsement of the TACB during its final
meeting in August and Chairman Watson had requested that the TNRCC staff and Task Force
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continue to advocate for the IAQMD. Albion Carlson, with the New Mexico Air Quality
Bureau, shared that the IAQMD had the support of the New Mexico Secretary of State and that
they expected a Memorandum of Support from the state legislature soon. Meiburg indicated that
the Region VI Office sent the IAQMD proposal to U.S. EPA headquarters for review. Following
a review and revision process that could take approximately one month to complete, the proposal
would be shared with the Task Force and sent to the U.S. State Department to initiate discussions
with Mexico.260
Task Force members also reported on other projects that were making progress. Robert
Gray, with Accugraph Corporation, and Jose Salcido with EDM International, reported that the
auto and paint shop study of the region was near completion and the data from this study was
being incorporated into the environmental database for the region. Chris Kennedy, a Border
Specialist with the TNRCC, added that the Voluntary Toxic Emission Reduction Program group
was working with the U.S. EPA and the El Paso Foreign Trade Association to host a workshop
on October 28 that would feature regional pollution reduction measures taken by General
Electric, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Briggs & Stratton, and AT&T. Dr. Erin Ross with
New Mexico State University was one of the primary organizers for this educational effort aimed
at helping companies reduce emissions.261
Finally, Francisco Núñez, with the Comité Ecológico de Ciudad Juárez reported on a
cooperative effort between the Texas Transportation Institute at Texas A&M, the Instituto
Tecnológico de Ciudad Juárez, the Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez and the municipal
government to obtain vehicle miles traveled and speed data for the city that would assist them in
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developing an emissions inventory. This data would also be helpful in developing vehicle
emissions reduction strategies. EDM International volunteered to process the survey data into the
appropriate format to facilitate the process. They anticipated this TTI-led effort would take
approximately one year to complete.262 Although the origins of this project preceded the Task
Force, the project benefited from the support and contributions of Task Force members like
Danny Vickers, who volunteered his company to assist with the data processing. These ongoing
studies were another key component of the public/private sector cross-border efforts to create a
comprehensive emissions inventory for the air basin. With these substantive projects in progress
and momentum building in support of the Task Force’s priorities, the group agreed to reconvene
on November 18.263
When the Task Force met again in November, the U.S. Congress had just approved
NAFTA and the environmental side agreements. The Task Force received several project
updates, but they focused their attention on their two biggest projects - the IAQMD and the
Border Region EPA Office. Jim Yarbrough with EPA Region 6 explained that the IAQMD
proposal was submitted to the EPA Office of International Activities, which would disseminate
the proposal to other EPA offices for review. Having heard an update that sounded much like the
report that EPA gave the previous month, Task Force members began to press Yarbrough for
additional information. Vickers asked Yarbrough who was in charge of tracking the proposal
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through the review process and suggested that they invite that/those individual/s as well as their
SEDESOL counterparts to attend their next Task Force meeting. Yarbrough provided the names
of two individuals in the EPA Office of International Activities who were working with the
project. Dr. Pete Emerson with the EDF provided the name of a SEDESOL representative who
could also be invited. This was followed by additional discussion regarding the October meeting
of the Binational Coordinators in Ensenada, Baja California. The biannual meeting, required by
the La Paz Agreement, was attended by EPA Administrator Carol Browner and SEDESOL
Secretary Luis Donaldo Colosio. According to the representatives from TNRCC and PROFEPA
who were in attendance and shared a copy of a joint communique issued following the meeting,
the Task Force and its projects were mentioned during the meeting and were included in the
initial list of priorities to be considered by the Binational Coordinators. This visibility for the
Task Force projects was important because it reflected that the top environmental officials for
both countries acknowledged the group’s advocacy and initiatives. This was a necessary step in
building credibility and support in both Washington D. C. and Mexico City. 264
The Task Force quickly pivoted to discussions about the establishment of the U.S. EPA
Border Region Office. Yarbrough told the group that he had not heard anything about this project
and added that President Clinton had indicated that the EPA would sustain a 7% budget cut that
might affect staffing. Nevertheless, Yarbrough reiterated that the Border Region Office was a
priority. Vickers once again asked whom they should contact at EPA to lobby for this office.
Yarbrough suggested the same individuals who were working on the IAQMD. This pressure
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from the fronterizos on the Task Force regarding the timeline and the pace of progress was a
necessary reminder for federal bureaucrats, no matter how well intentioned, that the air pollution
problems in the region needed swifter responses.265
Over the next few months, a contingent of Task Force members partnered with the
Greater El Paso Chamber of Commerce and elected officials from the region to lobby key
Washington D.C. leaders for the EPA Border Office and either the North American
Development Bank (NADBANK) or the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC)
to be located in the region. At that time, cities including San Diego, San Antonio, and Mexico
City were similarly lobbying for the placement of the NADBANK and the BECC. On the
Mexican side, the EDF worked with SEDESOL officials in Mexico City to keep the work of the
Task Force on the forefront amidst the NAFTA-related changes. Locally, the Ciudad Juárez
Chamber of Commerce and several other industry groups lobbied Mexican President Salinas de
Gortari through a letter writing campaign to place the BECC in Ciudad Juárez.266
It is worth noting that while the political lobbying and jockeying for the placement of
these institutions was ongoing, California was in the midst of the anti-immigrant campaign for
proposition 187, championed by republican Governor Pete Wilson. Proposition 187 sought to
limit public resources and services available to undocumented immigrants in the state. The
campaign portrayed Mexican immigrants as scofflaws who were dependent on public safety net
programs and draining state coffers. The Mexican government was vocal in its condemnation of
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the campaign and the overt racism that was on display throughout the state. They warned of the
long-term damage the campaign would cause to binational relations. With San Diego/Tijuana
being the only other large community on the U.S./Mexico border, El Paso/Ciudad Juárez stood to
gain from the proposition 187-related fallout as NAFTA-related resources were allocated.267
In spring 1994, the Task Force faced a couple of significant organizational changes and
existential questions. They learned during their March meeting that due to structural changes
within the TNRCC, the agency would no longer provide support to the organization. This
included administrative support that had been an important organizational tool. The Task Force
contemplated whether it should assume an action oriented role or an informative/facilitative role.
Vickers asked the group to think about this and be prepared to make decisions at the next
meeting. Mowinski Barrón concluded the meeting by announcing that due to time commitments
with her practice and other activities, she was stepping down as chair of the Task Force. She
asked Vickers to serve as interim chair until the Task Force could make nominations and vote for
a new chair. She also suggested that the Task Force formalize the structure and operations of the
organization, particularly because there was no established process by which the group would
nominate and elect a new chair. In order for the organization to continue as an independent
entity, they needed to develop their own operational and legal framework in order to continue
their work.268
During their May meeting, Vickers announced that he had received overwhelming
support for the Task Force to remain as action oriented as possible and to have a long-term role
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in the region. In line with that sentiment, he distributed a draft mission statement for the
members' consideration as they deliberated about the Task Force’s transition to a formal
independent organization. Christopher Johnston, an El Paso attorney, shared some organizational
options for the group to consider. They discussed the pros and cons of incorporating the group as
a non-profit entity versus a foundation. If it filed as a non-profit group, under section 501 (c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the group could face restrictions regarding lobbying
activities. As a foundation, Johnston informed the group, there would be "difficult fiduciary
technicalities," in addition to other restrictions. Another issue that needed to be addressed was
whether a sister organization could be set up in Ciudad Juárez similar to whatever was agreed
upon on the American side, since they could not create one transboundary non-profit
organization. Johnston advised the group to work as a non-profit organization operating in
concert with other area organizations. Vickers suggested to the group that the ideal structure
would be one in which the organization could get things done without being overly encumbered
by government restrictions. The group eventually decided to establish itself as two non-profit
organizations, one in Mexico and an equivalent organization in United States. Vickers said that
he hoped to have a charter, which would provide direction for the next five to ten years for the
Task Force by the July meeting. He also asked the group consider selecting a chair, given that he
was still serving in an interim capacity. 269
In addition to the decisions the Task Force had to make regarding their organization
structure, they also faced the challenge of staffing support. They had previously received staff
support from the TACB and the TNRCC, but with the shift in their structure that would change.
Vickers shared that he had spoken to TNRCC Commissioner Pam Reed regarding their
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continued need for support and that she had promised to look into assigning a TNRCC staff
person to help the Task Force develop its work plans and facilitate the implementation of their
projects. In the meantime, Dr. Wesley Leonard of the University of Texas at El Paso's Center for
Environmental Resource Management and Dr. Peter Emerson with the EDF agreed to provide
project support for the Task Force. Although these were mundane operational details, they were
critical to the continued work of the Task Force. 270
As the Task Force reached its one year anniversary as a coalition, their projects and
policy initiatives reflected the extensive collaborations and coordinated efforts by stakeholders
from the private and public sectors interested in improving the region’s air quality. These
stakeholders included researchers from the region’s academic institutions but they also included
researchers from national laboratories and universities hundreds of miles away who learned
about the initiatives in the region and wanted to help. NGOs such as EDF and civic groups in El
Paso and Ciudad Juárez all assisted by bringing resources to the Task Force projects.
Government officials from the U.S. EPA, SEDESOL and many state and local agencies were
also instrumental in the collaborations and implementation efforts. There were also many
business people deeply embedded in the Task Force. Whether the Task Force initiated the
projects or not, it became a hub for like-minded professionals with diverse competencies to
engage in multi-sectoral, binational collaboration and coordination that created trust and
synergies around air quality initiatives. After a year of work, the Task Force had become a
fronterizo-led epistemic community focused on the Paso del Norte air quality and border air
quality governance.
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Over the course of the next two years, this epistemic community would continue to
expand its network and focus its efforts to change the state of air quality and governance in the
region through innovative cross-border partnerships. While they continued to work on their
priority projects including the IAQMD and the EPA Border Office, they also engaged other
opportunities and partnerships as they solidified their role and expanded their capacity as an
organization. This included a cooperative effort between the Task Force, the Alternative Fuels
Council, the Rio Grande Council of Governments, and the El Paso Metropolitan Planning
Organization that produced a $500,000 alternative fuels conversion grant initiative.271
Another example was vehicle emissions inspection project managed by the Dirección
Municipal de Ecología de Ciudad Juárez. This initiative, which was launched with support of the
U.S. EPA and the State of Texas to curb vehicle emissions from the aging vehicle fleet, had
inspected 158,068 private vehicles and 1,926 public transportation vehicles. In conjunction with
this inspection project, the Dirección Municipal de Ecología de Ciudad Juárez was collaborating
with Colorado State University, El Paso Community College, and three Technical Vocational
Auto-Mechanics Schools in Ciudad Juárez to launch a “Diagnostic Centers Project” to train auto
mechanics to repair emissions systems and reduce the cost of those repairs for vehicle owners.
Smog Supply and Equipment, a diagnostic equipment manufacturer, donated three analyzers and
EDF agreed to assist with the expenses related to the importation of the equipment. This project
was remarkable given the number of partners that were coordinating to address a fundamental
and unmet need in Ciudad Juárez.272
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During their Summer Task Force meeting, EDF’s Christine Shaver shared that the U.S.
EPA had accepted the IAQMD proposal as Annex VI to the La Paz Agreement and would be
moving it to the State Department within the next month. The group also heard from Pat Cupp,
from the U.S. EPA, that the agency was planning to fund a number of projects including
pollution and traffic reduction studies in Ciudad Juárez and Doña Ana County, vehicle emissions
reductions in Ciudad Juárez, support for TNRCC’s Air Quality Program monitoring sites, and a
workshop on the International Air Quality Management District. The TNRCC’s Sally Gutierrez
also shared that they were creating an EPA-funded position for a new TNRCC staff person in El
Paso. She said that this project manager would assist the Task Force in its projects and act as the
coordinator for other binational cooperative efforts. All of this federal funding was responsive to
Task Force’s requests for support and intended to provide continuity to the ongoing projects and
collaborative efforts in the region. It was also a preface for developments related to the Task
Force’s request for an EPA Border Region Office.273
The positive July announcements were followed by mixed news at the September Task
Force meeting. EDF’s Dr. Pete Emerson reported that the IAQMD Annex VI proposal had been
discussed two days earlier in a meeting in Mexico, but that there was no official word from
Mexican Officials regarding next steps. Vickers reiterated how critical the establishment of this
district was to creating a cross-border pollution reduction and enforcement program.
Unfortunately, progress on the IAQMD was very slow and the process for approval was
shrouded in mystery and uncertainty. This disappointing update was followed by a very
significant announcement and victory for the Task Force. Nelly Rocha announced that the U.S.
EPA Border Office was opening in El Paso and would be staffed by seven people by the summer
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of 1995. Rocha shared that the Border Office would be focused on environmental issues along
the entire border and that they were in the process of developing a Border Action Plan. The
meeting concluded with Vickers addressing an internally stalled task - he urged the Task Force
to clarify the organization’s goals and operational structure in order continue to be viable and
productive. 274
Having successfully enlisted the support of the regional community and Texas Governor
Ann Richards, followed by a year-long lobbying effort to convince President Bill Clinton and
EPA officials in Washington D.C. to establish an U.S. EPA Border Region Office in El Paso, the
Task Force achieved one of its top goals. There are many factors mentioned earlier that went into
the decision to open the EPA Border Region Office in El Paso and by no means is the Task
Force to be solely credited for this decision. That said, the Task Force capitalized on the political
momentum associated with the passage of NAFTA and mounted a successful lobbying
campaign. On November 2, 1994, the Task Force members celebrated the inauguration of the
EPA Border Region Office in El Paso.275
They took advantage of this inauguration to meet with EPA Administrator Carol Browner
and her staff. Danny Vickers, Francisco Núñez, Jesus Reynoso, Carlos Rincón, Juan Sanchez,
and Pablo Salcido discussed the IAQMD proposal and its importance to the region’s air quality.
Vickers elaborated on the ongoing projects in the region, but emphasized that significant air
quality improvements would require region-wide programs and policies that would be facilitated

274 Task Force on Paso del Norte Air Quality, Minutes of September 22, 1994 meeting. U.S. EPA Border Office
Archive.
275 Dr. Carlos Rincón, Program Director, Environmental Defense Fund, interview by author, El Paso, TX,
November 20, 1995.
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by the IAQMD. Browner reportedly expressed her support and enthusiasm for the proposal and
pledged to pursue implementation.276
In January 1995, when the Task Force met again, the IAQMD was the dominant topic of
discussion. Danny Vickers shared Browner’s commitment to be a champion for the creation of
the binational district. He also indicated that he had spoken to a U.S. Department of State
representative and his impression was that the Task Force needed to do more work to convince
them that the IAQMD was necessary. The political environment in Washington had changed as
well. The November elections had yielded a republican majority in Congress, therefore Clinton
Administration officials would likely be more cautious about bold policy initiatives like the
IAQMD. EPA’s Jim Yarbrough shared that the U.S. EPA had met with the Department of State
and he confirmed that they had expressed concerns regarding federal jurisdictional authority and
the prospect of ceding that to a regional body. Yarbrough indicated that they could allay these
concerns if they promoted the IAQMD as an advisory board for the existing governments rather
than as an independent body with transboundary governance authority. He suggested that
additional meetings were necessary in order to work through these issues and finalize Circular
175, which would serve as the notice of intent to negotiate with Mexico on this matter. Roberto
Fernández, a Mexican attorney, reminded the group that it was a good time to establish contacts
within the Mexican agencies to foment support for the IAQMD, considering that they had lost a
great advocate with the recent assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio. Furthermore, with Mexico

276 Christopher J. Kennedy, Office of Border Affairs and Environmental Equity, Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission, to Members of the Task Force on Paso del Norte Air Quality, December 12, 1994. U.S.
EPA Border Office Archive.
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presidential elections concluded, the Zedillo administration had restructured and made new
government appointments.277
The Task Force also continued its conversation regarding the need to formalize its
structure as two parallel, non-profit entities in the U.S. and Mexico. Francisco Núñez urged the
group to push this effort forward. He reminded the attendees that the progress made in Ciudad
Juárez in air quality monitoring was due to the binational cooperation between EPA and
SEDESOL as well as the state and local stakeholders. Having a formalized structure, Núñez
argued, would help both sides work together more effectively. His sentiments echoed those of
Lydia Villalobos Prieto, with the State of Chihuahua’s Departamento de Ecología. Villalobos
credited much of the State’s progress made in environmental regulation to the collaborative
initiatives taking place in Ciudad Juárez. Due to the lack of support and resources coming from
federal authorities, Villalobos said the state was applying what they were learning from Ciudad
Juárez to the rest of the state. As such, the Task Force’s work in building environmental capacity
and infrastructure in Ciudad Juárez was creating benefits to the entire state. Vickers also
reminded the group that having the non-profit status would help the organization raise money for
its initiatives. Roberto Fernández, who was assisting with the organization structure in Ciudad
Juárez, provided details regarding next steps for the process. He also stressed how important it
was to get this structure formalized so that the group could more effectively advocate for the
IAQMD.278

277 Task Force on Paso del Norte Air Quality, Minutes of January 11, 1995 meeting. U.S. EPA Border Office
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Throughout 1995, the Task Force focused its efforts primarily on the adoption of an
IAQMD, with peripheral attention to the organizational structure as well of the other ongoing
projects that various members championed. Vickers worked closely with attorneys Christopher
Johnston and Roberto Fernández to solicit input from Task Force members regarding the desired
organization structure. They finally compiled their articles of incorporation under a new name:
Paso Del Norte Air Quality Task Force Inc. in the U.S. and Fuerza Ciudadana Pro-Calidad del
Aire Paso del Norte A.C. in Mexico.279
The articles would apply to the sister corporations created in both El Paso and Ciudad
Juárez in order to create mirror institutions. Their purposes as corporations were the following:
Our purpose is to improve air quality for all citizens in the border community of Paso del
Norte. Our community transcends national and state boundaries to encompass Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico, El Paso, Texas, Sunland Park, New Mexico, and surrounding areas. The
organization will unite with all public and private organizations that are working toward
the improvement in air quality. In carrying out our mission, we will do the following:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Serve as a forum for discussion of public policy concerning air quality;
Facilitate the planning, communications and coordination among all organizations that
are responsible for improving air quality;
Support, prioritize and actively promote programs that contribute to air quality;
Monitor the progress of all organizations that are responsible for improving air quality;
Raise funds from local, state, national, and international organizations for air quality
projects;
Educate the public on air quality and foster a grass roots movement to support the
initiatives of the Task Force;
Support the creation of an International Air Quality Management District in our
Community.280

Under this charter the membership was open to all applicants interested in the corporation and
each member would be entitled to one vote on each matter that was submitted to the vote of the

279 A.C. means Association Civil, the designation for a non-profit corporation in Mexico.
Two non-profit organizations with identical articles would be established on either side of the border due to legal
restrictions regarding bi-national entities. Therefore, the "corporation" refers to one entity composed of two
sections, one in Mexico and one in the U.S.
280 Paso del Norte Air Quality Management District, “Articles of Incorporation of Paso Del Norte Air Quality
Management District, Inc.” and “Bylaws of Paso del Norte Air Quality Management District, Inc.” 1996. Copy with
author.
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members. The Corporation called for seven directors from each section on its Board, who would
manage the business and affairs of the corporation. The Corporation would also have elected
officers, among them, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, and a Secretary.
Aside from the annual meeting, either the President or the Directors could call special meetings
as deemed necessary. The Board of Directors could form committees to work on specific
projects exercising the authority delegated to it by the Board. These committees would have
chairs appointed by the President or Board of Directors. The officers and positions within these
committees would have a one year terms. These and other specifics were outlined in the Articles
of Incorporation and Bylaws.281
Despite the progress made in defining the charter and bylaws, the Task Force took a long
time to initiate the legal process to become a non-profit corporation in both countries. This delay
was in part because Task Force members were focused on advancing the IAQMD and other
projects. The other reason, according to Vickers, was that the Task Force struggled to determine
who would sit on their first Board of Directors. The nomination process seemed to be a sensitive
one, as no one wanted to offend other members by excluding them from the board. This same
situation presented itself when Vickers, the Interim Chair, announced that he was stepping down
by March 1995. Vickers hoped the group would nominate a Mexican member to be the next
chair, but here again it seemed preferable not to nominate anyone rather than exclude and
possibly offend someone who could be a candidate. When the organization finally filed its
articles of incorporation in May 1996, Vickers continued as Chair of the Task Force.282
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140

Despite these delays, the Task Force finally set forth the list of the first members that
would sit on the Board of Directors for both the Mexican and the American sections. The Task
Force chose these individuals based on past contributions to the group projects and the level of
engagement within the organization. They represented different sectors of the community
allowing for a board representative of the balanced public and private sector involvement in the
Task Force. These people were also required to be residents of the Paso del Norte region.
Unfortunately, this meant that individuals who had been very active in the organization from its
inception, such as Dr. Peter Emerson of the EDF and Dr. Jim Yarbrough of the U.S. EPA who
were not area residents, were unable to serve as directors. Nevertheless, this was an important
caveat to make because they wanted the direction and work of the Task Force to be driven by
fronterizos.283
The Mexican section of directors included: Guadalupe Arizpe de De la Vega, President of
FEMAP; Roberto Fernández Reyes, Ciudad Juárez lawyer; Dr. Octavio E. Chávez, Resident
Advisor for the International City/County Management Association; Francisco Núñez, Director
of Water Treatment with the Junta Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento in Ciudad Juárez; Dr.
Carlos Rincón of the Environmental Defense Fund; and Jose Antonio González, a business
owner. The American section of directors included: Danny Vickers, of EDM International; Tom
Martin, Environmental Director for ASARCO; Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón, El Paso physician;
Archie Clouse, Air Program Manager for the TNRCC; Dr. Charles Groat, Director of the Center
for Environmental Resource Management at the University of Texas at El Paso; Dr. Erin Ross,
of the New Mexico State University College of Business Administration; and Jesus Reynoso of
the El Paso City-County Health District.

283 Ibid.
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For almost every nominated board member, their leadership in the Task Force is clear
from the meeting minutes and from interviews with several of them. It is unclear why the group
nominated Tom Martin to serve on the board of directors because the meeting minutes do not
reflect any significant level of involvement in Task Force Projects since its inception, although
meeting sign-in sheets show regular attendance. Given the scrutiny that ASARCO was under at
the time, the ASARCO representative may have pushed for participation on this board in order to
signal to federal and state regulators the company’s willingness to help address regional air
quality issues. He may have also participated in order to deflect any initiatives targeted at
ASARCO. This would have been consistent with the expectations of individuals in those roles,
representing highly polluting industries. In interviews with Task Force leaders Barrón and
Vickers, both stated that the success of the organization was due to their inclusion of all
stakeholders for the purposes of problem solving, rather than in placing blame on specific
polluters. They felt that inclusion of the region’s industry was very important to developing
productive solutions. Of course, those interviews took place long before the community learned
of the egregious illegal incineration of toxic chemicals at ASARCO’s El Paso site from the early
1990s through 1997. It is unlikely the Task Force would have nominated Martin if they had
known of the atrocities that ASARCO was perpetrating on the air basin at that time.284
From among these fourteen directors, the Task Force was to elect a president, secretary,
and treasurer to carry out the responsibilities outlined in the charter. They also tacitly assumed
that the presidency would alternate between a Mexican and an American member during future
elections. (The board did elect a Mexican chair when Vickers completed his term.) In early May
1996, Christopher Johnston began the application process with the Texas Secretary of State for

284 Danny Vickers, President, EDM International, interview by author, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, January 4, 1996.
Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, April 19, 1996.
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official status as the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force Inc. Simultaneously, Roberto
Fernández began the process on the Mexican side in order to become the Fuerza Ciudadana ProCalidad del Aire Paso del Norte A.C.285
The incorporation of the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force was initiated just as their
efforts to secure adoption of the IAQMD were coming to fruition. As mentioned earlier,
momentum and support in Washington waned in late 1994 when republicans secured majorities
in Congress and the Clinton Administration’s agenda stalled. In Mexico, the federal elections
had also brought about new political appointments in critical administrative positions. The Task
Force mobilized in the first quarter of 1995 to send letters to new SEMARNAP officials in
Mexico City to build awareness and support for the IAQMD proposal. In late June 1995, the
Annex V Binational Working Group (Air Work Group) met in Mexico City, as they were
required to do twice a year under the La Paz Agreement. During this four-day meeting, the Air
Work Group dedicated an afternoon of discussions to the IAQMD proposal. The American
section presented the Mexican section with the tentative draft of Annex VI that had been cleared
by the U.S. Department of State through their Circular 175 procedure. The Air Work Group
agreed to meet again in August to include State Department and Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores officials in a formal discussion solely about the IAQMD.286
On August 25, 1995, representatives of the EPA, SEMARNAP, the State Department,
and the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores held a formal meeting in Washington D.C. to discuss
the creation of the IAQMD. From this meeting emerged several milestones in its development.

285 Danny Vickers, Interview by author, January 4, 1996.
286 Carlos Rincón, Interview by author. November 20, 1995. U.S. Department of State, Circular 175: Request For
Authorization to Negotiate An Agreement With Mexico Establishing an Air Quality Management District and a Joint
Advisory Committee on Air Quality Improvement for the El Paso, Texas – Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico –
Doña Ana County, New Mexico Airshed. May 30, 1995. U.S. EPA Border Office Archive.
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First, the group officially recognized the existence of the Paso del Norte Air Basin as a
geographic region rather than using the names of the individual cities that artificially divide the
region. This recognition was the first step in getting the federal governments to acknowledge the
need for coordinated policymaking and truly bilateral efforts to improve the air quality. The
group agreed that the structure of the IAQMD was a viable approach to this complex problem;
however, the semantics of the proposal were problematic for the Mexican representatives. They
were concerned that the use of the words "international" and "district" in IAQMD implied a type
of agreement that would require congressional review, thus involving a long, drawn-out process.
They also preferred to draft the agreement as an Appendix to the existing Annex V, rather than
creating an Annex VI, which could also raise unnecessary political resistance. The Mexican
delegation assured those assembled that if the agreement was drafted as an appendix not an
annex, an "air basin" not a "district," and using "Paso del Norte" rather than "international" in the
name of the entity, then they would have the authority to hold negotiations and approve the
agreement. This changed the wording to an agreement to establish an appendix to Annex V that
would form the Paso del Norte Air Quality Management Basin (PNAQMB). Both delegations
took note of the concerns of the other side and agreed to work together over the corning months
to produce an agreement acceptable to both parties.287
Many Task Force members were disappointed with the shift from a district to an advisory
body because they feared it would amount to another meaningless committee. They all would
have preferred that the original wording remain intact, but they realized that there was value in
having strong local representation within the resulting institution. However, this too was
problematic for the Mexican side, which expressed its uneasiness with the idea of negotiating

287 Carlos Rincón, Interview by author. November 20, 1995.
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with non-governmental representatives. This was not a common practice in Mexico at the time.
In response to the apprehensiveness on the part of Mexican Section officials, the EDF reached
out to the Ford Foundation in Mexico City to request their assistance in setting up a meeting for
the Task Force. The Ford Foundation was an ally because they had provided EDF funding to
support the Task Force's lobbying efforts for the IAQMD.288
On October 9, 1995, Task Force members traveled to Mexico City to meet with
SEMARNAP officials Dr. Adrian Fernández Bremauntz, Director General de Gestión e
Información Ambiental and Dr. Ricardo Hernández, Director General de Coordinación de
Asuntos Internacionales. Task Force members in attendance included the following Mexican
representatives: Guadalupe Arizpe de De Ia Vega, President of FEMAP; Roberto Fernández, a
Ciudad Juárez Lawyer; Dr. Octavio Chávez, with ITESM and COPARMEX; Dr. Enrique Suarez,
Executive Director of FEMAP and CANACO; Alfonso Cota, a consultant; Francisco Núñez,
with the Ciudad Juárez Municipal Government, and Dr. Carlos Rincón, with EDF. Representing
the U.S. side were Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón, El Paso physician; Dr. Peter Emerson and
Christine Shaver, both with EDF. The Task Force members hoped this meeting would help them
build rapport between the Task force and the Mexican Section of the Air Working Group. The
Task Force members conveyed their interest in pursuing a partnership with the federal
government rather than acting autonomously. This interaction was positive because participants
were able to air their apprehensions and have those concerns addressed directly. For the Task
Force, their principal question related to the extent to which the Mexican Government would
allow them to become involved in the negotiation process. The SEMARNAP officials responded

288 Ibid. Octavio Chavez, Resident Advisor, International City Managers Association, interview by author, March
28, 1996, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.
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that they would allow Task Force members who were state and local government officials to
participate in the next round of negotiations.289
For the next few months, all of the adjustments made to the original IAQMD proposal
were made through the exchange of drafts rather than holding formal negotiations. Exasperated
by the lack of progress, Task Force Chairman Danny Vickers described the pace of negotiations
as that of a “snail on a turtle’s back.” On February 22, 1996, Task Force members once again
reached out to Mexican officials to urge their support for the IAQMD. In a six-page letter, the
Task Force reiterated the importance of creating an action-oriented governance mechanism that
would enable cross-border monitoring and mitigation strategies.290

ADOPTION OF THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AIR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT FOR THE
EL PASO- CIUDAD JUÁREZ- DONA ANA COUNTY AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT BASIN
During the last week in March, U.S. and Mexican negotiators reconvened in El Paso to
further the IAQMD discussions. The two parties sought the input of Task Force members and
finalized the details of the agreement to create a transboundary air quality management basin in
the Paso del Norte region. The agreement was adopted at the U.S.-Mexico Binational
Commission Meeting in Mexico City on May 6 and 7, 1996, when it was signed by Mexico's
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Angel Gurria and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
Appendix 1 to Annex V, the final designation of the agreement, created the Joint Advisory

289 Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force to Dr. Adrian Fernandez Bremauntz, Director General de Gestión e
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Committee on Air Quality Improvement for the El Paso- Ciudad Juárez- Dona Ana County Air
Quality Management Basin (Hereafter JAC).291
The JAC provided a vehicle to develop recommendations for the Air Work Group
related to a broad scope of activities. These activities included monitoring and modeling air
pollution, exchange of data and information, technical assistance and technology
exchanges/transfers, education and public outreach initiatives, and development of innovative
strategies for pollution abatement including emissions trading, international emission offset
projects, and other economic incentive programs.292 In many ways, these activities mirrored
those that collaborators in the region had managed for years by finding creative ways around
jurisdictional constraints. The JAC now enabled these activities and carried the imprimatur of a
federally-recognized binational body with the prescribed participation of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders.
According to the agreement, the JAC membership, consisting of 20 persons - ten from
each country was to be appointed by the SEMARNAP and the U.S. EPA. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the countries were each to name five government officials from federal, state,
and local jurisdictions and five non-government members from businesses, academia, and civic
and environmental organizations. All of the non-governmental members had to reside within the

291 Ramona Ortiz, “Integran Hoy Comité Binacional Ecologico,” Diario de Juárez, March 29, 1996. Sito Negron,
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Paso del Norte Air Basin in order to insure that local residents had a substantial presence on the
JAC.293
This agreement was a victory for Paso del Norte residents because it provided them with
a legally recognized mechanism with which to work as a binational community in matters of
transboundary air pollution. Although this was not the local control that the Task Force had
proposed in the IAQMD, it was an important development because it recognized the common air
basin and it codified the involvement of business, NGO, and academic representatives in a
binational advisory board for the first time in border environmental policy. During the
deliberations of the agreement, there was substantial uneasiness amongst Task Force members
who feared that negotiators would debilitate the original proposal to the point where any
semblance of local control was lost. While the final agreement did not give the JAC the authority
the Task Force had hoped for, most members acknowledged it represented a significant
commitment on the part of both federal governments to be more inclusive in their air quality
management and to facilitate cross-border pollution mitigation collaboration.294
In anticipation of the naming of the JAC appointees, the EDF worked with the Task
Force, the El Paso Community Foundation, and government partners to organize a two-day event
titled “Managing Transboundary Air Quality in the Paso del Norte Region: A Symposium on the
Joint Advisory Committee of Air Quality Improvement,” on June 26 and 27 in Ciudad Juárez.
The symposium featured panel discussions and presentations from federal officials from the
EPA, SEMARNAP, PROFEPA, and Mexico’s Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. State and
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local environmental and planning officials from all three states participated. There was also
ample representation from NGOs such as EDF, FEMAP and Physicians for Social
Responsibility, universities including UTEP, NMSU, UACJ and ITESM, and local business
leaders.295
The symposium allowed the Task Force to continue educating federal and state officials
regarding the economic and environmental conditions in the air basin and the air quality
collaborations that were ongoing. It was also an opportunity for government officials to speak
about their commitment to the JAC. Notably, Dr. Adrian Fernández, deputy director for
environmental administration at INE-SEMARNAP, stated that the work of the Task Force had
been a big lesson for him in multisectoral innovation and collaboration. He predicted that the
JAC would become a model for the world. Pledging to support this effort, Fernández urged Task
Force members not to be discouraged because the JAC was not exactly the IAQMD that they
proposed and suggested that the desired outcomes were attainable through the approved
framework.296
The symposium included sessions to develop a work plan, legal frameworks, and
operating procedures for the JAC. The objective of these discussions was to do as much of the
groundwork as they could in order for the JAC to be operational and productive once the
members were named. They discussed priorities and objectives that included creating economic
incentives and transboundary pollution abatement options with measurable outcomes. In many

295 Environmental Defense Fund, “Managing Transboundary Air Quality in the Paso del Norte Region: A
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ways, this symposium served as an opportunity to synthesize the work of the Task Force and set
the stage for the JAC.297
During the symposium, Bob Hannesschlager, EPA Assistant Regional Administrator,
reported that they had already received over 30 nominations and anticipated naming the U.S.
appointees to the JAC in July. Unfortunately, the U.S. and Mexico did not name the appointees
to the JAC for five months. Frustrated with this delay, the Task Force Chairman Danny Vickers
wrote a letter to the EPA Regional Administrator Jane Saginaw on October 1, acknowledging her
support of the JAC and urging her intervention to move along the appointment process. On the
Mexican side, Task Force leadership collectively wrote to SEMARNAP Secretary Julia Carabias
with a more subtle message, in line with the more diplomatic approach customary to addressing
Mexican government officials. In this letter the Task Force invited Carabias to host the signing
of the U.S. Mexico border environmental plan called Frontera XXI/Border XXI in Ciudad Juárez
at the end of October in conjunction with a scheduled visit from Chihuahua Governor Francisco
Barrio. They offered their full support to make the signing ceremony possible and mentioned the
opportunity to proclaim the progress made toward the creation of the JAC during these
proceedings. Judging from their responses, Carabias and Saginaw responded favorably to the
Task Force’s petitions for action. On October 28, both officials presided over the signing
ceremony for the Frontera XXI/Border XXI in Ciudad Juárez followed by a ceremony on
October 29 to name the Mexican and U.S. appointees to the JAC.298
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The following month the JAC convened in El Paso for its first meeting. Jane Saginaw and
Dr. Victor Hugo Páramo, representing the U.S. EPA and SEMARNAP, respectively, introduced
the U.S. and Mexican appointees. The table below lists the inaugural JAC appointees for both
countries along with their affiliation. Once again, there is a significant question related to the
ASARCO representative named to the JAC. As stated earlier, Martin did not have a record of
engagement in air quality projects in the region, leaving it unclear why the U.S. EPA appointed
him to the JAC when there were other highly engaged private sector representatives.
Table 7. U.S. and Mexico JAC Appointees
JAC U.S. Appointees
JAC Mexico Appointees
Jane Saginaw – Regional Administrator, EPA
Dr. Victor Hugo Páramo – INE-SEMARNAP
George Avalos – Director of Transportation,
Maria del Pilar Lopez Marco – PROFEPA
Doña Ana County, NM
Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón – El Paso
Dr. Rosalba Rojas Martinez – Director, Center
Physician, Texas Water Development Board
for Environmental Health Programs –
Member, former Chairman of the PDNAQTF
Secretaría de Salud
Archie Clouse – Air Program Director, TNRCC Jose Trevino Fernández – Director,
Region 6
Environmental Department – State of
Chihuahua
John Cordova, Engineer, City of El Paso
Oscar Ibañez Hernández – Director,
Department of Urban Development and
Ecology – Municipio de Ciudad Juárez
Dr. Carlos Rincón, Border Air Program
Rene Franco – representing environmental
Director, EDF
organizations in Ciudad Juárez
Tom Martin – Environmental Manager,
Angel Peralta Miram – Representing the
ASARCO – El Paso
business community
Dr. Charles Groat – Director, Center for
Dr. Hector A. Quevedo – Universidad
Environmental Resource Management, UTEP
Autonoma de Ciudad Juárez
Danny Vickers – President, EDM International Dr. Enrique Suarez – Executive Director,
and Chairman of PDNAQTF
FEMAP
Cecilia Williams – Chief of the Air Quality
Felipe Adrian Vasquez – Chihuahua
Bureau, New Mexico Environmental
Consultative Committee for Sustainable
Department
Development

Advisory Committee on Air Quality Improvement for the El Paso- Ciudad Juárez- Doña Ana County Air Quality
Management Basin, on October 29, 1996 in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. U.S. EPA Border Office Archive.
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Each appointee had an opportunity to say a few words about their area of expertise or their
specific interest in the work of the JAC. Of note, Oscar Ibañez Hernández, director of the
Department of Urban Development and Ecology for the Municipio de Ciudad Juárez expressed
what an enormous cultural, administrative and political advancement this was for the coexistence
of their cross-border community. He predicted that the JAC would become a model for other
aspects of binational relations. Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón expressed the magnitude of the task
at hand in terms of the health implications for the residents of the region, warning “what we
pollute the air with will come back to us in diseases, increased healthcare costs and in less
cognitively sound people.”299
Many of the JAC appointees acknowledged the work of the Task Force for advancing
cross-border collaboration in air quality improvement. They discussed several ongoing projects
and recommendations for the JAC. These included 1) creating a joint air quality public
information system for the region, 2) supporting the Paso del Norte Border 2000 Task Force to
reduced wait times at the ports of entry, 3) establishing a joint emissions inventory, 4)
developing an international emissions credits trading program, 5) creating a regulatory and
enforcement mechanism to reduce brick kiln emissions, and 6) establishing obligatory vehicle
inspections in Ciudad Juárez. JAC members volunteered to work on action items associated with
each of these projects.300
In addition to the project discussions, the meeting concluded with comments from the
public – many of whom were Task Force members. Beatriz Vera, an active Task Force member
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and Dr. Octavio Chávez, the new Task Force chair, emphasized how important it was for the
JAC to make every effort to raise awareness of this new body and to publicize upcoming
meetings. Vera also requested that the JAC incorporate public comment into the proceedings as
they discussed the projects to ensure the JAC considered the community input. The minutes of
this inaugural meeting reflect a vocal commitment from the local JAC appointees and Task Force
members to continue to work toward the improvement of the region’s air quality and to utilize
this new advisory committee to push forward innovative cross-border mitigation strategies that
required new legal frameworks from both federal governments. 301
The JAC began to meet quarterly the following year. During their first meeting in 1997, a
clear tension emerged between the non-governmental and governmental JAC members as nongovernmental members pushed for JAC involvement beyond just making recommendations to
the Air Working Group. The JAC worked through this, concluding that the bylaws for the group
should allow for recommendations to the Air Working Group as well as responsiveness to other
relevant initiatives that required more immediate action. The JAC co-chairs established a
subcommittee to develop the bylaws to formalize the operations of the advisory committee.302
In addition to working through the technical aspects of the JACs role, they also took up
the discussion of the international emissions reduction credits program (IERC program). Dr. Ron
Ketter with UTEP’s Public Administration program presented a proposal for an IERC program
that would allow companies in the region to “offset” their emissions by investing in projects

301 Ibid
302 Joint Advisory Committee for the Improvement of Air Quality in the Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua/El Paso,
Texas/Doña Ana County, New Mexico Air Quality Management Basin, Meeting Minutes, Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua, February 18, 1997. JAC Bylaws were finalized and approved during the August meeting according to
Joint Advisory Committee for the Improvement of Air Quality in the Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua/El Paso,
Texas/Doña Ana County, New Mexico Air Quality Management Basin, Meeting Minutes, El Paso Texas, August 12,
1997.
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anywhere in the air basin that would result in a net emissions reduction. This mechanism, Ketter
argued, would allow greater cost efficiencies that result in greater emissions reductions. For
example, paving some number of miles of unpaved roads in Ciudad Juárez would be cheaper and
create a greater reduction in particulate matter than installing more complex air filters at a
manufacturing facility. The IERC program would also give companies more opportunities to
reduce emissions offsite in order to enable expansion and economic growth in the region. Ketter
suggested identifying a company-sponsored pilot project whereby scientifically verified
emissions reductions could be credited to the sponsoring company for emissions reduction
credits.303
The JAC members agreed that such a project would be advantageous to the residents as
well as the companies in the region. Emissions reduction credits trading programs were
permissible by environmental policy in both the U.S. and Mexico. The problem was that nothing
within those legal frameworks allowed for this type of program to operate across international
boundaries. The group agreed to identify specific legal hurdles and begin working on ways to
clear them.304 This discussion served as a critical launching point for an unprecedented crossborder emissions reduction project that is the subject of the next chapter.
Over the course of the next four years, the JAC advanced several projects with high
potential for air quality improvement in the region. One such initiative, which came to fruition
after almost three years of advocating and leveraging the influence of the JAC Mexican federal
appointees, compelled PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos) to supply oxygenated gasoline in Ciudad
Juárez during winter months. The JAC expected this measure, which would mirror the

303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
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oxygenated fuel requirement in El Paso, to result in a reduction of CO emissions of up to 16% in
Ciudad Juárez. According to Jesus Reynoso with the El Paso City County Health and
Environmental District (EPCCHED), CO exceedances dropped from 15-16 per year in 1992
when the oxygenated fuel requirement was initiated in El Paso, to zero in 1998 and 1999. For the
initial phase of the roll out of oxygenated fuel in Ciudad Juárez, the EPCCHED assisted their
Mexican counterparts by testing the fuel samples collected at gasoline stations throughout the
city to ensure compliance from PEMEX. The project moved forward slowly and with the
constant pressure from local JAC members who refused to accept the stalling and false
justifications from PEMEX and other federal officials who resisted change. This was an example
of how the JAC members, from all sectors and levels of government, took a local
recommendation and saw it through to execution for the benefit of the air basin and its
residents.305

CONCLUSION
In response to a strong multi-sectoral, frontera-based advocacy effort championed by the
Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force over many years, the U.S. and Mexico established the
JAC as a vehicle to develop recommendations related to a broad scope of activities to improve
air quality in the Paso del Norte air basin. The JAC was a significant victory for Paso del Norte
residents because it provided them with a legally recognized mechanism within which to work as
a binational community in matters of transboundary air pollution. This epistemic community,

305 Joint Advisory Committee for the Improvement of Air Quality in the Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua/El Paso,
Texas/Doña Ana County, New Mexico Air Quality Management Basin, Meeting Minutes, El Paso City County
Health and Environmental District – WIC Training Center, December 2, 1999.
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anchored by its fronterizo identity, insisted on accountable governance and solutions to the air
quality crisis developed by residents of the region who breathed the air every day.
Beyond the Paso del Norte air basin, there was a larger acknowledgement of the value of
the multisectoral engagement and the synergies created by that epistemic community. This
model of frontera-based advocacy and involvement became the new standard and blueprint for
border environmental governance. By 2003, the US and Mexico adopted the Border 2012
program- a plan that incorporated a frontera-based approach that focused on the environmental
needs of border residents. The Border 2012 program featured multi-stakeholder task forces for
water, air, solid waste and other areas of environmental management that resembled the JAC.
The Border 2020 program contained this same task force structure, as does the current Border
2025 program. These task forces and working groups representing sister communities along the
border have informed the binational environmental project priorities adopted by the U.S. EPA
and SEMARNAP for almost two decades.306 During the inaugural meeting in 1996, Oscar Ibañez
Hernández was prescient when he stated that the JAC would become a model for many aspects
of binational relations. The Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force and the JAC were
transformational in their fronterizo approach to shared resource management and served as a
template for the binational multi-stakeholder structures that characterize border environmental
policy making today.
That said, it is also important to acknowledge that while the JAC represented a significant
transformation in community involvement in border environmental governance, decisions
regarding the levels of investment in environmental infrastructure and regulatory enforcement
continue to be made thousands of miles away from the border. Border communities live with an

306 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Mexico Border Program, “What is Border 2025,”
https://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/what-border-2025 (accessed September 13, 2021.)
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inordinate and unjust burden of trade-related pollution without the adequate public infrastructure
to manage the demands of a globalized economy. Having a seat at the table to help develop
border environmental policy is certainly an important step forward, but sustained and targeted
frontera-advocacy efforts and the federal expenditures in critical infrastructure that truly address
the environmental and human health needs of fronterizos are essential.
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Chapter Five: Ciudad Juárez Brick Kilns: A Case Study in Innovative Cross-Border
Collaborations, Failed Good Intentions, and Appropriate Technologies

In the early 1990s, the U.S. EPA characterized the Paso del Norte region as having the
worst air quality along the U.S.-Mexico border. According to their indices, the air was unhealthy
for the general population 68 days a year and unhealthy for sensitive groups 128 days a year. In
Ciudad Juárez, the major sources of pollution were motor vehicles, unpaved roads, and open
burning. All of these emissions sources grew along with this sprawling city as industrialization
took hold during the 1970s and 1980s. One informal sector that expanded in order to keep up
with demand for new housing construction was the brickmaking business. Ladrilleros, as brick
makers are called in Spanish, provided their community a valuable commodity, but their
production methods involved open burning of highly polluting fuels that produced tons of toxic
emissions. This chapter explores the innovative fronterizo-led binational efforts to work with the
ladrilleros to develop more efficient production technologies, reduce emissions, and improve
their well-being. It examines the way in which the ladrilleros themselves helped reframe the
challenges in order to create appropriate technologies that could be adopted in their communities
and replicated in microenterprises worldwide. Finally, it illustrates the opportunity for significant
and cost-effective pollution reduction through cross-border emissions reductions credits.307

307 Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force, Solving the Air Pollution Problems in Paso del Norte. EI Paso, Texas,
1994. U.S. EPA Border Office Archive. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Outdoor Air Quality Data - Air
Quality Index Report,” https://www.epa.gov/outdoor-air-quality-data/about-air-data-reports, (accessed May 17,
2020). Allen Blackman and Geoffrey J. Bannister, “Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: The Ciudad Juárez
Brickmakers’ Project,” Natural Resources Journal 37, no. 4 (Fall 1997): 834.
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ladrilleros in Ciudad Juárez utilized centuries-old
technology to build their microenterprises in several colonias along the outskirts of the city.
These microenterprises mushroomed as demand for housing expanded after the implementation
of the Border Industrialization Program and development of the maquiladora industry. As the
city footprint expanded, many colonias ladrilleras found themselves in the middle of residential
neighborhoods. Due to the heavy dark smoke the brick kilns produced and their proximity to
these residential neighborhoods, they found themselves the subject of many complaints to
municipal authorities. Nevertheless, the brick kiln expansion was constant throughout the 1980s,
with ladrilleros situating new kilns in close proximity to residential and industrial developments
where demand for bricks was high. Between 1990 and 1995 brick kiln operations ballooned from
350 to a peak of 450 in response to a booming international trade economy, but a devastating
peso devaluation in late 1994 crippled the economy and brought the brick kiln count down to 290
by the end of 1995.308
The ladrilleros operated traditional brick kilns that were large square-shaped open
chimney clay structures that produced an average of 8000 bricks per burn. Each burn lasted
between 20-30 hours. They fueled their kilns with materials such as scrap wood, saw dust, and
shipping pallets. Some also used paper products, particle board, railroad ties, tires, used motor
oil, and other petroleum products to reach temperatures necessary for brick-fabrication of over
600 degrees Celsius. For ladrilleros with very limited means, the imperative was to find the
cheapest and most readily available fuels in order to be competitive in an industry with minimal

308 ETM Consultores, S.A. de C.V., “Census Update of Brick Producers in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua,” Ciudad
Juárez, Chihuahua, March 31, 2003, copy with author. Gustavo Cordova Bororquez, Gestión Ambiental en Ciudad
Juárez, Chihuahua: participacion social en el marco de la gobernabilidad democratica (Tijuana: El Colegio de la
Frontera Norte, 2011), 207-224.
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profit margins. Unfortunately, the fuel mix they used emitted carbon monoxide, particulate
matter, volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide and heavy
metals into the air.309
Most ladrilleros were unaware of the emissions-related health risks for themselves or
their families, who often lived in modest houses built adjacent to or in close proximity to their
kilns. When they fired the brick kilns for their normal bi-monthly production, the emissions
created horrible dark black plumes of smoke that could be seen billowing into the sky from miles
away. Although these emissions were visible throughout the air basin, the contaminants tended
to settle close to the sources, thereby creating especially unhealthy conditions for brick kiln
operators, employees and their families. Numerous studies published between 1995 and 2006
have documented the human health effects of exposure to particulate matter and other air
contaminants that are contained in brick kilns emissions. One study focused on health effects of
air pollution on children in Ciudad Juárez found that elevated levels of particulate matter
increased the risk of respiratory mortality among infants. Another publication found that brick
kiln emissions were responsible for causing serious health problems as well as more than a dozen
premature mortalities per year.310

309 Ibid.
310 Allen Blackman and Geoffrey J. Bannister, “Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: The Ciudad Juárez
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In 1989, the Consejo Municipal de Ecología began promoting propane gas as a fuel for
brick making in order to reduce emissions. The following year, the Federación Mexicana de
Asociaciones Privadas (FEMAP) took the lead on an initiative to help ladrilleros in Ciudad
Juárez convert to cleaner burning technologies. At the federal level, political leaders in the U.S.
and Mexico began focusing additional attention and resources on border environmental issues as
NAFTA debates intensified. In 1991, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s administration
created a fund called Empresas Solidaridad to assist microenterprises. From this initiative,
FEMAP was awarded a trust fund of 800,000 pesos to assist brick makers with the transition to
cleaner burning propane fuel. FEMAP used this 800,000 pesos to leverage an 8,000,000 peso
line of credit with NAFIN, the Mexican federal development bank dedicated to financing small
business project.311
FEMAP’s president and founder, Guadalupe de la Vega, utilized her influence and
network to secure the scientific and engineering expertise of Los Alamos National Laboratories
(LANL) and El Paso Natural Gas Company (EPNG). These scientists and engineers from all
over the country interviewed and observed the ladrilleros and their kilns to gain a better
understanding of their operations and the modifications that would be needed to incorporate the
propane-powered burners. Following months of field and laboratory-based research, LANL and
EPNG engineers developed modifications to incorporate propane burners into the brick kilns.
They were confident the propane equipment would provide greater fuel efficiency and more
uniform burning, in addition to emissions reduction benefits. FEMAP took these design
recommendations to the propane providers and the ladrilleros unions and requested their

311 FEMAP is a non-profit organization founded in Ciudad Juárez in 1973. It administers healthcare and
microenterprise development projects in 25 Mexican states. Blackman and Bannister, “Pollution Control in the
Informal Sector,” 837-840.
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assistance in educating the ladrilleros about the economic and health benefits of the conversion.
The propane providers donated much of the equipment for the kilns and set up lines of credit for
the ladrilleros to purchase the fuel. Additionally, ladrilleros had access to financing for any
required modifications through the federal Empresas Solidaridad fund secured by FEMAP.312
At the same time that ladrilleros learned about these propane modifications, state and
municipal emissions regulations and enforcement were ramping up. In 1991, the Ley Ecológica
Para el Estado de Chihuahua restricted the combustible fuels for brick kilns to clean sawdust
and wood. Municipal authorities, under the leadership of newly-elected Municipal President
Francisco Villarreal, banned all “dirty fuels” and allowed only propane to be used for kiln fuel.
They also encouraged citizens to report violations of this new fuel ordinance. Ladrilleros who
violated the “dirty fuel” ban were arrested and jailed for 24-36 hours and sometimes fined. In
addition to the enforcement approach to address the brick kiln emissions, FEMAP, the Municipio
de Ciudad Juárez, and the ladrilleros unions worked with the principal housing construction
entities in the city to set a uniform minimum brick price in order to protect the law-abiding
ladrilleros from being undercut by those who continued to use cheaper clandestine fuels. The
combination of the carrot – the free propane equipment, fixed brick pricing, and the line of credit
to facilitate conversion – and the enforcement stick motivated many ladrilleros to convert to
propane during 1992 and 1993. An estimated 50-60 percent of the kiln owners had converted to
propane by fall 1993.313

312 Robert Bryce, “Air-Polluting Tale of Two Cities,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 25, 1994. Blackman
and Bannister, “Pollution Control in the Informal Sector,” 847. Cordova Bororquez, Gestión Ambiental en Ciudad
Juárez, 221. Guadalupe De La Vega is a member of a prominent Ciudad Juárez family with significant retail and
industrial holdings.
313 Blackman and Bannister, “Pollution Control in the Informal Sector,” 846, 848.
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Unfortunately, in the early 1990s Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) began to eliminate
propane subsidies as a part of the Salinas Administration’s economic liberalization initiatives.
The new economic policy was completely misaligned with the administration’s environmental
initiatives. This proved disastrous for the ladrilleros, who saw their fuel costs skyrocket.
According to one study, the propane fuel costs per brick went from being 29% higher than scrap
wood in 1992 to being 162% higher in 1995. Faced with this untenable economic situation, most
ladrilleros abandoned their propane equipment. The municipal authorities soon rescinded their
propane fuel mandate and allowed ladrilleros to burn sawdust and scrap wood that was free of
resins and varnishes. By 1995, the rising gas prices and the massive peso devaluation drove all
but one ladrillero to abandon the propane technology.314
Despite this setback, LANL scientists continued their research in an effort to improve
their brick kiln designs. In 1995, the U.S. EPA awarded the El Paso Community Foundation a
$32,000 grant to build 14 new brick kilns that incorporated recommendations for a cylindrical
base and utilized equipment donated by EPNG and LANL. The kilns were built in Ciudad Juárez
at the site of FEMAP’s newly established Instituto de Ecotecnologia (ECOTEC), an educational
facility dedicated to training and educating ladrilleros in the technical aspects of brickmaking.
While the new kilns displayed improved structural integrity at the extremely high temperatures
required to fire the bricks, emissions were not substantially reduced and the fundamental
problem of fuel costs continued to plague researchers.315

314 Robert O. Marquez, “Appropriate Chemistry for the Economically Limited People of the Earth” (PhD diss.,
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Pollution on U.S.-Mexico Border,” The Dallas Morning News, November 28, 1995. John del Rosario, “The Robert
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REFRAMING THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION
LANL partnered with New Mexico State University (NMSU) doctoral student Robert O.
Marquez to continue to refine their brick kiln research and modifications. A fronterizo with a
uniquely empathetic perspective, Marquez approached this problem in a very different way. Born
in Deming, New Mexico, into a large and impoverished Apache family, Marquez had survived
extreme hardships in his early life and felt that he had a responsibility to use his talents to help
other people. In his dissertation, titled “Appropriate Chemistry for the Economically Limited
People of the Earth,” Marquez described brick makers of the world as fiercely independent
people who withstood harsh and dangerous conditions to provide their societies a valuable
commodity. Marquez referred to the brick makers as people of the earth because they were
dependent on sunlight, water, clays and sand for their livelihood.316
In the Paso del Norte region, sand was abundant in the desert and clays could be obtained
along the Rio Grande valley. Depending on the location of the brick kilns, water was either
brought in by truck or piped in. The most limited and most expensive resource for the ladrilleros
was fuel to fire the kilns. As discussed
earlier, when alternative fuels such as
propane became too expensive, the
ladrilleros resumed using the highly
polluting fuels that brought them so
much scrutiny years earlier. For
Marquez, this meant that the
Figure 8: Traditional Brick Kiln Located in Fronteriza
Baja

technological solution that the

316 Marquez, “Appropriate Chemistry for the Economically Limited People of the Earth,” 6.
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engineers and scientist had created for these communities was not developed with a complete
understanding of the problem, thereby making it an inappropriate technology. He proposed that
“the problem is not the brick-makers, their processes, their environment, or their way of life but
it is society’s philosophical approach to understanding the problem, society’s view of science,
and technology’s role in solving the perceived problem.” He suggested reframing all of the
established assumptions about brick making, including judgements about the use of discarded
materials for fuel.317
Marquez suggested that economically limited people (EPL) who lived in these
communities and did this work every day needed to be equal partners on the research team
attempting to solve the problem for the ladrillero community. He also argued that the best
technological solution was not necessarily the best overall solution because technology needed to
be balanced with economic, political, and communal factors. In order to find an appropriate
solution to the problem, ladrilleros needed to be an active part of the experimental process so
that they could feel ownership of the outcome. Consistent with this belief, Marquez worked with
ladrillero Don Enrique Chávez to develop a new kiln design that could reduce emissions, burn
times, and fuel without altering any of the required inputs or placing any limitations on the type
of fuels that could be used.318
With the assistance of his research team that included the ladrilleros and colleagues from
the Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juárez, Marquez designed a dual cylinder kiln that
featured a domed roof referred to in brick kiln literature as the MK2 design. Following several
modifications developed through extensive experimentation, the MK2 design incorporated a raw

317 Marquez, “Appropriate Chemistry for the Economically Limited People of the Earth,” 9.
318 Marquez, “Appropriate Chemistry for the Economically Limited People of the Earth,” 13-15.
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clay brick filtration system that utilized the electrical charge of the clay to trap and filter the
smoke and soot produced during the firing of bricks. The domed roof and heat recapture system
created better combustion efficiency and decreased fuel costs by 50 percent while also reducing
the emissions produced in
each burn by up to 80
percent. The kilns included
simple features that
allowed the kiln operator to
check the temperature of
the bricks without having
to make the dangerous
climb to the roof, as was

Figure 9. MK2 Kiln

required with traditional kilns. The building materials and construction techniques were those
traditionally used by the ladrilleros, thereby facilitating the subsequent adoption and
construction of the kilns. In addressing this problem, this research team applied “appropriate
chemistry” to develop a technological solution alongside, not in spite of, the ladrillero
community.319
The challenges related to brick kiln emissions had been a part of the Paso del Norte Air
Quality Task Force discussions since its first meetings in 1993. With FEMAP and other partners
active in the Task Force also participating in the JAC, these discussions and initiatives also
transitioned to the JAC’s agenda. During the JAC’s first meeting, Dr. Enrique Suárez, FEMAP’s

319 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, “A Study of Brick-Making Processes along the Texas Portion of
the U.S-Mexico Border: Senate Bill 749,” December 2002, 25-26. Copy with author. Marquez, “Appropriate
Chemistry for the Economically Limited People of the Earth,” 129-130.
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executive director, urged the group to continue to support efforts to improve brick kiln
production in Ciudad Juárez. The group also discussed the need to establish the legal frameworks
for international emissions reduction credits (IERC) for the region.320 Subsequent work groups
and discussions around both of these topics provided the catalyst for a unique cross-border
collaboration, despite the fact that these discussions were tense at times and by no means
indicated a binational consensus around how to address the brick kiln emissions challenges.
This dynamic was certainly palpable at the February 1998 JAC meeting. Marquez was
slated to present his team’s findings on the environmental brick kilns. Prior to the start of the
meeting, PROFEPA’s Maria del Pilar López Marco expressed an objection to the agenda item
because of sensitivities to the U.S. involvement in Mexico’s brick kiln problems. Responding to
this objection from a federal counterpart, U.S. EPA’s Matt Witosky suggested to the JAC’s
executive secretary, Victor Valenzuela, that they table the item. Valenzuela, an El Paso native
and TNRCC El Paso region planner, disagreed and insisted that the presentation was scientific in
nature and would not be controversial. During his presentation, Marquez shared his vision for the
application of appropriate technologies to this global brick kiln problem and indicated that the
domed design and the clay filtration system they had developed had already demonstrated
significant emissions reductions. He asked the JAC for their support of the project and requested
their assistance in attaining the required permissions from Mexican immigration authorities to
continue this work in Ciudad Juárez.321

320 Joint Advisory Committee for the Improvement of Air Quality in the Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua/El Paso,
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López Marco suggested that Marquez continue to do his research in the U.S. then bring
the technology to Mexico once it was ready for implementation. She also shared that PROFEPA
was already preparing a plan for regulating the fuels that brick kiln operators were allowed to
burn, suggesting that this issue could be resolved through regulatory enforcement. Her comments
were met by resistance from another fronterizo, Oscar Ibanez with the Municipio de Ciudad
Juárez. He insisted that this collaborative research effort provided Juárez academic institutions
an opportunity to build their technical and engineering capacity. He insisted that this was one of
the few initiatives in which Mexicans were an integral part of the technical work, thereby
enabling them to achieve their “goals in and for Mexico.” Attempting to mediate this tension
between Mexican federal and local officials, INE’s Dr. Victor Hugo Páramo, the Mexican JAC
Co-chair, suggested that in order to move forward with a recommendation they would need more
data on the specifics of the kiln design. Marquez took the opportunity to add that the prototype
they developed reduced emissions by up to 80 percent and the total amount of fuel required by
50 percent, regardless of what fuel source was utilized. This was critical to the health and
economic well-being of the ladrilleros because the new design did not require expensive
adaptations to realize these benefits. Marquez ended his slide presentation with pictures of the
ladrilleros at work knee deep in mud and their children playing amidst the ashes from the kilns.
He reminded the JAC that these individuals were the driving motivator for his work. Following
this final appeal for support, López Marco relented in her opposition and suggested that the JAC
present a resolution of support to the Air Working Group. The JAC agreed to do so.322
During that same February meeting, El Paso Electric’s Mark Rodriguez spoke about the
company’s interest in working with authorities on both sides of the border to improve air quality.

322 Ibid.
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He encouraged the JAC to help create policies and incentives that would attract business to
participate in such an effort. While Rodriguez did not provide an example of the incentives he
had in mind, IERCs were one of the tools the JAC discussed that day. UTEP’s Ron Ketter
explained that IERCs would allow a company to invest in an emissions reduction project
somewhere in the air basin in order to offset its existing emissions or to justify an expansion.
Given that El Paso County was in non-attainment status, any expansion that created additional
emissions required an emissions offset in order to gain permit approval. As such, IERCs could be
a critical economic development tool as well as an emissions reduction tool.323
A principal advantage of the IERCs for highly regulated companies like EPE that already
had technologically advanced pollution reduction equipment is that they could achieve
significant emissions reductions by investing in basic abatement projects. For example,
investing $500,000 in road paving or gasoline fume recapture equipment could produce
significantly higher emissions reductions than the same amount of money spent on next-tier
filtration technologies available for their existing equipment. Ketter emphasized that the key to
making IERCs operational was to quantify and verify the emissions reduction achieved through
the project – and of course to have the legal framework that would enable recognition of
emissions reductions across international boundaries. While the IERCs were fairly straight
forward conceptually, quantifying the emissions reduction of a project in order to verify actual
offsets could be cumbersome and time consuming. The IERCs also required cross-border
collaboration between air quality authorities with significantly different resources to dedicate to
such a project.324
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After that JAC meeting, EPE’s Environmental Department staff met with Marquez and
his advisor Dr. Antonio Lara to explore ways in which they could work together. Marquez and
Lara wanted to share their findings about the properties of clay, which they felt held promise for
different kinds of filtration applications. The opportunity to work together came into clearer
focus in 1999, when the Texas Legislature was developing a plan to deregulate the electric utility
industry in most of Texas. As a part of the legislative negotiations, senate bill 7 (SB7) included a
provision aimed at controlling nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions in non-attainment areas of the
state. Although it was intended primarily for the coal and lignite-fired power plants in east
Texas, this provision created a new cap-and-trade program on NOx emissions for all power
plants in Texas. The cap-and-trade program created a ceiling for the permissible NOx emissions
of each power provider in the state and allowed for emissions offsets and credit trading in order
to meet the new cap requirements. EPE worked with El Paso’s state senator Eliot Shapleigh and
the rest of the El Paso legislative delegation to have language embedded in this mammoth
deregulation bill that would allow electric utility companies along the Texas-Mexico border to
pursue emissions offsets or credits in Mexico – a fronterizo legislative initiative that enabled
innovative solutions.325
The new SB7 requirements compelled EPE to achieve a 50% reduction in NOx emissions
from three boilers at the Newman power plant in northeast El Paso County. Those boilers already
had water-injection pollution reduction equipment, therefore the prospects for achieving the
required emissions reductions from additional equipment were low and it would be very

325 Luis Ito, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. Erik Groten, Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.C.,
EPE Counsel, letter to Matthew Witosky, EPA Attache, US Embassy Mexico City, September 23, 2003, El Paso
Electric Corporate Archive. Victor Valenzuela, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, August 16, 2021. Texas
Legislature, “Text for Senate Bill 7, 76th Legislature – regular session,” Texas Legislature Online,
https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=76R&Bill=SB7 (accessed August 16, 2021).
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expensive. EPE was happy to have the option of investing in pollution reduction projects in
Mexico to meet the new NOx cap, and to be allowed to continue normal operations at the
Newman power plant. With the enabling legislation in place in Texas, EPE Environmental,
Health and Safety Director Luis Ito began working with the TNRCC to obtain approval for an
IERC project. Ito proposed replacing a number of traditional brick kilns in Ciudad Juárez with
Marquez’s environmental brick kilns and applying the emissions reductions to EPE’s required
NOx reductions. An El Paso native with family in Ciudad Juárez, Ito welcomed the opportunity
to spearhead a project for his company that could have a positive impact on the binational
community he called home.326
The TNRCC was open to this IERC proposal but they identified two critical issues that
EPE needed to address. The first was related to quantification of the brick kiln-related emissions
offsets. In order to know how many emissions reductions credits could be awarded to EPE,
TNRCC needed scientific verification of the emissions produced by traditional brick kilns and
the MK2 brick kilns. The second issue was related to the actual contaminants offset by the
conversion to the MK2 kilns. While the MK2 kilns had demonstrated significant reductions in
emissions, those emissions were primary comprised of carbon monoxide and particulate matter.
TNRCC did not have the authority to allow EPE to substitute the reduction of one type of
contaminant for another.327
In order to address the first issue, EPE retained an engineering consulting company
named URS Corporation to produce the data that TNRCC needed in order to approve the brick
kiln IERC proposal. With the approval of the New Mexico Environment Department, EPE

326 Luis Ito, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. Victor Valenzuela, interview by author, El
Paso, Texas, September 14, 2021.
327 Ibid. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, “A Study of Brick-Making Processes along the Texas
Portion of the U.S-Mexico Border: Senate Bill 749,” December 2002, 26.
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worked with URS and the NMSU research team to build a traditional brick kiln and an MK2
brick kiln on the grounds of EPE’s Rio Grande power plant in Sunland Park, New Mexico.
Utilizing U.S. EPA methodology for sampling and measuring, URS monitored and quantified the
emissions produced in burns from both kilns. This construction, testing and measuring process
took two years to complete. URS concluded that the MK2 kiln reduced emissions by an average
of 466lbs of contaminants per burn, with the vast majority of the emissions reductions in carbon
monoxide, followed by particulate matter, NOx and VOCs.328
To address the second issue, EPE went back to the El Paso legislative delegation during
the 2001 legislative session for their support of legislation that would amend the Texas Health
and Safety Code to allow the TNRCC to accept emissions substitutions for the purposes of
emissions control. Senator Eliot Shapleigh agreed to author senate bill 1561, a narrowly tailored
bill that fine-tuned the enabling language in SB7 from the previous legislative session. This bill
allowed the TNRCC to authorize emissions reductions outside of the U.S. to satisfy the
emissions reduction requirements for a holder of a Texas air emissions permit along the
international border, so long as the reductions were in excess of what was required in the state
implementation plan and that said reductions were quantifiable and enforceable. It allowed the
TNRCC to use the emissions reductions of one contaminant to satisfy the emissions reductions
requirements of another contaminant so long as the reductions were comparable in quantity and
resulted in greater health benefits than could be achieved by reductions at the permit holder’s
facility. Finally, it required that substitutions only be allowed if the contaminants being
substituted were those for which an area had been designated in non-attainment. Given its

328 URS, “Source Test Report for Testing on Brick Kiln, El Paso Electric Company” Prepared for El Paso Electric
Company, June 6, 2002. ENews - El Paso Electric Employee Newsletter, “El Paso Electric Environmental Proposal
Receives Approval,” November 2002, El Paso Electric Corporate Archives.
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narrow focus on the border region and the requirements for contaminant verification, the
legislation did not draw any significant opposition in public hearings and was ultimately passed
by the Texas Legislature.329
With the enabling legislation approved and the URS report completed, EPE submitted a
proposal to TCEQ requesting approval to satisfy the reduction obligation of 17 tons of NOx
through the conversion of five brick kilns in Ciudad Juárez. In addition to the conversion of the
five brick kilns required for the emissions offset, EPE committed to building up to 60 MK2 kilns
in Ciudad Juárez. While they awaited approval from TCEQ, Ito and other EPE representatives
met with Mexican officials at the local, state and federal level to ensure they received the
necessary approvals in Mexico as well. They were surprised to learn that because the brick kiln
industry was largely informal, there was no licensing or permitting process required for the
conversion of the kilns. Essentially, the brick kiln conversion was a business-to-business
arrangement between EPE and the individual brick kiln owners.330
EPE received approval from the TCEQ for the IERC on November 16, 2002. And
although there was no required authorization for the conversion project in Mexico, EPE’s Ito
worked closely with the Alma Leticia Figueroa, the director of the Dirección General de
Ecología y Protección Civil del Municipio del Ciudad Juárez (Dirección de Ecología
Municipal). Figueroa served as the official witness of the five kiln conversions for verification
with the TCEQ. She also committed the Dirección de Ecología Municipal to conduct quarterly
inspections of the new MK2 kilns to ensure they were operating as expected. The Dirección de

329 Texas Legislature, “Text for Senate Bill 1561, 77th Legislature - Regular Session,” Texas Legislature Online,
https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=77R&Bill=SB1561# (accessed September 25, 2021). In
2001, the legislature passed sunset legislation that changed the name of the Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ.)
330 Luis Ito, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. Victor Valenzuela, interview by author, El
Paso, Texas, September 14, 2021.
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Ecología Municipal in turn requested EPE’s cooperation in building any additional MK2 kilns at
a new colonia ladrillera named Mexico 68, a site which the Dirección de Ecología Municipal
was developing in order to relocate and consolidate many of the brick kiln operators that were
scattered throughout the city. While they had initially planned to build MK2 kilns at various
colonias ladrilleras to serve as demonstration projects that could encourage more ladrilleros to
convert their kilns, EPE agreed to assist the Dirección de Ecología Municipal by directing their
contractor to build the majority of the new MK2 kilns at Mexico 68.331
In partnership with Marquez, EPE quickly identified five ladrilleros who were interested
in converting their traditional ovens to the MK2 model for the purposes of the IERC. These
ladrilleros entered into legal agreements with EPE whereby they allowed EPE’s contractor to
destroy their traditional brick kilns and replace them with MK2 kilns. The agreement specified
that the ladrilleros would assume ownership of the new kiln without conditions, other than those
applicable by law. In addition to these five conversions that needed specific documentation, EPE
funded the conversion of 15 additional kilns. The ladrilleros were also invited to be a part of the
MK2 kiln construction team so that they could learn how to build the new kilns and share that
newly acquired technical expertise with others in the future. This created technical capacity
within the ladrillero community, but it also served the practical purpose of providing the
ladrilleros themselves with income while their kilns were undergoing the conversion.332

331 Luis Ito, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. Victor Valenzuela, interview by author, El
Paso, Texas, September 14, 2021. Nora Ines Ramirez, Directora de Ingenieria, Municipio de Cuidad Juárez, Permiso
para contracción de obradores ladrilleros para construcción de hornos ladrilleros en ciertas ubicaciones, Octubre 11,
2002, El Paso Electric Corporate Archives. Margaret Hoffman, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
Executive Director letter to Luis Ito, El Paso Electric Manager, Environmental Affairs, August 26, 2003, El Paso
Electric Corporate Archives. Erik Groten, Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.C., EPE Counsel, letter to Matthew Witosky,
EPA Attache, US Embassy Mexico City, September 23, 2003, El Paso Electric Corporate Archives.
332 Luis Ito, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. Luis H. Ito, Director, Environmental Health
and Safety, El Paso Electric letter to John Steib, Director, Permits Division, Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality, April 30, 2003, El Paso Electric Corporate Archives. Mario Trejo Torres, Convenio De Coparticipación en
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The twenty brick kiln conversions were completed in the colonias ladrilleras of
Fronteriza Baja and Mexico 68 between January and April of 2003. EPE submitted the required
documentation for five of the conversions to TCEQ in order to receive a total of 17 tons of
emissions credits –
3.3 tons of emissions
reductions for each
converted brick kiln.
TCEQ approved
EPEs credits and
applied them toward
the Newman Power
Plant compliance
account on August
26, 2003. Figure 10
is representative of
the construction and
demolition
documentation that
EPE submitted to
TCEQ for
Figure 10: EPE Verification Form Submitted to TNRCC

la Construcción de Un Horno Ladrillero, (undated legal agreement between EPE’s project administrator in Ciudad
Juárez and the brick kiln owners located in the El Paso Electric Corporate Archives.) Note: Marquez never
trademarked his MK2 design in order to ensure that it was accessible to anyone who was interested in the building a
new kiln. He hoped that by making the design available and training ladrilleros to build them, this appropriate
technology would become widespread.
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verification and emissions credit allowances. It includes the name of the brick kiln owner, the
coordinates of the brick kiln and the verification from the Dirección de Ecología Municipal. It
also illustrates the stark contrast in the design of the traditional brick kiln and the MK2 kiln even
while the construction materials are similar.333
Although the EPE IERC was successfully completed and verified, EPE’s support of brick
kiln replacements was not without complications. For the additional 15 brick kilns, EPE
volunteered to provide funding to a contractor who was working with the Dirección de Ecología
Municipal to develop a new colonia ladrillera. Months after the new kiln construction was
completed, significant quality issues emerged. These issues came to light after a heavy storm
caused flooding due to poor drainage at the site. The flooding exposed shoddy construction
practices inconsistent with the MK2 design specifications, including the use of barbed wire
instead of rebar to fortify the structure and the lack of a steel ring footing for the chambers.
These construction flaws rendered the 15 kilns inoperable. This development exposed a lack of
close supervision and inspections from either Dirección de Ecología Municipal or EPE in the
voluntary phase of the project. The partners worked to correct this deficiency and over the next
two years EPE supported the construction of additional brick kilns, for a total of 31 MK2 kilns in
Ciudad Juárez. Fortunately, the initial five MK2 kilns that were part of the IERC were closely
managed and supervised by the EPE/Marquez team and did not suffer damage from the storm.
Subsequent inspections verified proper construction and operations of those MK2 kilns for years
following the initial certification.334

333 El Paso Electric, Kiln Conversion Verification Form, Submitted to Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality, May 1, 2003, El Paso Electric Archives.
334 Victor Valenzuela, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 14, 2021. Luis Ito, interview by author, El
Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. El Paso Electric, “News Release – El Paso Electric’s Brick Kiln Project Will
Continue to Improve Region’s Air Quality,” June 24, 2005, El Paso Electric Corporate Archives.
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The EPE IERC was lauded as a ground-breaking cross-border initiative shortly after
completion. EPE received the Texas Environmental Excellence Award in Innovation Technology
from TCEQ as well as the Environmental Awareness Business Award from the Texas League of
Women Voters in 2003. EPE used this positive attention to urge the U.S. EPA to include the
Brick Kiln Project as a part of the Border Air Quality Strategy (BAQS), an initiative of the
Border 2012 Air Policy Forum to support pilot programs along the border that foster sustainable
development. They reiterated that while success of this IERC in converting several kilns was
noteworthy, there were still more than 300 highly polluting kilns that needed to be addressed to
make a significant impact on the air quality of the region. The JAC also submitted a resolution to
the Air Working Group requesting the inclusion of cross-border pollution trading on the BAQS,
listing the EPE IERC project as a success story.335
In 2009, the Good Neighbor Environmental Board of the President and the Congress and
the United States (GNEB) wrote in its annual report titled “Innovative and Practical Approaches
to Solving Border Environmental Problems” that EPE’s IERC project had led to the development
of brick kiln-related pilot projects the Mexican states of Baja California, Querétaro, Chihuahua
and Sonora. It suggested that transboundary emissions credit trading could be explored as a tool
for air quality improvement in non-attainment areas along the border. It also reported the

335 Joint Air Quality Task Force for the Improvement of the Air Quality in the Ciudad Juárez Chihuahua/El Paso,
Texas/Dona Ana County, New Mexico Air Basin, Resolution Regarding Cross Border Pollutant Trading in the Paso
del Norte Air Basin, September 25, 2003. Erik Groten, Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.C., EPE Counsel, letter to
Matthew Witosky, EPA Attache, US Embassy Mexico City, September 23, 2003, El Paso Electric Corporate
Archives. Luis Ito, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 22, 2021. El Paso Electric, “News Release – El
Paso Electric Receives Texas Environmental Excellence Award,” May 7, 2003, El Paso Electric Corporate
Archives. In the 2005 Texas Legislature, EPE secured passage of legislation that would enable IERCs like the brick
kiln project to continue in the event that El Paso achieved attainment status. See House Bill 2240 on Texas
Legislature Online,
https://capitol.texas.gov/Search/DocViewer.aspx?ID=79RHB022401F&QueryText=%22haggerty%22&DocType=F
(accessed September 29, 2021).
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important fact that this type of trading was not explicitly allowed under the Federal Clean Act or
under state law in New Mexico, Arizona or California - verifying that cross-border emissions
credit trading remained nothing more than an interesting concept more than five years after the
successful demonstration project in the Paso del Norte region. 336
It is unclear why IERCs were not adopted elsewhere. What we do know from the EPE
IERC is that the tool required a motivated company, a quantifiable offset project, a willingness
for collaboration at multiple levels of government and a high level of engagement from
fronterizo stakeholders to make it work. We know from the tensions between Mexican federal
and local officials during the initial discussions at the JAC meeting that there are sovereignty
sensibilities to overcome. Perhaps those critical components have not co-existed in other
communities along the border where IERCs could have been utilized. Former TNRCC Program
Specialist Victor Valenzuela confirmed that while working with the EPE IERC, he received
inquiries from air quality officials in Arizona and California who were interested in applying the
concept along their borders. Once Valenzuela shared the steps taken to gain approval in Texas,
they indicated that they did not believe they could secure state approval. Although anecdotal,
these responses point to a lack of government flexibility and commitment to engaging
transboundary solutions that could result in quantifiable quality of life improvements for border
communities.337

336 Good Neighbor Environmental Board of the President and the Congress of the United States, “Transboundary
Emissions Trading in the Paso del Norte Area,” under “Innovative and Practical Approaches to Solving Border
Environmental Problems,” 12th Report, March 2009, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc949030/
(accessed September 15, 2021).
337 Victor Valenzuela, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, September 14, 2021.
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CONCLUSION
The EPE IERC project built on years of well-intentioned efforts by many fronterizos
from the Paso del Norte region who attempted to address the challenges faced by the ladrilleros.
These efforts, launched by the Municipio de Ciudad Juárez and subsequently led by FEMAP,
focused on reducing emissions produced by the brick kilns and improving the health and
economic well-being of the ladrilleros and their families. Their goal was to help ladrilleros by
developing cleaner and more efficient methods to produce bricks such that they could be more
profitable and create fewer emissions. This would be a benefit to ladrillero families as well as
the larger community. FEMAP’s Brick Makers Project brought significant external resources and
expertise to examine, research and develop possible technological solutions. They also worked
with the local and state authorities to create the enforcement pressures to compel the ladrilleros
to convert to cleaner fuels. Unfortunately, these approaches and technologies failed because they
did not appropriately account for the economic, political and communal realities of the
ladrilleros. They were not aligned with the daily realities of these microenterprise operators with
very limited resources, slim profit margins, and the immediate need to feed their families.
Fortuitously, the LANL engaged NMSU doctoral student Robert Marquez in their
ongoing brick kiln research efforts. Marquez helped reframe the project so that the research
included the valuable input and experience of the ladrilleros. He emphasized the value of the
ladrilleros’ work in recycling the community’s waste rather than focusing on punitive measures
or complex technologies. He also incorporated researchers from Ciudad Juárez in an effort to
build local technical capacity that would persist after the completion of this project. The result of
this mindful research was a brick kiln design that reduced fuel consumption by 50 percent and
emissions by 80 percent, utilizing all of the inputs that ladrilleros had traditionally employed in
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their operations. By applying “appropriate chemistry,” Marquez’s team developed a design that
was adopted by ladrilleros in Ciudad Juárez and has been built throughout Mexico and other
parts of the world.
The development of this innovative brick kiln design coincided with the ongoing efforts
in the region to reframe transboundary air pollution abatement. Discussions within the Paso del
Norte Air Quality Task Force and subsequently within the JAC explored the promise of crossborder emissions credit trading for companies in the air basin. In 1999, EPE saw the opportunity
and had the economic imperative to bring together this brick kiln technology and the crossborder emissions credit trading concept. Drawing on years of collaborative efforts and political
support on both sides of the border, EPE and its many fronterizo partners worked through the
necessary steps and barriers to execute the first international emissions credit trading project
along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Although the EPE IERC model has not been replicated in the years since, it serves as an
important demonstration project. It is not clear why this concept was not replicated by others
along the border. Some have suggested that the onset of homeland security anti-terrorist
protocols along the border changed the tone of cross-border cooperation. Perhaps the political
urgency around border environmental protection subsided in the years following the passage of
NAFTA. Maybe the IERCs posed a perceived threat to federal jurisdictions and national
sovereignty. Perhaps some internalized it as unnecessary meddling in a neighbor’s problem.
Regardless of reasons, the IERCs remain a valuable tool for transboundary air pollution
abatement along the U.S.-Mexico border and other borders where these challenges and
opportunities continue to exist today. With the threats of climate change upon us, the EPE IERC
serves as a ready example of an innovative way to leverage limited pollution abatement
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resources to reduce emissions while improving the lives of those most vulnerable in our
communities. Applied more generally, IERCs would allow companies, communities and
regulators to bring critical resources to those low-income communities that are most exposed to
high levels of air pollutants. Investments in basic infrastructure improvements like utility
connections, paved roads, and trash disposal services would significantly reduce pollution
sources and markedly improve their quality of life. This would require a true transboundary
mentality among air quality regulators as well as the leadership of fronterizo companies and
communities.
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Chapter Six: Frontera Collaborators and Stakeholders

In any sustained and fruitful community-led effort, there are individuals who drive
initiatives, agendas, and deliverables. That was certainly the case for the PDNAQTF. Absent
the talent, dedication, and passion of a number of key individuals, the PDNAQTF would not
have accomplished what they did. The projects they set out to complete benefited from their
collective business acumen, technical expertise, professional networks, and skill to navigate the
labyrinth of bureaucracies in two countries. These individuals volunteered their time or stretched
the bounds of their official job descriptions in order to facilitate the innovative cross-border
collaborations explored in this dissertation. As noted in chapter four, there were dozens of Task
Force members who championed and contributed to projects, therefore it is not feasible to
develop comprehensive profiles of all of them. This chapter allows us to get to know a few of
them by giving us some insight into their personal and professional backgrounds.
I selected five individuals who had critical roles within the Task Force and who lived in
the air basin, given the importance of the fronterizo-led aspect of this initiative. Two of them
served as chairs of the organization, another two held critical positions in local government, and
the last was an NGO representative whose time was dedicated to this effort. I had the opportunity
to interview all of them between 1996 and 1998, when the work of the Task Force was at its peak
and the JAC was commencing its operations. I was able to interview three of them once again
between 2015 and 2021.These profiles reveal the motivations, frustrations, and anecdotes that
the Task Force members shared during their oral interviews. These first-person perspectives
reflect the diverse group of fronterizos who shared a goal of reframing transboundary
environmental governance and improving air quality for their community.
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DR. ELAINE MOWINSKI BARRÓN
Dr. Elaine Mowinski Barrón grew up in a Polish-American household in a suburb of
Cleveland - Maple Heights, Ohio. Mowinski Barrón attended the St. Alexis School of Nursing in
downtown Cleveland, where she recalled returning to her car at the end of the day to find it
covered in soot from the surrounding steel factories. It was as a nursing student in this heavily
industrialized city that she began to see patients with lung ailments caused by exposure to
hazardous air emissions in their work places and in the neighborhoods adjacent to steel factories.
Mowinski Barrón subsequently moved to Detroit, Michigan, where she described the existence
of similar air pollution problems and related health issues among its residents.338
Mowinski Barrón moved to El Paso in 1974 with her husband, Dr. Miguel Luis Barrón, a
cardiovascular-thoracic surgeon who was initiating his medical career. Having earned a diploma
in nursing in Cleveland, Mowinski Barrón wanted to continue her studies at UTEP to become a
registered nurse. After completing her bachelors and master’s degrees in nursing at UTEP, she
became an intensive care nurse and taught nursing courses. Before long, this determined
professional working mother deciding to pursue her life-long dream of becoming a doctor.
Living in El Paso, her only option to do that was to attend medical school at the Universidad
Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez. Despite not being a native-born fronteriza, Mowinski Barrón was
undaunted by the idea of crossing the border to attend medical school and take courses in another
language. Her Spanish skills were limited and she described “taking hours to read one or two
pages” of medical texts. Nevertheless, she credits the two years of Spanish and Latin courses she
was required to take in high school for enabling her to make it through her medical program.
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Mowinski Barrón Interview, October 6, 2015.
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This cross-border educational experience was culturally formative and no doubt helped prepare
Mowinski Barrón for her leadership role with the Task Force.339
As a part of her medical education, Mowinski Barrón provided one year of service work
(servicio social) at the Centro Medico del Valle, a unit of the United States Public Health
Clinics. Normally this type of service was rendered in Mexico, but she was allowed to provide
her year of service in El Paso. Located in the lower valley of El Paso near the Mount Carmel
Cemetery, this clinic provided medical services to uninsured patients who were primarily from
low income and Mexican immigrant backgrounds. She earned her medical degree in 1985 and
went on to complete her internship and residency in internal medicine at Texas Tech Medical
School in El Paso in 1988.340
As she recalled seeing patients as a medical doctor at the Centro Medico del Valle, she
described an elderly man who had worked at ASARCO for over thirty years, whom she “will
never forget.” With tears in her eyes, Mowinski Barrón described how this man told her how
sick he was, and “he brought his handkerchief with the blood and tiny pieces of metal that he had
coughed up.” Her experience treating patients in her practice and in the emergency room
informed and guided her public service. Reflecting on her motivation for the decades of
volunteer service, she said, “I’ve always wanted to bring in the health aspects of any decision
that was being made.”341
Mowinski Barrón served as the founding chairperson of the TACB Advisory Committee
and the PDNAQTF from 1993 through 1994. She also served on the JAC from 1996 through
2019. When asked to reflect on her role chairing the first TACB Advisory Committee meeting
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in May 1993, she described a difficult start with a room full of people assigning blame for the
region’s air pollution issues. “It came to the point where I said this is not a meeting to point
fingers, this is a meeting to find solutions,” Mowinski Barrón recalled. The initial meetings of
the Advisory Committee lasted entire work days, as participants worked through establishing the
priority project lists. Mowinski Barrón added, “we created a model where we listened to all
parties involved to try to come up with a central mission. That is needed for long-term
improvements given all of the contamination that continues to occur from many different
sources.” Several individuals who were involved in those initial meetings of the Task Force
believe this approach was the reason the group was able to coalesce around specific pollution
abatement projects rather than becoming ensnared in questions of blame and responsibility.342
Mowinski Barrón’s record of public service is extensive and spans numerous local, state,
and national boards related to environmental health and protection of natural resources. In 1998,
she served as president of the El Paso County Medical Society, having served in numerous other
leadership positions within the organization since 1994. She utilized her medical expertise to
assist with the roll-out of a Medicaid Managed Care model as well as the state’s children’s health
insurance program (CHIP). She also served as the chair of the Public Service Board for the El
Paso Water Utilities from 2003-2004 and chair of the El Paso City-County Health and
Environmental District from 2006-2007. At the state level, following Mowinski Barrón’s
appointment to the Texas Air Control Board, Governor Ann Richards appointed her to the Texas
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Water Development Board from 1994-2000. Within the Texas Medical Association, she served
as the designated chairperson for the Committee on Environment in 1998 and as an appointee to
the Council on Public Health from 1998 through 2006. Her involvement with the PDNAQTF and
the JAC brought her to the attention of key officials within the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) who appointed her to the National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee,
Air-Water subcommittee from 1998 through 2002. She was also appointed to the U.S. EPA’s
Clean Air Act Advisory Committee from 1999 until 2010.343
Mowinski Barrón explained that over years of exposure to several board chairs who set
very high expectations for outcomes, she developed stronger strategic problem solving and
project management skills. The professional staff who supported those boards also helped her
become more knowledgeable in key content areas including environmental health and natural
resource management. Tying it back to her role within the Task Force and the JAC, she shared
“the information I was being fed by all of these agencies and experts was phenomenal. I think
that helped with the formation of what needed to be done at that time.”344
When asked what she considered to be her biggest accomplishment and legacy related to
her work with the PDNAQTF, she was quick to refer the work of all of the members, “I think it
is always a joint effort. I think the whole task force should be proud that we made
improvements. We needed everybody – you can’t do that alone.” As the interview concluded in
2015, she insisted that the work of the PDNAQTF was as relevant then as it was in 1993. “The
task force was critical to provide important evaluation of contamination, to speak to the strategic
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placement of new industry, housing, so that we are minimizing exposure to harmful
pollutants.”345

DANNY VICKERS
Danny Vickers, born in Wuerzburg, Germany, grew up in a military family and lived on
army bases all over the world until he was in the sixth grade. When his father retired from the
Army they returned to his hometown of Monroe, Louisiana. At that time, the local school district
was in the process of desegregating their schools. Vickers had attended integrated schools on
Army bases his entire life, so it was not a shock to him. Unfortunately, the resistance to
integration in Monroe was so strong that “it caused the school system to collapse,” Vickers
recalled. Concerned for his safety and his education, Vickers’s parents sent him to El Paso to live
with an aunt and uncle. Vickers attended Irvin High School in Northeast El Paso and eventually
went on to attend UTEP. “El Paso became my home,” shared Vickers. He graduated with a
bachelor of business administration in finance and accounting in 1978 and later returned to earn
his master of science in economics degree.346
When he graduated with his business degree, Vickers went to work for a locally-owned
computer software company that allowed him to travel the world setting up product distribution.
Drawing on his years of living abroad and his experience doing business in other countries, in
1985 he decided to begin his own venture and established an import/export company that traded
primarily with Asia and Mexico. After three years, Vickers decided this import/exports business
was not for him and returned to UTEP to pursue his graduate degree in economics. After
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completing his coursework, Vickers started a data services company in Ciudad Juárez with three
partners, including three Mexican businessmen and the person who had offered him his first job
out of college. Together, they built EDM International in three locations in northern Mexico and
it grew to 3,500 employees - 1900 of which were in Ciudad Juárez. They offered back-office
services including billing and customer service to large U.S. firms like General Electric and
Federal Express. Vickers considered himself an entrepreneur and a builder. He also considered
himself lucky that all of his clients were outside of the region because it gave him the freedom he
needed to be vocal in the community without fear of losing business.347
After launching EDM International in Ciudad Juárez, Vickers became involved in civic
organizations like the Sunturions and business groups including the El Paso Foreign Trade
Association (FTA) and the Greater El Paso Chamber of Commerce. The FTA was a business
organization comprised primarily of U.S.-based maquiladora executives. Perhaps because of his
outspoken and direct nature, Vickers was asked to serve as the environmental representative for
the FTA. In this role he was the liaison between the Mexican environmental authorities and the
330 U.S.-based maquiladoras in Ciudad Juárez. It was his responsibility to follow up on any
information they received from officials regarding possible environmental violations in a
maquiladora operation. He was charged with contacting the maquiladora in question and
pressuring them into compliance. Vickers says that Charles Dodson, the FTA president at that
time, was adamant that if they found a maquiladora violating environmental regulations, “we
will hammer them.” According to Vickers, Dodson and the FTA were mindful that if any
maquiladoras were found to be violating environmental laws, it would reflect badly on all of
them. When asked if this sort of self-regulation was effective, Vickers responded, “I think so…it
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was the best we had at the time.” Given the lack of environmental enforcement staff in Ciudad
Juárez, the FTA did what it could to encourage compliance in the maquiladora community and
minimize scrutiny of their operations.348
It was through this role that Vickers learned about plans for the TACB Advisory
Committee from EDF’s Dr. Pete Emerson. He felt it was important to participate because he was
concerned that El Paso would lose highway construction dollars due to its non-attainment status.
He quickly became a leader within this initiative and served as interim chair/chair of the Paso del
Norte Air Quality Task Force from 1994 through 1996. Thereafter, he served on the JAC until
2002. Vickers was outspoken and direct in his interactions with U.S. federal officials, whom he
felt initially had no real interest in helping the region. Although he remained frustrated with the
pace at which projects like the IAQMD progressed, eventually he became convinced of the
sincere commitment of individuals like U.S. EPA’s Jim Yarbrough. He was also impressed by
the efforts of local and state-level government officials who were willing to push the bounds of
their traditional roles to address the region’s air quality issues. The minutes of the TACB
Advisory Committee, the Task Force and the JAC document Vickers’s constant pressure on the
coalition members to develop solutions, to push harder on bureaucratic barriers, and to demand
accountability from the public and private sectors.349
In addition to his volunteer work related to the environment, Vickers was also involved in
numerous education related initiatives. He believed that the root cause of the region’s many
issues was poverty and the best way to address poverty was through education. He was actively
involved with UTEP’s El Paso Collaborative for Academic Excellence as well as the Alliance
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Schools program. His company partnered with Ysleta Elementary School so that they could
receive a federal grant through the Alliance Schools program to help educate parents on ways in
which they could support their children’s education and demand accountability from the school
system. Some of his involvement in Alliance Schools is documented in Kathleen Staudt’s book
Hope for Justice and Power: Broadbased Community Organizing in Texas. He was also
appointed by Governors George W. Bush and Rick Perry to serve as a business representative on
several education task forces.350
Despite his long-term commitment to the efforts of the Task Force and the JAC, Vickers
expressed frustration with the magnitude of the region’s challenges and the lack of resources
available to address them. He questioned how it was that his company was paying 5% of its
payroll into INFONAVIT but none of his employees had received this benefit. Vickers shared
that his company inquired with INFONAVIT as to why none of his employees had access to
housing. He was advised that if his company would pay for the drawings for a new housing
development in Ciudad Juárez, INFONAVIT would build the new housing and make some
portion available to EDM International employees. He indicated that EDM did pay for the
engineering work and eventually over 100 employees were able to access INFONAVIT
homes.351
He also questioned why Mexican officials syphoned away the tolls collected at the
region’s ports of entry rather than utilizing those funds to upgrade and expand the bridge
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infrastructure to improve mobility, commerce and air quality. In order to avoid closure of the
Bridge of the Americas cargo lanes due structural issues, the FTA entered into an agreement with
the IBWC to “tax” its own members in order to finance desperately needed bridge maintenance
and expansion of the cargo lanes and inspection bays. For Vickers, these were examples of the
chronic extraction of resources from Ciudad Juárez to Mexico City that worsened living
conditions in Ciudad Juárez and the region. Until the federal governments properly allocated the
rightful funds to the border region, Vickers reflected, these issues will continue to be a
challenge.352

FRANCISCO J. NÚÑEZ
Francisco Núñez was born and reared in Ciudad Juárez. He left to pursue his college
education at the Universidad Autónoma de México where he earned a degree in biology with an
emphasis in environmental sciences in 1971. Núñez returned to Ciudad Juárez in the 1980s to
work in the private sector before becoming the director of water treatment for the Junta
Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento (Junta de Aguas), a state enterprise that oversees water and
wastewater services for Ciudad Juárez. In 1992, when the newly elected municipal president
Francisco Villarreal Torres took office, he pledged to build a department to oversee
environmental issues for the city. He reached out to Núñez and asked him to spearhead the
development of this office. Villarreal did not have a budget to create this department but,
according to Núñez, he offered his own salary to launch this effort. For Villarreal, improving the
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environment was fundamental to improving the quality of life for Juarenzes. He also wanted to
encourage public engagement with the municipal government. Núñez agreed to work with
Villarreal to build this new department on a voluntary basis while continuing to serve as director
of the Junta de Aguas. He described working evenings and weekends to develop the structure for
this new department with a focus on sustainable development.353
In March 1993, when Núñez learned about the TACB’s interest in developing a
binational advisory board in the region he was excited to participate. Although his experience
was in water and not air, he felt that it was an opportunity to learn from this state agency how to
engage the public in their mission. This was something he wanted to build into the framework
for the new Direccíon de Ecología for Ciudad Juárez but was not sure how to do it. He reminded
me that public engagement and government transparency like what is afforded through the
Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. did not exist in Mexico. Núñez was also excited to learn
from experts in air quality and engage in a binational forum with multiple levels of governmental
as well as the NGO and business community.354
Consistent with the meeting minutes, the interview with Núñez reflected his vocal
support for the Task Force and its transboundary initiatives. He described the community
involvement with the Task Force as “explosive,” with 60-80 attendees working through 3-4 hour
meetings to advance projects, identify funding sources and develop execution strategies. He
compared the Task Force to a clock – a mechanism that required all of the gears and parts
working together to make it function properly. He credited the EDF, the U.S. EPA, and several
Texas state entities for identifying and securing funding sources for many initiatives. However,
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he emphasized that without local government officials in Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, including
himself and Jesus Reynoso, who had developed trust relationships over many years and were
willing to work together to find solutions, the Task Force would not have been successful. In
other words, in his estimation the willing disposition and participation of local government
officials in the Task Force served as the critical foundation upon which they could build their
projects.355
Núñez shared that he had to do a significant amount of convincing over the course of the
Task Force’s first year to get Mexican federal and state officials committed to the coalition. As
mentioned earlier, Mexican government officials were not accustomed to participating in forums
with the public and non-governmental entities. They were also sensitive to U.S. meddling into
environmental issues that were clearly their jurisdiction – even if they were not doing anything to
address those issues. He explained that early on, there were collaborative projects proposed
through the Task Force that progressed because they were “approved” by the Ciudad Juárez
municipal government without the official approval from the federal government. Their approach
seemed to be one of asking for forgiveness rather than asking for permission with regard to these
projects. He felt that the “Washington boys” and the “chicos del D.F.” did not understand the
urgency of what was happening on the border, therefore it was incumbent on the local
governments to make things happen. Based on his experience, it was a better strategy to move
forward with innovative collaborations because once Mexican federal officials learned about the
initiatives that were ongoing in Ciudad Juárez they were generally supportive.356
Núñez continued to serve in dual roles with the Junta de Aguas and the Direccíon de
Ecología for almost four years. In late 1996, the Municipio de Ciudad Juárez finally funded the
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department and hired a full-time director, Oscar Hernández Ibañez. According to other Task
Force members interviewed for this study, Núñez’s energy and commitment over that period of
time was indeed critical to this binational initiative. With the clear directive from Villarreal,
Núñez was eager to partner with his U.S. counterparts to move projects forward and develop the
capacity necessary to build a functional environmental department for Ciudad Juárez.357

JESUS “CHUY” REYNOSO
Jesus Reynoso was born in Ciudad Juárez and grew up in El Paso. He studied
engineering at UTEP and subsequently earned a management degree from Park University. He
was a part of El Paso County’s air quality monitoring efforts since they began in 1968, when he
and a chemist were charged with complying with the monitoring requirements of the Clean Air
Act. Starting in 1979, Reynoso served as El Paso City County Health and Environmental
District’s (EPCCHED) environmental health program manager and had been an integral part of
developing El Paso County’s pollution abatement plans. These included mandating oxygenated
gasoline and vehicle emissions testing, converting public fleets to cleaner fuels, paving alleys
and reducing open burning.358
In 1989, Reynoso’s team worked with the U.S. EPA to set up air monitoring stations in
Ciudad Juárez. At that time, Ciudad Juárez did not have any air monitoring stations in place nor
did they have the technical staff to operate the equipment. It was important for Ciudad Juárez to
have the monitoring stations and to have uniform measuring parameters across the air basin in
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order to have a more accurate reading of the region’s air pollution. According to Reynoso, the
initial arrangement between the U.S. EPA and the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)
was that the U.S. EPA would purchase the equipment, install it in Ciudad Juárez and train
Mexican staff to operate the equipment. The EPCCHED was to assist the Mexican technicians
until they were ready to assume responsibility for operating the equipment on their own.
Reynoso shared that SEDESOL staff came from Mexico City to receive training and promptly
returned to Mexico City, leaving no staff capacity in Ciudad Juárez to operate the equipment.
Since air quality monitoring was a function of the Mexican federal government, the Municipio
de Ciudad Juárez did not have the funding, staff or authority to assume this responsibility. This
meant that the EPCCHED went from assisting with the air monitoring stations to managing them
altogether.359
In 1998, Reynoso’s team was still managing three air monitoring stations in Ciudad
Juárez because Mexican federal officials had not dedicated the resources to assume operations.
He expressed frustration with those officials who “really don’t care about what is happening in
Juárez.” To further prove his point, he indicated that federal officials were running air
monitoring systems in Guadalajara and Monterrey but would not take ownership of the system in
Ciudad Juárez. Although he qualified his statements to indicate that there are some individuals in
the Instituto Nacional de Ecología (INE) who were genuinely interested in helping, Procuraduría
Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA) was largely unwilling to do anything and
unwilling to let anyone else do anything. The context here is that when SEDESOL was
restructured in the early 1990s, environmental policy moved to a new agency called INE and
environmental enforcement was assumed by PROFEPA. According to Reynoso, PROFEPA was
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compelled to continue with the transboundary projects that SEDESOL had approved and
initiated but certain PROFEPA officials were unwilling to expand that collaboration either due to
a lack of commitment or resources – or both. He felt that until there was a change in leadership
in PROFEPA, the JAC would be limited in what they could accomplish.
For Reynoso, this meant that the municipal government officials in Ciudad Juárez, with
whom he worked regularly, had their hands tied. They were limited in what they were able to do
despite their disposition to assume greater monitoring and enforcement authority. Although these
conclusions seem to contradict Núñez regarding Ciudad Juárez’s ability to work through the
necessary approvals, it is important to note that Reynoso’s interview took place almost two years
after Núñez’s interview and more than a full year after the initiation of the JAC in which
PROFEPA had an official role. Like Vickers, Reynoso lamented the lack of investment in
Ciudad Juárez for basic things like trash collection services so that people would not need to
burn their trash and road paving that would significantly reduce particulate matter. Because of
the work he had done in El Paso, he knew there were simple solutions to address the many of the
emissions sources in Ciudad Juárez but there were insufficient funds to implement them. For
Reynoso, the sense of accomplishment related to the Task Force’s initiatives and his feelings
regarding the potential for the JAC were muted by his belief that real change required a true
commitment from all stakeholders and that commitment was missing from some.360
Reynoso was a member of the TACB Advisory Committee and the Task Force from 1993
through 1998, when he was appointed to serve on the JAC. Despite his obvious frustration, the
minutes of the meetings for these organizations reflect that Reynoso was a consistent contributor
to and facilitator of transboundary pollution abatement projects. Francisco Núñez described
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Reynoso as a steadfast supporter and partner who readily shared his department’s technical
resources and the lessons learned in El Paso in order to help Ciudad Juárez build its capacity.
Reflecting on his involvement with this coalition, Reynoso said he did not “get paid more or less
if they got a project done.” His motivation for continuing to participate despite the setbacks was
to make progress for the region he called home.361

DR. CARLOS RINCÓN
Dr. Carlos Rincón was born in Jerez, Zacatecas into a family of 9 siblings. His parents
owned a small store that served the surrounding rural agricultural communities. When he was a
teen, a series of droughts devastated the agricultural community and forced his family to migrate
to southern California, where his mother’s extended family lived. He graduated from high school
in Anaheim then returned to Zacatecas to complete his high school equivalency there so that he
could begin university studies in Mexico. He earned his undergraduate degree in agricultural
engineering at the Escuela Superior de Agricultura Hermanos Escobar in Ciudad Juárez. He went
on to earn his master of science degree in water and soils use and a Ph.D. in hydrology and water
resources at the Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores in Monterrey, Nuevo León.
Rincón worked as a consultant in the U.S. for an international seed company before returning to
Ciudad Juárez in 1992. He learned about the Task Force through acquaintances and began to
attend the meetings in November 1993. In 1994, EDF hired Rincón to serve as a program
director and established an office in El Paso to support the work of the Task Force. From 1994
until 1996, Rincón provided administrative support for a number of the Task Force’s projects
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and served as a liaison between the border region and EDF’s network of resources. He was
appointed as a U.S. member of the JAC in 1996 and continues to serve today. In 2005, Rincón
became the director of the U.S.-Mexico Border Program Office for the U.S. EPA.362
Rincón said his role with EDF was to help stakeholders in the region push governments
to do what they should be doing regarding air quality governance. He welcomed the opportunity
to work for a national NGO and partner with academic institutions, government agencies and
private citizens to improve conditions for his family and every resident of the air basin. One of
the most satisfying aspects of the work for him was that “every project was a win-win
proposition because no matter where it was located, the entire region would benefit from the
emissions reductions.” He was also motivated to be a part of a coalition that was developing an
unprecedented and innovative framework to manage transboundary air resources. For him, the
IAQMD which was not just another project, it represented a shift in governance and held the
promise of fundamental change.363
When asked about his biggest frustrations, Rincón shared that he was disappointed that
some of the policy tools that the Task Force and the JAC advocated for and utilized for
transboundary resource management had not been more widely employed along the border.
Instruments like the IERCs that enabled the brick kiln project discussed in Chapter 5 and
international supplemental environmental projects (ISEPs) allowed border communities to
develop projects that leveraged limited resources and addressed significant environmental
challenges. He lamented that the disposition for involvement in those types of innovative
projects seemed to be driven by the threat of sanctions related to non-attainment status rather
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than a fundamental desire to address environmental issues. Said differently, only when border
communities were non-attainment and those threats of sanctions were present were key
stakeholders, namely U.S. state governments, willing to engage these instruments.364
Rincón most emphasized the importance of an engaged civil society, particularly in a
place like the Paso del Norte region where recurring changes in multiple levels of government
leadership could make long-term goals more difficult to achieve. The sustained involvement of
individuals including Mowinski Barrón, Vickers, Reynoso, Núñez and others ensured that
initiatives like the IAQMD persisted from one administration to the next. Of course, Rincón’s
sustained involvement in this regional collaboration is unparalleled. According to Rincón, this
long standing service and commitment to a shared goal also facilitated the development of trust
relationships between individuals who were in positions to make things happen. These trust
relationships were particularly important, he believed, because many of the Task Force projects
involved multiple partners and champions located across sectors and jurisdictions.365

CONCLUSION
In 2009, researchers with the Center for Technology in Government at the University at
Albany, SUNY published a report titled “Mitigating Cross-Border Air Pollution: The Power of a
Network.” This study examined the JAC to identify the key components of its success and
whether this model could be useful for improving air quality in other cross-border air sheds. The
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report’s authors found that the JAC had been successful because of a unique confluence of
critical factors. One of those factors was that the JAC drew from a large pool of passionate and
motivated individuals who were experts in diverse fields. They also referenced the strong trust
relationships and an effective organizational structure that emphasized an inclusive approach to
problem solving. The observations in this report are consistent with the conclusions regarding the
effectiveness of this fronterizo epistemic community presented in Chapter 4. They are also
reflective of the thoughts and anecdotes shared by the Task Force/JAC members highlighted in
this chapter. These profiles illustrate the commitment of a diverse group of people from different
sectors who shared a goal and persisted in their pursuit of that goal despite many setbacks,
frustrations, and institutional barriers.366
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Conclusion

In her seminal work, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, the Chicana poet and
author Gloria Anzaldúa wrote:
The U.S.-Mexico border es una herida abierta where the Third World grates against the
first and bleeds. And before a scab forms it hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two
worlds merging to form a third country – a border culture…A borderland is a vague and
undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary.367
Anzaldua’s words, though jarring and vivid, capture the fronterizo experience quite
appropriately. Her analogy resonates whether one considers it from the perspective of the
industrialization and the environmental fallout along the border or in the context of fronterizo
identity formation. For the Paso del Norte region, which had been a strategic location for
migration for thousands of years, the imposition of an international boundary in 1848 brought
with it a series of treaties, regulatory structures, and unnatural barriers that initiated the grating
that Anzaldúa describes. It was the beginning of what Juan Mora-Torres calls a contact zone,
within which fronterizos were forced to protect themselves, create their own economies, and
develop their own social structures, irrespective of the nation states that claimed separate
portions of the region. This new reality became the foundation of a border culture and a
fronterizo identity.
Over the course of the next century and a half, the region was transformed as U.S.
financial interests built railroad networks that connected it to the U.S. coasts and the interior of
Mexico, thereby facilitating the extraction and exploitation of natural resources and labor. The
flourishing mining and smelting industries were joined by the agriculture and manufacturing
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industries that would similarly benefit from the transportation network and the abundance of
labor, often at the expense of a hemorrhaging border community.
The region’s transformation was particularly marked between 1940 and 2000 as a result
of several bilateral treaties and economic agreements, including the Bracero Program, the Border
Industrialization Program (BIP), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
These agreements catalyzed an unsustainable population growth and industrialization that
expanded the urban footprint beyond the available infrastructure resources. The region’s
population grew from over 145,000 in 1940 to almost 1.8 million in 2000, with 1.2 million
residing in Ciudad Juárez. By the end of the 20th century the Paso del Norte region had become a
global manufacturing hub overwhelmed by mass migration, depressed wages, and a woefully
insufficient public infrastructure that created unsafe and unhealthy living conditions for all of its
residents. One of the deleterious outcomes of this unfettered growth was the deterioration of the
air quality within the shared air basin. The sister cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez had the
worst air pollution along the border and each city ranked among the most polluted in its
respective country.
Over the course of the late 19th century and throughout the twentieth, the treaties and
policies that governed the international boundary and transboundary natural resources evolved
slowly. Initially, treaties like the one that established the International Boundary Commission
were created to strengthen the sovereignty and power of the federal governments on either side
of the nascent boundary. Over time, the focus of these agreements shifted to create mutual, albeit
disparate, benefit in economic and environmental spheres. The changes in the bilateral
environmental agreements were prompted by fronterizos who demanded changes in governance
structures and protective mechanisms for their environment, their natural resources, and their

202

quality of life. Through their activism and protests, communities spanning the U.S.-Mexico
border made their concerns central to the economic discourse of the nation-states. It was because
of these efforts that the U.S. and Mexico began to shift from boundary-focused agreements to
agreements that acknowledged and encouraged collaboration in the protection of the border
region’s environmental resources. The most significant of those environmental agreements was
the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in Border Areas, also known as the La Paz Agreement of 1983.
Despite the La Paz Agreement and numerous annexes, federal policies in both countries
continued to subject border residents to an inordinate environmental burden in the name of
national security, free trade, and economic development. As a result of federal customs policies
and woefully inadequate investment in trade-related infrastructure, border communities were
contaminated by thousands of tons of toxic emissions. For those low-income, minority
communities located adjacent to ports of entry, the inequitable exposure to environmental
hazards was even more pronounced. Furthermore, weak environmental regulations and
insufficient investment in environmental enforcement resources enabled polluters ranging from
multinational corporations to family-owned brick kilns to pollute border communities with
minimal, if any, accountability.
During the early 1990s, as the United States, Mexico, and Canada were in the midst of
NAFTA negotiations, environmental and labor activists and grassroots organizations throughout
the North American continent mobilized to block passage of the trade agreement. For fronterizos
in the Paso del Norte region and their allies, these international debates regarding trade and
border environmental conditions provided the necessary context to pressure federal and state
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officials in the U.S. and Mexico to support the projects and initiatives they believed would help
address their environmental challenges.
As residents of the Paso del Norte air basin suffered from air pollution-related health
problems and industry faced government-imposed limitations to growth due to El Paso’s nonattainment status, unilateral air quality governance measures failed to address growing
transboundary challenges. Given the air quality conditions and the obvious ineffectiveness of
government oversight, many concerned fronterizos from various sectors of the community
initiated projects and investigations aimed at improving their region's air quality. Drawing on
their fronterizo identity, these individuals and organizations took it upon themselves to seek
solutions.
In 1993, their efforts coalesced within the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force (Task
Force), a multisector, binational, tristate environmental advocacy group. The Task Force
included local, state, and federal government officials, researchers, business leaders, healthcare
providers, and NGOs with a wide range of expertise and a common interest in improving the
conditions in the air basin. Over many years, this fronterizo epistemic community developed and
carried out projects intended to address some aspect of the region’s air quality challenges. The
most significant of these projects was the creation of an international air quality management
district. The IAQMD was envisioned as a formalized agreement through which local, state, and
federal government regulators together with local stakeholders would jointly manage the
transboundary air basin.
In response to a persistent multi-sectoral, frontera-based advocacy effort championed by
the Task Force, the U.S. and Mexico adopted Appendix 1 to Annex V of the La Paz Agreement,
which created the Joint Advisory Committee on the Air Quality Improvement for the El Paso –
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Ciudad Juárez – Doña County Air Quality Management Basin (JAC). Although it was not the
management district that the Task Force sought, the JAC was a significant victory for Paso del
Norte residents because it provided them with a legally recognized mechanism within which to
work as a binational community in matters of transboundary air pollution. In many ways, the
JAC became the next evolution of the epistemic community created by the Task Force. It served
as a binational coordinating body that effectuated policies and facilitated projects that improved
the region’s air quality and helped the air basin achieve compliance with air quality standards in
both countries.
Beyond the Paso del Norte air basin, there was a broader acknowledgement of the value
of the multisector engagement and the synergies created by the Task Force and subsequently the
JAC. This model of frontera-based advocacy and involvement became the new standard for
border environmental governance. In 2003, the US and Mexico adopted the Border 2012
program- a plan that incorporated a frontera-based approach that focused on the environmental
needs of border residents. The Border 2012 program featured multi-stakeholder task forces for
water, air, solid waste and other areas of environmental management that resembled the JAC.
The Border 2020 program contained this same task force structure, as does the current Border
2025 program. These task forces and working groups representing sister communities along the
border have informed the binational environmental project priorities adopted by the U.S. EPA
and Mexico’s SEMARNAP for almost two decades. The JAC structure was even suggested as a
viable model to address transboundary air pollution challenges in the Hong Kong-Guangdong
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region, where two governmental systems struggle to address air quality as well as multistakeholder inclusion.368
While this dissertation demonstrates that the JAC represented a significant transformation
in the way in which the U.S. and Mexican governments approached border environmental
governance, it is clear that this transformation addressed only one aspect of a complex problem.
This dissertation argues that the progress made in border environmental governance and policy
development did not translate into progress in federal appropriations. The decisions regarding
federal spending for border environmental infrastructure and regulatory enforcement were and
continue to be made thousands of miles away, where fronterizos have had limited input and
influence. For decades, border communities have lived with an inordinate and unjust burden of
trade-related pollution due to a misalignment of economic imperatives with the infrastructure
necessary to manage the demands of a globalized economy. In order to realize significant
change, the transformations in the border environmental policy process must be coupled with
sustained and targeted investment of federal resources in the critical infrastructure that addresses
the environmental and human health needs of fronterizos.
This dissertation adds a significant narrative to the border environmental historiography,
particularly as it relates to transboundary air resources and cross-border collaboration. It
demonstrates an inextricable connection between fronterizo identity and a community driven to
develop environmental solutions for its shared air basin. It documents the formation of a unique
and powerful epistemic community that forced the reframing of border environmental
governance. The concepts of fronterizo identity and epistemic communities each provide a
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promising framework for considering different areas of inquiry in borderlands research. In
environmental history, the concept of epistemic communities provides a particularly valuable
construct because of the interdisciplinary nature of that field. It is quite likely that epistemic
communities have existed in relation to other shared natural resources such as wetlands, aquifers,
forests, and migratory animals. Fronterizo identity is an appropriate framework for considering
problem solving across international boundaries. It is applicable in areas where cross-border
coalitions have materialized to address the critical needs of fronterizos, including public health
initiatives like vector control and the treatment of drug-resistant infectious diseases such as
tuberculosis.
Equally important, this dissertation serves as a reminder of the value in fronterizo
epistemic communities and their potential for problem solving. As fronterizos continue to
advocate for increased investment in the public infrastructure necessary to create livable
environments, they benefit from the precedent established by the Task Force and the JAC for
binational collaboration and deployment of innovative transboundary pollution abatement tools.
With the challenges of continued population growth and the threats of climate change upon us,
policy tools such as the international emissions reduction credits (IERCs) and international
supplemental environmental projects (ISEPs) serve as a ready instruments that leverage limited
pollution abatement resources.
For the Paso del Norte region and the Brownsville, Texas/Matamoros, Tamaulipas sister
cities, two border communities which are facing worsening air quality and are on the brink of
non-attainment status, the IERCs and ISEPs may be instrumental in reducing emissions.369 They
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enable companies, communities, and regulators to bring critical resources like utility
connections, paved roads, and trash disposal services that would significantly reduce pollution
sources to those low-income communities that are most exposed to high levels of air pollutants.
As we learned from the experience of the JAC, these non-traditional tools require significant
leadership from fronterizos in the public and private sector on both sides of the border. They also
require a shift in environmental policy from a focus on the typical jurisdiction-bound pollution
control solutions to transboundary projects that create the most efficient and cost effective
pollution reductions while markedly improve the quality of life for residents on both sides of the
border.
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Glossary of Abbreviations
CAPUFE - Caminos y Puentes Federales
CO – carbon monoxide
EDF – Environmental Defense Fund
EPCCHED - El Paso City County Health and Environmental District
FEMAP - Federacion Mexicana de Asociaciones Privadas de Salud y Desarrollo Communitario
FTA – Foreign Trade Association, also El Paso Foreign Trade Association
HAPs – hazardous air pollutants
IAQMD – International Air Quality Management District
INE – Instituto Nacional de Ecologia
INFONAVIT - Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores
NGO – non-governmental organization
NOx – nitrogen oxides
PDNAQTF – Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force
PM-10 – particulate matter with inhalable particles that measure 10 microns in diameter or less
PROFEPA – Procuraduria Federal de Proteccion Ambiental
SEDESOL - Secretaría de Desarrollo Social
SEDUE - Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia
SEMARNAP – Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca
SRE – Mexico’s Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, counterpart to U.S. Department of State
TNRCC – Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission
TACB – Texas Air Control Board
TCEQ - Texas Commission of Environmental Quality
U.S. EPA – United States Environmental Protection Agency
VOCs – volatile organic compounds
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